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PREFACE
Preparation for membership of the European Union follows the same
procedure for every candidate country. During long and arduous negotia-
tions the acquis communautaire of the Union is compared with the
relevant national legislation and an assessment is made as to the capacity
of the national institutions of the prospective Member State to fulfil the
obligations incumbent upon them following accession. In the course of this
process, provisions with politically sensitive implications are duly con-
sidered and time-limited concessions are sometimes made to allow for a
smooth transition in particular policy areas, both in old and new Member
States. But it is generally agreed that such concessionary phasing-in
arrangements should not entail permanent exceptions imperilling the unity
and consistency of Union legislation.  
There is little doubt that the recent negotiation round has been fruitful in
spurring many institutional and legislative changes in the candidate
countries, thereby helping to strengthen the structural conditions for future
economic growth. Nevertheless, this transitory stage has been essentially
one of adaptation to rules initiated and developed in other countries. 
Having graduated from this trying preparatory process, the countries in
“the class of 2004” are now full-fledged members of the European Union,
with equal rights to participate in the policy process shaping its future.
This implies a quality leap in their political status. From having been
“policy takers”, bound to adapt to the policy legacy of EU15, the new
Member States will now also be “policy makers”, taking full part in the
collective deliberations concerning the further development of this acquis.   
This raises a set of new questions about the future design of Structural and
Cohesion Policy. There is a wealth of previous work in this policy area,
particularly in the huge body of ex-ante, mid-term and ex-post studies of
particular programmes and interventions. This inquiry, however, attempts
to present a new and critical perspective of the issue by focusing on the
perspectives of the new-comers. In a collaborative effort, researchers from
independent institutes in five Central European countries seek to assess the
experience of pre-accession support and the official position of each
country in the membership negotiations. They also present their own
evaluations of the fit between the current policy proposals for the next
Financial Perspective and the particular needs and priorities of their
respective countries.  
The study contains contributions from the following institutes:
• Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS),
Latvia
• Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Poland
• EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Czech Republic
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• Institute of Slovak and World Economy of Slovak Academy of
Sciences (ISWE SAS), Slovakia
• Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
(IWE), Hungary
• Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), Sweden
• Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw), Austria
Each author participates in his or her own capacity. As editors, we introduce
the volume (chapters 1 and 2) and seek to draw our own conclusions from
the views presented by the contributors (chapter 9).
With the decision on the next Financial Perspective still pending, we
believe that it is an auspicious moment to draw attention to viewpoints in
the new Member States. SIEPS and the editors would like to thank the
researchers and support staff of all the participating institutes for their
committed efforts and excellent cooperation.
September 2005
Jonas Eriksson, Bengt O. Karlsson and Daniel Tarschys
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PARTICIPATING INSTITUTES
Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies, BICEPS, is a
research centre, web site http://www.biceps.org, aimed at undertaking and
promoting high quality policy-oriented economic research in the Baltic
States. Recent projects done at BICEPS include: a growth accounting study
of the Baltic states, bridging research and policy in the Baltic states, and an
Interreg IIIB project on investment strategies for the three Baltic capitals.
BICEPS has hosted several international conferences and organises regular
academic and applied seminars. BICEPS together with SSE Riga publishes
Baltic Economic Trends which reports on new research and policy issues in
the Baltic States together with an update of economic developments. 
Center for Social and Economic Research, CASE, is an independent, non-
profit international research and advisory institute based in Warsaw deal-
ing with European integration, transition countries and the global economy
issues. CASE has performed extensive comparative research in the macro-
and microeconomic fields, including international trade, financial markets
and labour markets, agricultural markets, structural and social policies. A
special attention in research has been given to economic modelling and
forecasting of diverse market components, including: inflation, growth, in-
vestments, raw material prices, agricultural policies and financial markets.
CASE publishes on regular basis forecasting quarterlies in Poland (“Polish
Economic Outlook – Trends, Analyses, Forecasts”). CASE also carries 
ut extensive publishing activities through regular series, such as Studies
and Analysis, Reports, two Book series, and many other occasional policy
papers. CASE has in cooperation with other research centres coordinated
and completed over 80 research projects and 100 advisory projects,
financed chiefly from foreign sources (EU, World Bank, UNDP, USAID,
Open Society Institute). The CASE network includes more than 100 highly
experienced and qualified researchers and experts from the EU, Central
and Eastern Europe and the CIS region.
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy was founded in 1998 as a civic
association on the initiative of the lecturers at the Department of European
Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague.
The aim was to provide a platform for young researchers and university
students interested in various aspects of European integration to develop
their potential and capacity. EUROPEUM was built with a strong support
of Faculty of Social Sciences and the Tempus programme of the European
Commission. Over the past few years, it has evolved into a full-fledged
think-tank that undertakes programme, project, publishing and training
activities related to the European integration matters. In this respect, the
organisation was re-named into EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
to reflect more on the activities that it deals with. 
Institute for World Economics, IWE, as part of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, carries out research and formulates policy recommendations on
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their present and future impact on the Hungarian economy. In addition, it
sets out to contribute to international research through co-operation with
top research institutes throughout the world. Since the beginning of the
1990s, economic integration in general, and that of Hungary into the
European Union in particular have been in the focus of its research
activity.
Institute of Slovak and World Economy at the Slovak Academy of Sciences,
ISWE SAS, conducts basic and applied economic research with particular
regard to solving the real economic problems of the Slovak economy. In
the field of basic research the institute pursues accumulation and
enlargement of economic knowledge in the particular fields, which are
relevant for solving the economic problems of Slovakia in the present
development period. The institute is forming the theoretical basis for
conceptual solving of specific economic problems and tries to contribute
to rising of overall economic knowledge in Slovakia.
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, SIEPS, conducts and pro-
motes research, evaluations, analyses and studies of European policy
issues, with a focus on the following areas: economics and trade, political
science and law. The research is conducted within three broad headings:
power and democracy; the external dimensions of the European Union;
and consequences of EU policies. SIEPS considers it important to broaden
and intensify research on matters that are significant for the future
development of the European Union. The objective is to develop well-
functioning cooperation with institutions in Sweden and other countries
that are already engaged in research on European issues. SIEPS is seeking
to act as a link between the academic world and decision-makers at various
levels. By publishing reports, arranging seminars, as well as through
debates in the media, SIEPS hopes to further stimulate research on the
future of Europe.
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw, was established
in 1973 as an independent research institute and is a non-profit organiza-
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forecasting economic developments in the countries of Central, East and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The accession of eight Central and East European Member States to the
European Union (EU) in 2004 added both new participants and a new
dimension to the European Cohesion Policy (ECP). While EU membership
had been preceded by lengthy negotiations on the terms of accession, the
new members’ influence on Cohesion Policy was mainly restricted to
adjustments and phasing-in and there was little room for questioning the
policy as such.
The present study reverses the perspective: having been presented more or
less with a fait accompli with respect to regional policy prior to accession,
full membership in the EU implies that the new members will go from
being “policy takers” to becoming “policy makers”. In this study we
discuss to what extent the present and proposed Cohesion Policy is
compatible with their needs and preferences. 
Researchers from five research institutes in respectively the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia have been asked to
examine their country’s experience from the pre-accession support; to de-
scribe wishes and controversies that arose during the accession negotia-
tions; to examine the problems posed by the present and proposed Cohe-
sion Policy; and, most importantly, to single out the priorities that would
prevail if the Member States themselves had full national control over the
European Cohesion Policy.
While the ultimate aim of the Cohesion Policy is to further economic and
social cohesion between the Union’s regions, economic growth is often
concentrated around “growth poles”. Ample evidence of such concentra-
tion exists, particularly in the fast growing Central and East European
Countries (CEEC) where growth is concentrated to the capital city regions.
Regional disparities, which are much more pronounced in the new
Member States than in the EU15, deepened as economic growth took off
in the 1990s. Hence there appears to be an implied contradiction inherent
in the Cohesion Policy between national cohesion on the one hand and
regional cohesion on the other.
The experience and lessons learned from the pre-accession instruments
Although it is fair to say that the pre-accession support has had positive
effects in the new Member States, it is also true that the instruments have
had varying impact in the respective countries. For example, the in-
struments have not prepared Latvia fully for the use of the Structural
Funds and in Poland the programmes were inadequate, even though they
seem to have had some effect. Another telling example is Hungary, where
the emphasis on environmental aspects regarding infrastructural invest-
ments under ISPA implied prioritisations that were not in accord with
Hungarian preferences: the EU showed reluctance to co-finance major
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highway projects, preferring railway modernisation instead. However, this
was in large part an exception to the rule, albeit an important one, as the
overall experience with ISPA in Hungary has been positive.
Another common problem in the five countries was the lack of national
influence on the pre-accession programmes. Domestic authorities were
consulted rather than playing an active role in the process. The upshot of
this was a situation where the main concern became not to forego any of
the funds available from the EU.
More importantly, however, the experiences from the pre-accession
instruments have revealed a number of institutional, managerial and
administrative shortcomings at the receiving end. Moreover, there are clear
indications that most of those problems have not yet been resolved and
will remain for a considerable period of time. One might therefore draw
the conclusion that resources will have to be set aside for continued
administrative and legislative reform, coupled with training and education
at several levels. Unless these improvements take place the transition from
policy takers to policy makers will be very difficult. 
The present Cohesion Policy
The conditionality of the present Cohesion Policy – and indeed of the
proposed future policy – implies a number of aspects that are particularly
problematic for the new Member States. First, there is an obvious goal
conflict between the Maastricht criteria – i.e., exchange rate stability, low
budget deficits and low inflation and interest rates – and the co-financing
requirements. This having been said, this conflict may have a positive side
effect in that it can force governments in the new members to carry out
much needed budget reforms. Second, there is a conflict between the aim
to decentralise management and implementation of ECP-funded projects
on the one hand and the required formalities for project preparation,
proposals and reimbursement on the other. The amount of documentation
attached to a project proposal is immense, creating problems through an
extra workload that is further aggravated by the EU disbursement and
reimbursement procedures. As funds are reimbursed late in the project
cycle severe liquidity crises may arise for small enterprises or municip-
alities, who may also have difficulties in accessing the banking system.
Moreover, there are also problems that have long accompanied EU regional
policy and that are not only visible in the new members today but remain
in the European Commission’s proposal for the future Cohesion Policy.
The complex design of the policy may create a situation with too many
instruments for too many objectives, leading in turn to confusion regarding
means and ends. Generally, efficiency is achieved when there is one in-
strument for one goal. The omnipresence and multifinality of the European
Structural and Cohesion Policy are largely responsible for the “making
16
sure no funds are foregone” attitude in the receiving countries. EU
transfers are a vital factor in successful membership and sustainable
modernisation, but at the end of the day they are instruments and not
objectives in themselves.
The future Cohesion Policy
The Country studies show that if the wishes of the new Member States
would prevail, objectives and priorities for the Cohesion Policy would be
quite different from the ones proposed. First, all Country Studies would like
to see more national control over the Cohesion Policy and a majority of
them have more or less indicated that they would see advantages in a
national approach, i.e., where the policy focuses on the least developed
countries rather than the least developed regions. According to this line of
reasoning, priority should be given to economic growth since the regional
imbalances can be seen as temporary and will decrease over time when
adequate economic reforms have been implemented. Second, there is an
overwhelming need to develop domestic human resources through education
and training at different levels. Human resource development is an invest-
ment that will not distort markets and will also allow the economy to grow
faster in the future without additional subsidies. Third, there is a need for
simplification and more flexibility, given the state of many of the regions in
the new Member States, both regarding administrative capacity and financi-
ally. Fourth, the limited possibilities for “cross-financing” in the Commis-
sion’s proposal also cause concern. A significant problem is that possible
synergy between projects financed under different objectives might get lost.
Another important aspect is the need for cooperation and coordination
between the new Member States. Even though this is pronouncedly
stronger in some chapters, it is evident that proper infrastructural condi-
tions are absolutely essential to facilitate growth. Furthermore, if the new
Member States are to reap the full benefit from their geographic location
infrastructural coordination and cooperation are vital.
Conclusions
The study arrives at the following conclusions:
• The pre-accession support has helped to prepare for EU membership,
but it has also revealed institutional shortcomings that to a large extent
will remain and will have to be dealt with in the future. Resources are
needed for continued administrative and legislative reform as well as
training and education at several levels.
• Focus should lie on the special needs of the new Member States and
more national control over the Cohesion Policy should be allowed.
Targeting divergences between Member States rather than between
regions would probably both satisfy net payers and give the receiving
countries increased control and influence over the policy. 
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• Human resource development and institution-building should be the
overriding priorities. While being one of the most important factors
for long-term growth, welfare and cohesion, human resource
development implies a considerable and rapid lift in managerial,
administrative and technical levels in the short run. Institution-
building of course is already one of the main objectives of the
European Cohesion Policy and this phase is not yet over in the new
Member States. Even if considerable progress has been made and
there are many successful projects to report, it is clear that the
administrative and managerial capacity, particularly at regional and
local levels, still leaves a lot to wish for. This could become a major
obstacle for a successful implementation of the future European
Cohesion Policy.
• Cooperation and coordination between the new Member States is
vital. Investments that emphasise the principle of coordination
between Member States would be more efficient than national
infrastructure programmes which are often designed and implemented
in line with narrow national interests.
• Simplification and more flexibility are desirable, not least because of
the conflict in simultaneously fulfilling the convergence criteria and
the co-financing requirements. There is a genuine dissatisfaction with
what is felt to be unnecessary bureaucracy and mistrust on the part of
the Commission and also a perceived lack of understanding for the
special conditions of the new Central European Member States. The
situation calls for maximum flexibility and provides yet another
argument for taking a national approach to the future European
Cohesion Policy.
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1 ENLARGEMENT AND COHESION: THE ISSUES
Daniel Tarschys and Jonas Eriksson
1.1 Introduction
The accession of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia to the EU on 1 May 2004
represents an impressive historic achievement but also an unprecedented
challenge.
The enlargement is first and foremost a political process, breaking down
barriers in Europe and paving the way for an “ever closer union” between
its peoples. It is fuelled by the yearning for peace, security and stability.
But enlargement is also an economic process, and the prospects for
growing prosperity have always been a powerful motive for entry into the
Union. Throughout the new Member States (NMS) there are high
expectations as to the material returns from the step just taken. This
presents a dilemma for policy-makers who are very much aware that many
of the effects of memberships are mainly structural and long-term but who
also feel the pressure from their electorates to deliver short-term results.
Historically, every national campaign for membership has contained an
element of “over-sell” which is likely to generate some disenchantment in
the aftermath of accession. In this situation, there is inevitably a strong
interest in the size of the specific cash flows between the EU and its
Member States. The immediate success of the accession and the dexterity
of national negotiators are gauged by their ability to “bring home the
bacon”. With agricultural policy virtually locked for the next ten years, a
lot of attention is paid to Cohesion Policy which every Member State, old
and new, tends to examine with an eye to its own net position.
Easy to measure, the cash flows offer apparently precise quantitative in-
dicators of the impact of EU membership. Other sequels are more intang-
ible, or more long-term, or more difficult to attribute to the very accession.
Many consequences of European integration are linked to institutional and
legal changes, increased mobility and the benefits of expanding markets
and foreign investments. All of these developments need to be taken into
account when it comes to assessing whether we attain the goal set in 2003,
when the European Council stated that “making a success of enlargement
remains the key priority for the years to come” (CEU 2003, p. 7).
Enlargement has led to significantly greater disparities within the EU. Even
though economic growth on average has been stronger in the Central and
East European Countries (CEEC) over the last decade – implying that there
is some economic convergence – GDP per capita differences between new
and old Member States are still substantial. This situation will be even more
accentuated by the likely accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the
very year that the next Financial Perspective will come into force.
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In February 2004, three months before the enlargement, the European
Commission (henceforth the Commission) presented its proposal for the
Financial Perspective for the years 2007-2013. This proposal was
accompanied by the Third Cohesion Report, which outlined the Commis-
sion’s proposal for the future European Structural and Cohesion Policy
(ECP).
1
The budget proposal implied an increase in the EU budget by 31
per cent by 2013 compared to 2006, while the proposed new guidelines for
Cohesion Policy shift the focus of EU regional policy in important areas.
The implications of the two documents and the positions of the respective
Member States in the Financial Perspective and ECP reform debate will be
discussed below. Needless to say, the future Cohesion Policy and the 2007-
2013 Financial Perspective will have important consequences regarding
both revenues and expenditures, for new as well as old Member States.
Taking into account the fact that EU25 has an additional number of lagg-
ing regions and at the same time a lower aggregate per capita income than
EU15, the stage is set for an active debate on the future of the European
Cohesion Policy.
In the views of Bachtler and Wishlade (2004), there are mainly three
aspects that underline the need for a Cohesion Policy reform. First, the
enlargement brought with it a doubling of the socio-economic disparities
and decreased the average EU GDP per capita by 12.5 per cent (COM
2004) while, at the same time, the economic and social problems remain in
the regions that now face a scaling down of assistance from the Structural
Funds. Second, the progress made in the Lisbon Strategy, as described in
detail in the Kok Report (Kok et al. 2004),2 has thus far been a disappoint-
ment. Third, a number of institutional changes are underway which imply a
shift of emphasis for the ECP.
A fourth aspect may be added which will constitute the point of departure
for this study. When the new Member States negotiated their terms of
accession, their influence over the European Cohesion Policy was limited.
What was open to discussion was mainly a set of modalities for adjustment
and phasing-in, but there was no room for questioning the principal para-
meters of the policy package. The candidates met a ready-made model
which had evolved from earlier stages in European integration. In fact, in
several different stages.
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1 We will use the terms Structural Policy and Cohesion Policy interchangeably throughout this
study, without making any distinction as regards the meaning of the two concepts. However,
the study predominantly addresses the contents of the new budget heading, Sustainable
Development, in the Commission’s proposal for the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective,
in particular the heading “Cohesion for growth and employment” (see table 2.1 in chapter 2).
2 The report concluded that although external events had been unfavourable to growth in the
EU Member States, the Member States themselves were also responsible for the slow
progress by failing to act on the Lisbon Strategy. The report also called for greater
involvement at the regional and local levels. See also COM (2005a) for the mid-term review
of the Lisbon Strategy.
While some elements in the present Cohesion Policy may be traced back to
the very first decades of European integration, its most significant parts
were developed in the 1980s in conjunction with the key decisions on the
internal market and the monetary union. Other important provisions were
added in connection with previous accessions, starting with the UK and
Ireland and continuing with the entry of first Spain and Portugal and then
Austria, Finland and Sweden. Further elements were added with the
perspective of Eastern enlargement, particularly the allocation absorption
cap of four per cent of a Member States’ GDP.
3
Even though the
absorption cap applies in all Member States, it is “only likely to bite in the
new Member States” (Bachtler and Wishlade 2004, p. 23).
While it is easy to grasp the importance of formulating a successful ECP in
the perspective of the new Member States, it is essential that the ECP
promotes growth rather than alters the natural growth path expected from
countries with initially low GDP per capita levels. Taking into account the
historic evolution and outcome of the ECP, there is every reason to carefully
evaluate the consequences of simply extending the present system to the
new Member States, especially the CEEC Member States (CEECMS). By
focusing on five of the CEECMS, this collaborative project involving
researchers from two old and five new Member States will attempt to give
new insights into the expected effects of the ECP in its current shape and
form on the respective CEECMS economies. It will also suggest possible
modifications of the present policy with the view of making it better
adapted to the needs of the new Member States.
1.2 Objective and framework
The ECP purports to make a genuine and positive contribution to cohesion
in the EU. As we will see below, however, it has to be recognised that
although the ECP may come to play a crucial role in EU27, unresolved
issues remain in both its structure and in the formulation of its objectives.
As noted, the new Member States landed in a policy framework formulated
and decided long before they could assert any influence on its foundations.
With the insight that regional disparities widened after the enlargement, it
begs the question: how is an optimal European Cohesion Policy designed
in the perspective of the new Member States?
The present collaborative project seeks to disentangle this complex
problem. In addition to the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
(SIEPS) and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(wiiw), five renowned research institutes in Czech Republic (EUROPEUM
Institute for European Policy), Hungary (Institute for World Economics of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, IWE), Latvia (Baltic International
Centre for Economic Policy Studies, BICEPS), Poland (Center for Social
21
3 For a survey of the evolution of EU Structural Policy, see Tarschys (2003).
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and Economic Research, CASE) and Slovakia (Institute of Slovak and
World Economy, ISWE SAS) have agreed to address a common set of
questions. The problem formulation has been designed so that the first
three questions give a natural introduction to the last, and most important,
question as to how a future European Cohesion Policy should be designed
to best suit the new Member States.
First, it is reasonable to assume that some implications of the effects of the
European Cohesion Policy on the new Member States can be derived from
the experience of the use of the pre-accession instruments.4 Even though
the pre-accession assistance differs from the ECP in important aspects, the
similarities between them increased as accession drew nearer. The experi-
ence of the pre-accession support can also serve to indicate possible future
problems of Cohesion Policy in the new Member States, in terms of its
benefits and drawbacks regarding implementation. The first objective of
the national contributions is therefore to describe what experience the
particular country has had of the pre-accession EU assistance.
A second indication of how the Cohesion Policy can be improved may be
derived from the various positions and wishes expressed in the accession
process. The entry of the ten new Member States crowned a long period of
arduous negotiations about the terms of their accession, closing chapter
after chapter in an extensive catalogue of requirements. Even though there
may have existed many differences of opinions in each and every candidate
country, articulated in a variety of domestic political promises – e.g., due to
the influence of internal pressure groups – a reasonable assumption is that
the consolidated official positions were based on well founded consider-
ations of how to optimally design Cohesion Policy from each country’s
point of view. Hence the second objective is to single out and describe
which questions and controversies arose in the accession negotiations. 
Third, the conditionality of the Cohesion Policy may influence national
policies. In particular, the method of “matching funding” may cause
modification of policy objectives and, coupled with the amount of red tape
involved in European regional policy, give rise to budgetary strain.5 Re-
gardless of whether this is a serious problem, the pros and cons of the
present framework have to be evaluated and balanced against the need for
assistance, on the one hand, and the principle of additionality and the need
for evaluation and monitoring, on the other. The objective is thus to
4 The pre-accession instruments are PHARE (strengthen public administration, promote
convergence with the acquis and promote economic and social cohesion), ISPA
(the pre-accession equivalent to the Cohesion Fund) and SAPARD
(the pre-accession equivalent to the Common Agricultural Policy, CAP).
5 Assistance from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund must be co-financed by the
Member States. The idea behind this so called “additionality” is that EU regional policy
should complement, rather than reduce, a Member State’s own regional policy efforts. This
presents the new Member States with a specific problem, an issue that we will return to on
numerous occasions in this study.
examine whether the policy in its current shape causes problems as regards
its design.
This brings us to the essential problem to be examined in this study: the
future of the European Cohesion Policy in the new Member States. The
institutes have worked along the lines of a scenario where the country
under scrutiny may dispose freely of the sum foreseen for it in the
Commission’s 2007-2013 Financial Perspective. Given its own priorities
for national development, how would these resources be used?
This opens up several matters to consider. First of all, an examination of
which priorities will prevail has to be undertaken. Second, consideration
must be given to relations between different targets and ambitions. Though
the European Cohesion Policy is sometimes presented as a single-objective
policy intended to promote “cohesion”, it has in effect a much more
complex goal structure and the relationship between its multiple objectives
may be construed in several different ways. To offer but one example:
while some measures may promote both growth and intra-national con-
vergence, others (such as investments in transport infrastructure close to
the capital) may promote national growth while also leading to greater
inter-regional disparities, at least in the short run.
Given the specific needs of the respective countries examined, how should
the system be designed in order to function optimally from each Member
States’ point of view? This will be the main focus of this study.
1.3 Basic outline of the study
The next chapter gives a brief account of the design and impact of the
ECP; describes and discusses the causes that underlie the need for a Euro-
pean regional policy; and provides an overview of the present reform
debate. The third chapter presents an overview of regional developments of
the new Member States and two of the candidate countries, Bulgaria and
Romania, with respect to income and growth disparities; compares
measures of regional disparities for the NMS with those of the EU15;
analyses differences across regions in terms of the distribution of foreign
direct investment and of infra-structural facilities; and examines a number
of “problem regions”.
In chapters 4 to 8, the respective institutes respond to the problem for-
mulation outlined in the beginning of the first chapter. Chapter 4 examines
the case of Poland, chapter 5 Hungary, chapter 6 the Czech Republic,
chapter 7 Slovakia and chapter 8 Latvia.
Finally, the ninth chapter summarises and analyses the main findings of the
respective country studies. On the basis of the results, the chapter will aim
at drawing certain conclusions for the future of European Structural and
Cohesion Policy.
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2 COHESION POLICY – RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
Jonas Eriksson
2.1 Regional policy in the EU – need, logic and rationale
The economic and social differences and the territorial imbalances
prevailing in the Union today are seemingly sufficient reasons for a
European regional policy. However, a number of aspects should be
considered before we accept this argument, all of which will be dealt with
in the remainder of this section.
First, we need to get a better picture of what is meant by economic and
social disparities. The European Cohesion Policy predominantly addresses
issues of economic efficiency, income levels and employment, but the
choice of indicators to use for measuring regional inequalities is not at all
obvious. Second, there is a need to show what constitutes the optimal level
– regional, national or supranational – from which to conduct and imple-
ment specific factors of regional policy. Finally, and most importantly,
sending money into a region may have adverse effects. Obviously, the
Structural Policy should not strive toward goals that offset each other.
2.1.1Regional disparities in the Union
Troublesome as they might appear in reported statistics, disparities
between regions may be understated or overstated depending on how they
are measured. For example, the indicator used as a basis for assistance
from the Structural Funds is GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Stan-
dards (PPS). However, further distinctions are desirable. One might argue
that the optimal indicator should not only take into account the cost of
living in the various regions, but also taxes, transfers and public expend-
itures, as well as private capital flows (Tarschys 2003a). Emigrants often
come to the aid of relatives in impoverished areas by sending them part of
their salaries earned in richer areas and remittances make up a consider-
able part of the resources available for consumption in some regions (and
extra-EU countries).6
However, although gaps within the EU may be exaggerated, it is certainly
clear that significant regional disparities exist and that the disparities have
been further pronounced, to say the least, after the most recent enlarge-
ment. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania – and the possible future
accession of Croatia, other Balkan countries and Turkey – will not improve
the picture. The third chapter, which delves deeper into the economic and
social situation in the EU25, provides ample evidence of the extent of the
problem. 
6 Not surprisingly, these arguments have been brought forward by EUROCITIES, a network
that consists of the larger European cities; see, for example, Häupl (2003).
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The determinants of regional disparities have been studied from many
angles and by scholars in several disciplines. The approaches to it span a
wide spectrum from exclusively economic to predominantly cultural.
Regarding the economic determinants, it is possible to single out at least
four basic, but intertwining, elements (see Begg 2003):
1. There might be a lack of development in many regions because of the
existence of large agricultural sectors and the lack of an industrialisa-
tion process with large scale industries.
2. Less developed areas tend to be geographically remote and, accord-
ingly, transportation costs are high.
3. As new regions emerge, agents of industries meet competition they are
unable to counter and therefore experience a loss of competitiveness.
4. Economic integration may result in the agglomeration of industries,
further reinforcing the lack of development when removal of barriers
leads to economic concentration in border areas.
There are also factors that add to the problem indirectly such as the aging
population in the EU and, particularly in the CEECMS, the marked
slowdown in the population growth. The CEECMS are forecasted to ex-
perience negative population growth in the future.7 Since major cities and
capitals tend to attract the younger and better educated part of the popula-
tion, it may further accentuate regional polarization. Thus, as it is clear that
all the above listed factors are present in the Union today, the endeavour to
reduce regional disparities might be viewed as justified.
2.1.2The Cs: Convergence, Competitiveness and Cohesion
Although the concept of “economic and social cohesion” is mentioned in
the Treaty of Rome, it was practically forgotten until refreshed and put in
use by the Delors Commission in the 1980s. As such, “cohesion” is inter-
twined with the concept of “convergence”. Allegedly, the ECP will boost
growth and employment, i.e., promote convergence between regions, which
in turn will lead to greater cohesion in the Union.
It has to be recognised, however, that the connection between growth and
the reduction of real income disparities is complex. Taking into account
that, according to the Commission’s proposal, the ECP should not only
reduce income disparities, but also promote employment, sustainable
development and, most notably, increase the EU’s competitiveness, further
complications are added to the equation. We will therefore devote some
space to discuss, in turn, convergence, competitiveness and cohesion. Our
discussion should not be seen as an attempt to exhaust the issue, but more
as a need to be aware of the pitfalls of the phrases invoked in the discus-
sion of the future ECP.
7 See, for example, forecasts from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004).
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Convergence
By convergence, according to the standard neo-classical model, we mean a
process of higher growth in countries with comparatively lower capital to
labour ratios, i.e., countries that have a lower GDP per capita level should
grow faster than richer countries. This is in the economic literature known
as “-convergence”. However, the relationship between -convergence and
the dispersion of real per capita incomes, or “-convergence”, is less than
clear-cut: it can be shown that -convergence is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for -convergence, i.e., there may be -convergence but
no -convergence.
Moreover, different theoretical models produce very different results.
According to one theory, initial regional imbalances may be enhanced by
the integration process (Myrdal 1957).8 The idea is that regions with a
highly skilled labour force tend to attract more R&D investments while
such investments in turn attract skilled labour. Highly skilled workers
therefore tend to move away from less productive areas.9 In the celebrated
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models, by contrast, the integration process
will cause convergence through an equalisation of factor returns when
barriers to trade are removed.10
Arguments that emanate from new economic geography (see, for example,
Krugman and Venables 1995) further add to the complexity of the regional
policy domain. In these models, economies of scale are a source of
concentration of production. If transport costs (real transport costs or
artificial transport costs such as customs or other costs of crossing a
border) are high, each country will only produce enough to serve its own
market. If costs fall, the gains from economies of scale can be realised by
concentrating the production. It will be most profitable to concentrate
production to the largest market since this minimises total transport costs –
and wages may therefore be higher. However, if transportation costs
continue to fall, it is less important to produce in the large market and a
wage difference between countries will not be sustainable. In the first case,
a lowering of transportation costs through integration may lead to
divergence in real incomes between countries; in the second case to con-
vergence.
The Commission’s Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion reco-
gnises that there may be a trade-off between national and regional converg-
8 This is called circular and cumulative causation; see Myrdal (1957).
9 Myrdal (1957) therefore recommended active regional policies to promote “spread effects”,
for example through FDI or development funds; see also Martin (2003).
10 It should be noted that this equalisation rests on the assumptions of constant returns to
scale, no market distortions and perfect mobility of production factors; see, for example,
Markusen et al. (1995). Convergence may also result from the “the life-cycle of the
product” model; see Molle (2001).
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ence in the first stages of catching up, especially because of agglomeration
effects. A telling example is Ireland, which has experienced high national
growth and a strong concentration of economic activities on Dublin whilst
regional disparities in the three other “cohesion countries” have largely
remained at the same levels. Even though the third cohesion report points
out that “the extent to which a trade-off of this kind exists depends in part
on the spatial distribution of economic activity and of settlements across
the country in question” (COM 2004b, p. 149), the observation seems less
relevant for the new Member States where the spatial distribution of
economic activity was often decided by the central planning authority (see,
for instance, chapters 6 and 7).
While economists still struggle with the problem of explaining the concept
of economic growth, there is agreement that growth is conditional on what
is often referred to as “technological progress”, that is to say, improve-
ments in the production process that enhance productivity. In other words,
supply side factors that improve the production process improve a
country’s (or region’s) long term growth. However, the phrase “techno-
logical progress” should be interpreted in the widest sense. It could imply,
for example, both methods of production and effects from individual or
corporate networks (Eliasson and Westerlund 2003). Similarly, economists
have come some way in their search for an environment that facilitates a
maximum outcome from different growth factors. Above all, empirical
studies11 point at factors such as investments in physical and human capital
(education and research) in the context of a stable political environment,
institutions such as property rights, and the absence of barriers to trade.12
Competitiveness
A related distinction as made above regarding -convergence and -con-
vergence can also be made regarding “competitiveness”. As pointed out by
Martin (2003), there is no clear link between microeconomic and macro-
economic competitiveness. In fact, Krugman (1994, p. 41) goes so far as to
say that competitiveness in the macroeconomic sense is little more than
saying productivity13 and that the search for macroeconomic competi-
11 In the sensitivity analyses carried out by Levine and Renelt (1992), only three out of 50
variables survived the tests: initial GDP per capita, physical investments as a share of GDP
and human capital. A similar, though less strict, analysis by Sala-i-Martin (1997), gave 22
out of 58 statistically significant variables, among others the three mentioned variables and
institutional circumstances such as a country’s geographic position. This suggests that
regional policy in remote areas may benefit from a focus on reallocation, rather than active
measures that aim to promote economic growth.
12 Barriers in the sense discussed here include barriers to goods, services, labour and capital.
One should also mention here that the integration process, which has removed numerous
obstacles, may in fact have played the prominent role where convergence between countries
and between regions has been observed.
13 Adding, perhaps, the condition of low inflation.
tiveness is a “dangerous obsession” that “distort[s] economic policies”.
Furthermore (Krugman 2003, p. 30),
[t]he idea that a country’s economic fortunes are largely determined by its
success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a
practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. That is, it is simply
not the case that the world’s leading nations are to any important degree in
economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic
problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets.
If there is any distinction to be made between macroeconomic and regional
competitiveness, furthermore, the latter should arguably be the primary
concern with respect to European regional policy. Unfortunately, as Martin
(2003, p. 7-1) concludes,
[t]here is no single theoretical perspective that captures the full complexity of
the notion of ‘regional competitiveness’. The overview of both theoretical and
empirical literature confirms the […] notion that competitiveness is a difficult
and often confusing term – especially so at the regional level. The term
‘competitiveness’ often raises more questions than answers, perhaps one reason
why the term has only relatively recently infiltrated the language of macro-
economic theory and regional economics alike.
The concept of competitiveness rather becomes a question of outcome and,
as such, Martin (2003) argues that some lessons can be learned from the
empirical exercise carried out in his report. Above all, the report stresses
that regional policy makers should adopt measures that take into account
the stage of development in a particular region. That is to say, “there is no
‘one-size-fits-all policy’” (Martin 2003, p. 7-5). He uses a trisected typo-
logy divided into “Regions as production sites” (lower to medium income
levels), “Regions as sources of increasing returns” (high and sustainable
income levels) and “Regions as hubs of knowledge” (mainly major cities
and capitals, with relatively high wages), with different priorities depend-
ing on the type of region.14
Even though the typology and policy recommendations make sense on
many levels, the aftertaste of this discussion is a bit sour; and for two
reasons. First, because it is difficult to define regional competitiveness and,
second, because it is difficult to single out the factors that promote com-
petitiveness in regions that do not qualify for any of the three above cate-
gories, such as the least developed regions in the CEECMS.
Cohesion
The third concept, and the ultimate aim of European regional policy,
“cohesion”, is one which can be given a multitude of interpretations. As a
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14 In the first category policy makers should emphasise economic governance,
internationalisation and accessibility; in the second category innovation and
entrepreneurship; and, in the third category, more or less all four mentioned factors;
see Martin (2003).
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starting point, the Commission’s view on cohesion, here provided by Hall
et al. (2001, p. 5), distinguishes,
between inequalities between countries, and particularly between the so called
Cohesion Four (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the rest of the Union;
inequalities between regions within the EU; and inequalities between
individuals (“social cohesion”). […] Greater cohesion implies that incomes,
employment, and economic opportunities grow faster for groups in weaker
areas with low incomes than for groups in richer areas with high incomes.
An advantage of this definition is the exclusion of non-economic factors:
cohesion is improved when lagging regions, on all levels in the Union,
catch up with non-lagging regions, that is to say, they converge in the tra-
ditional sense by growing faster.
However, there are at least three drawbacks related to this line of reasoning:
1. As noted – and the essential point from much research on economic
growth – it is not at all clear whether the promotion of regional con-
vergence within Member States (or within the Union) with any
certainty will promote economic and social cohesion between the
Member States’ (or the Union’s) regions and/or between the Member
States, and vice versa.
2. The definition provided by Hall et al. (2001) may be too narrow, in
that it leaves out important aspects of the European integration
process. We return to this point below.
3. Convergence may also be attained by a decline in growth in higher
developed areas and less developed regions may in that sense still
“grow faster”. 
An alternative way of conceptualizing cohesion is to divide it into the four
categories economic, social, political and cultural cohesion (Tarschys
2003a). The point of departure is the idea that these four categories will
capture the essence of what creates, constitutes and maintains a political
community such as the nation state, or indeed, the European Union. It can
be argued that none will work without the other. That is to say, to achieve
the goals of economic and social cohesion, both political and cultural
cohesion are of the essence – and while economic growth can create the
need for social measures, political and cultural cohesion should be viewed
as a precondition for economic development.15 This perception of cohesion
may also be more in line with the perceived benefits (or “added value”) of
the Structural Funds as they are interpreted by the EU Member States and
programme management authorities, a point to which we will return in the
next section.
15 The list of characteristics in which the four concepts intertwine is long; see Tarschys
(2003a). The report also argues that far too little attention has been paid to political and
cultural cohesion, particularly the latter.
Even though the regional tension within Member States, with few
exceptions, has been accentuated in later years, implying that we have
moved farther away from cohesion in some parts of the Union, it would be
presumptuous to draw the conclusion that the ECP has failed to promote
economic and social cohesion in the EU. Tendencies to even further
divergence may have been counteracted. Furthermore, convergence has
taken place between the EU Member States and – although to a much
lesser extent – between the Union regions. However, the role and the
success of the ECP in this respect are unclear.
What the discussion boils down to – with special attention paid to the fast-
growing CEECMS, where we today are witnessing emerging growth poles
and increased regional disparities, that is to say, an indication of -con-
vergence without -convergence – is that the link between convergence,
competitiveness and cohesion is not self-evident. The supposition that the
three concepts are mutually supportive is questionable, especially in the
short run.
2.1.3 Rationale for policy: European added value
As argued by Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002, p. 349), there is
justification for regional policy when market forces move an economy in a
“direction that is not desirable in terms of either efficiency or welfare.”
Thus, the polarization at the regional level in the EU would according to
this argument justify active intervention. Notwithstanding the evidence of
marked regional disparities, however, a rationale for a regional policy on
the European level cannot be found in this fact alone. A European regional
policy should at the very least produce an outcome that transcends that
which can be accomplished at the national level.
Both the Commission and the EU Member States share the view that the
future European regional policy should maximise the added value of the
Structural Funds, particularly outside Objective 1 assistance.16 According to
one Commission document, regional policy is justified “when the actions
of Member States are not sufficient (the criterion of need) and when
benefits are generated for the entire Union (effectiveness criterion)” (COM
2004e, p. 1)
All the EU15 Member States have expressed appreciation of at least some
of the effects the Structural Funds have had in their respective countries.
For example, it has been pointed out that the ECP has improved strategic
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16 The bulk of the present ECP assistance is channelled through the Objectives 1, 2 and 3.
Objective 1 supports development in the less prosperous regions; Objective 2 supports the
revitalising of areas faced with structural difficulties that lead to high unemployment; and
Objective 3 supports the improvement of education, training and employment policies and
systems in regions not eligible under Objective 1 assistance; see, for example,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/index_en.htm.
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planning, development and evaluation at the regional level; that it has
facilitated more cooperation between regions and Member States; that it
has, in many cases, both improved regional cohesion and increased local
and regional employment; that it has made the EU more visible in the
respective Member States; and that it has brought added value from its role
as a bridge between richer and poorer regions in the Union (Bachtler and
Wishlade 2004).
As pointed out by the IQ-net, a network of analysts and practitioners
engaged in programme management authorities across Europe (Bachtler
and Wishlade 2004, p. 1),
[a]dded value is not a simple concept. It attempts to capture both the
quantitative impact and qualitative effects of the European Community con-
tribution to regional development through the Structural Funds, for example
with respect to the ‘Community method’ for implementing programmes. As
such, it entails considerable subjectivity.
The IQ-net has nevertheless made an attempt at summing up the added
value of the Structural Funds. The point of departure for their definition is
that added value is “something which has been enabled [with], or which
could not have been done [without], […] Community assistance” (Bachtler
and Wishlade 2004, p. 7).17
The concept of added value is in the report classified into five different
categories. The first category, Cohesion added value, is perhaps the most
obvious category: it is the added value that comes from the reduction of
economic and social disparities in the Union. We will discuss in some
detail the successfulness of the ECP in this respect in the next section.
Political added value concerns the visibility on several levels in the
Member States’ societies. Allegedly, support from the Structural Funds has
increased the support for European integration. However, while regional
beneficiaries may have become more positive in their attitudes toward both
the political and the economic integration process, scepticism against
further integration has remained or even increased in some of the regions
and countries that have received least support from the Structural Funds.
Increasing assistance from the Structural Funds to these Member States
would be difficult since they are among the richest in the EU. Thus,
political added value may certainly be considered a positive side-effect of
the ECP in supported areas; but any such gains, if weighed, would likely
weigh about the same as losses made in other areas.
Policy added value stems from the strategic improvements made as regards
regional policymaking. However, there is some disagreement as to whether
17 One should perhaps go so far as to say that added value is something which has been
enabled with, and could not have been done without, Community assistance.
the Structural Funds have altered policy priorities for the better or the
worse. The UK government in particular has expressed concern regarding
the latter (UK Treasury 2003). The argument is that the temptation to
receive financial support from the ECP may lead to policy distortions if
national or regional funds are diverted to co-financing projects that would
otherwise receive low priority.
Another form of added value comes from the partnership principle. This
operational added value first and foremost gives a better quality to regional
interventions. The spoke in the wheel seems to be the sheer amount of
bureaucracy involved, which is both costly and demanding. Again, the
mentioned position paper from the UK Treasury (2003) has expressed
concern of a deficient coordination of assistance at the regional, national
and supranational level.
Finally, learning added value is the encouragement of “[a]nalysis, reflec-
tion and learning […] through regulatory requirements placed on pro-
grammes to monitor and evaluate their activities” (Bachtler and Wishlade
2004, p. 4).
The EU Member States differ somewhat in their views on the added value
of the Structural Funds. The Greek government maintains the view that
“the added value of regional cohesion policies has already proven to be
highly significant” (cited in Bachtler and Taylor 2004, p. 4). The UK
Treasury (2003, p. 19), by contrast, has criticised the Structural Funds for
their “lack of flexibility” and goes so far as to claim that “it is not clear
that the use of Structural Funds adds significant value in comparison to
domestic initiatives.” However, this latter view mainly concerns the effects
of the Structural Funds in the UK regions, rather than in the Union as a
whole.
To evaluate the perceived added value of the Structural Funds in the
respective Member States, the positive effects concern above all co-
operation, learning, strategic planning and implementation efficiency. The
“detracted value” of the Structural Funds, on the other hand, is allegedly
related to distortions to national policy priorities; excessive bureaucracy
and costly management and implementation; and poor coordination
between supranational, national and regional levels. Even though it is fair
to say that, for rather obvious reasons, the net contributors are less positive
in their attitudes toward the ECP than are the beneficiaries, judging by its
proposal the Commission seems to have listened to the complaints voiced
by the former group of countries.
2.2 The impact of the policies in EU15
The ECP has made a number of positive contributions in the EU. As noted,
all of the EU15 Member States have expressed appreciation of at least
some of the effects the policy has had in their respective countries, even
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though there remain unresolved issues where the ECP may actually have
had a negative effect. There has been a long-standing concern of the
burden imposed on recipients through the specific conditionality of the
ECP. Moreover, there are many signs that the ECP suffers from goal
congestion, in that it strives towards fulfilling too many objectives
(Tarschys 2003b). This approach makes it difficult to evaluate and pin
down the real effects of the policy. As Wim Kok has said of the Lisbon
Process: “Lisbon is about everything and thus about nothing” (Kok et al.
2004, p. 16).
An issue that has already been touched upon is the paradox that may result
from regional interventions. The gains expected from a deepening of the
integration are principally related to a) structural change and a more
efficient allocation of resources and b) the accumulation of additional
resources (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002). The role of the ECP has
been to aid regions in the Member States to manage the transition process
when such structural change has occurred. However, regional measures
may also have unintended consequences, such as the distortion of local
markets.
Notwithstanding the allegations of policy alterations, excessive bureau-
cracy and goal congestion, empirical evidence on the outcome of the ECP
is mixed. On the one hand, indication of its results is witnessed by those
most affected by it. Reports by implementing authorities and organisations
that are involved in the programming impress upon us the great success of
the Structural Funds. These reports are complemented by evaluations
carried out by the Commission, above all the cohesion reports. The Third
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion concludes that GDP per capita
growth was higher in the Cohesion Four (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain) than the EU average, and that this was in no small part due to
Structural and Cohesion Funds assistance. According to the Commission’s
simulations, “GDP in real terms in 1999 was some 2.2% higher in Greece
than it otherwise would have been, while in Spain the figure was 1.4%, in
Ireland 2.8% and in Portugal, 4.7%” (COM 2004b, p. 148).
As regards Objective 1 assistance, which represents the bulk of the support
from the Structural Funds, the Commission claims that the assistance is
likely to lead to another 700,000 jobs created and that the faster growth
witnessed in the Objective 1 regions bears a positive relationship with
structural aid. In the case of the Objective 1 regions in Germany and Italy,
however, the report concludes that “growth seems to have been depressed
by low growth in the rest of the country” (COM 2004b, p. 148).
There are obvious drawbacks with these reports. The micro perspective
employed in the studies conducted by implementing authorities and or-
ganisations prevents the authors from discovering effects of the policy that
cannot be ascertained by examining specific sectors, areas or projects. For
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example, if the employment level increases in an area as a consequence of
funding, a serious examination of the effects will have to take into account
possible crowding out effects from higher wages.
The problem with the Commission’s reports is rather one of credibility:
one would like to express caution to those taking the estimates reported
above at face value.18 For example, in the Sapir report (Sapir et al. 2003, p.
60), in which a high-level study group under Professor André Sapir tries to
lay down the lines for future growth promoting policies in the Union, the
authors claim that,
[i]n practice, […] there is simply not enough relevant regional GDP data for
statistical procedures to distinguish the effects of cohesion policies in the
absence of data on other regional characteristics, such as initial income, human
capital, local industrial structures, quality of local administration, the peripheral
nature of the region, and of random influences. The net result is that it is not
possible to establish conclusively what the relative performance of these regions
would have been in the absence of EU cohesion policy and other policies.
The same report also examined the empirical outcome of the ECP. The
poor data quality notwithstanding, the authors concluded that the ECP had
played some role in boosting growth in the regions that had received
funding, but that (Sapir et al. 2003, p. 146),
during the catching-up process, increasing regional disparities within the poorer
countries may also emerge. However, this phenomenon may be mitigated by
national growth and could be eased by national rather than EU policies (such as
social transfer schemes, labour market and wage policy, etc).
The recommendation from this report was to focus on low-income
countries, rather than low income regions, and it goes on to suggest that
the future regional policy in this respect should have two objectives. First,
it should promote institution building, thus improving the administrative
capacity in Member States and, second, sustain “high investment rates in
human and physical capital” (Sapir et al. 2003, pp. 146-147).
There has also been research by independent students of European regional
policy, examining particularly the effects on industry location from integra-
tion. These surprisingly few papers tend to moderate the conclusions on
whether the ECP has been successful in its objectives. Midelfart-Knarvik
and Overman (2002) examine whether assistance from the Structural
Funds has facilitated structural change and whether the EU has been
successful in improving the functioning of state aid in its Member States.19
Their results indicate that the assistance has in fact acted counter to the
18 For a critique of the assertions in the cohesion reports; see Tarschys (2003a).
19 Articles 92-93 (Aids granted by States) of the EEC Treaty empower the Commission to
supervise state aid in the EU Member States. The purpose is to realise the full potential
of the common market and prevent Member States from giving aid that counteract these
forces.
36
first point, even though the Commission has been successful on the latter.
They find that the ECP has not been able to prevent regional polarization,
i.e., the ECP has been unsuccessful in delivering economic and social
cohesion. Furthermore, the most direct result of EU expenditure has been
the distortion of the location of R&D industries by attracting them into
areas without the proper endowment of high-skilled workers.
The authors argue that there is still a motive for a European regional policy.
If the aim is to improve the situation of people in the poorest regions in the
EU, they propose a strategy with three objectives. First, it should try to
focus support so that the poorer countries are helped in changing endow-
ments and specialise according to their comparative advantage. Second, the
policy should seek to ease this comparative advantage dispersion by remov-
ing factor price distortions. Third, labour mobility should be encouraged so
that the end result is an efficient location of both firms and production
factors (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002).20
A report from the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR; Brauner-
hjelm et al. 2000), examines the cases of Ireland and Italy (the Mezzo-
giorno region). The historic outcome of regional policy in the two countries
has differed significantly: where regional policy has succeeded in Ireland, it
has been a failure in Italy. What makes the comparison interesting is the
relative uniformity of current regional interventions in the two countries. As
noted in the CEPR report, one aspect of Structural Policy is the copying of
behaviour at the national level. The Italian approach has changed over time
to increasingly resemble Irish policies.
According to the authors of this report, the success of Ireland owes to the
promotion of two sectors: electronics and pharmaceuticals. The CEPR
report argues that the concept that made the Irish government’s investments
less of a gamble was the fact that it chose to concentrate on these sectors
after industries had already been established. Thus (Braunerhjelm et al.
2000, p. 89),21
[e]lectronics may not have been an obviously good bet for Ireland before the
Intel and Microsoft investments arrived, but once they had done so, Ireland was
well advised to promote them for all it was worth. Success was facilitated by
their willingness, along with other global companies, to assist actively in the
promotion of further investment in the Irish electronics sector. This they did in
the interests of developing the electronics agglomeration, while ensuring that
there was not excessive poaching of labour from any one company as new
plants were established.
20 Sectoral remedies such as those advocated by Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002)
are criticised later in this study (see chapter 8).
21 The massive inflow of FDI from the US is to a large extent explained by the close ties
between the two countries.
Regional initiatives in Italy, by contrast, have been “half-hearted”, given
too little time, suffered from a lack of consistency and have not had the
same concentration on specific sectors as in Ireland.
In order to meet the effects of deeper integration, the CEPR report recom-
mends, among other things, investments in schooling and lifelong learning;
the creation of an entrepreneurship friendly tax and regulatory system;
endorsing labour market policies that allow wages to adjust according to
productivity trends; welcoming international investments; and removing
barriers to capital and labour movements (Braunerhjelm et al. 2000).22
In sum, the ECP seems to have promoted cohesion in the least developed
regions, but at a high cost given the meagre results. There is also dis-
agreement as to the size of the effects, as it is difficult to trace the specific
effects of funding due among other things to poor data quality. Moreover,
the ECP may have had negative effects in that it has not promoted an
optimal localisation of R&D industries.
2.3 The present and future European Cohesion Policy
Although this study focuses on the current and future ECP, the debate and
negotiations on the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective will have implications
for Cohesion Policy. The Commission has taken an expansionistic view as
regards the Financial Perspective, proposing an increase in the total budget
by 31 per cent in 2013 compared to 2006 (see Table 2.1). However, the
June 2005 European Council summit showed that the amounts proposed by
the Commission are no longer credible.23 The numbers in this proposal
nevertheless remain the only ones which have not (and will not) change.
Furthermore, the shares devoted to the respective headings in the proposal
serve as good indicators of the Commission’s priorities. Hence we will use
the Commission’s proposal as our starting point when discussing the future
ECP.
2.3.1 The debate on the future ECP
In its proposal for the next Financial Perspective, the Commission has
reduced the number of budget headings to five. The first heading in Table
2.1, Sustainable growth, encompasses both Cohesion Policy (1b Cohesion
for growth and employment) and EU funding for implementing the Lisbon
Strategy (1a Competitiveness for growth and employment). The total
37
22 Indeed, examples of lingering protectionism are not difficult to find. One example is the
Services Directive, which in certain Member States has come under heavy fire. Another
much debated element of protectionist behaviour among EU15 Member States concerns the
restrictions on labour migration from the CEECMS imposed in all but three of the EU15
Member States.
23 The final bid from the Luxembourg presidency (which was turned down) was a budget
ceiling of 1.06% of EU GNI. The EU budget is thus likely to be dramatically lower than the
Commission’s proposed budget.
financial resources under heading 1b in the proposal represents €336.3
billion in 2004 prices, or 0.41 per cent of EU27 GNI.
24
Cohesion Policy (1b) would increase by ca 23 per cent in 2007 and ca 31
per cent in 2013, compared to 2006. By contrast, CAP, which is included
under the second heading, would increase by only ca 2 per cent by 2007
and ca 3 per cent by 2013, compared to 2006. In other words, according to
the proposal this heading would basically remain fixed throughout the
period 2007-2013. Thus, the division of resources in the Commission’s
proposal is roughly almost a half to Cohesion (and competitiveness) Policy,
more than a third to CAP, and the residual, about 15 per cent, for the
remaining headings.
As shown in Table 2.1, the Commission has replaced the former three
objectives with a Regional Convergence and Employment objective (78.54
per cent of heading 1b in Table 2.1, replacing Objective 1; henceforth
Convergence objective); a Regional Competitiveness and Employment
objective (17.22 per cent of heading 1b, replacing Objectives 2 and 3;
henceforth Competitiveness objective); and a European Territorial Co-
operation objective (3.94 per cent of heading 1b; henceforth Territorial
objective), respectively (COM 2004b). The three objectives would be sup-
ported by the financial resources of the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. 
Regions eligible for assistance under the Convergence objective would be,
as before, those with a GDP per capita level below 75 per cent of the Com-
munity average. However, the Commission has proposed that temporary
resources (85 per cent in 2007 and then phased out by steps of 5 per cent)
are made available from the Structural Funds for regions in the EU15 that
would have received support had the base for calculation been the EU15
rather than the EU25. The aim of the Convergence objective is to “promote
growth-enhancing conditions and factors leading to real convergence.
Strategies should plan for the development of long-term competitiveness
and employment” (COM 2004c, p. 4).
The programmes under this objective would be supported by the resources
of all three funds, where support from the Cohesion Fund, as before,
would be given to Member States with a Gross National Product (GNP)
below 90 per cent of the Community average (i.e., Greece, Portugal and all
ten new Member States). According to the Commission’s proposal, the
Cohesion Fund will have a specific conditionality attached to it, insofar as
assistance is conditioned on the convergence programmes and constraints
on excessive deficits. Programmes supported by the Cohesion Fund would
38
24 An additional €8.6 billion is planned to cover for the new Solidarity Fund and the
Commission’s administrative expenditure.
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as before focus on transport and environmental infrastructures and institu-
tion building, strengthening the capacity to manage support from the
Structural Funds (COM 2004g).25
The Competitiveness objective aims at improving the competitiveness and
attractiveness of the regions. The regions eligible for support would be
those “currently eligible for Objective 1 not fulfilling the criteria for the
convergence priority even in the absence of the statistical effect of enlarge-
ment” and “all other regions of the Union covered neither by the con-
vergence programmes nor by the ‘phasing in’ support…” (COM 2004c, p.
5). The Competitiveness objective would be funded equally by the ERDF
and the ESF and interventions supported by the ERDF would be based on
innovation and knowledge based economy;26 the environment and risk
prevention; and accessibility of services of general economic interest,
while interventions supported by the ESF would become more in tune with
the European Employment Strategy (EES) (COM 2004c).27
The Territorial objective, building on the INTERREG programme, would
promote sustainable development of the EU territory (and beyond). It
would support cross-border cooperation actions, for regions located on
internal borders or certain external borders; contribute to the cross-border
elements of the future European neighbourhood and partnership Instrument
and Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). It would benefit from
trans-national cooperation actions and cooperation and exchange networks.
In response to criticism regarding problems encountered with the manage-
ment of the funds, the proposal also implies a number of simplifications.28
Priorities for Cohesion Policy would, in the future, be given in an overall
strategic document, adopted by the Council, and in national framework
documents worked out by the Member States, based on the Commission’s
proposal. The documents would then serve as a basis for specific national
and regional programmes. The so-called programme complements and
management by measure would be abolished, the number of funds reduced
from the current six to three (i.e., the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion
Fund will remain in place) and a mono-fund approach introduced (one
fund per programme).29 There would also be a number of simplifications as
25 As we will see, strengthening institutions and the administrative capacity in the new
Member States will be crucial in the years to come.
26 For a critique of the concept of “knowledge based economy”, see chapters 8 and 9.
27 The EES was launched in 1997 as a coordinated effort at the EU level to increase
employment in the Union. Since 2002 the EES has become a key component in the
Lisbon Strategy.
28 It should also be mentioned – as pointed out by Bachtler and Wishlade (2004) – that the
system has to be in place before it has been proven to be a simplification. See also chapter
9, where we question the assertion that the Commission’s proposal as a matter of fact
implies a simplification.
29 This particular feature is criticised in the subsequent chapters; see, for example, chapter 8.
regards financial management and control, such as the elimination of “on-
the-spot” audits and payments operated at the level of priorities rather than
at the level of measures (which excludes private co-funding) (COM 2004c,
p. 8). However, the principle of additionality would still apply for the
Structural Funds and the n + 2 rule30 would not only remain but also be
extended to the Cohesion Fund. As we will see in subsequent chapters,
they may both have serious consequences for the new Member States.
A number of features in the Commission’s proposal have received
widespread support.31 There seems to be agreement on the linking of the
ECP and the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas; the attempts at simplifying
the regulation of the Structural Funds; and the three new objectives and
their content. In particular, there was general agreement on the importance
of concentrating support to the least developed areas of the Union.
Even though there is broad support for the Convergence objective, some
Member States have proposed that resources allocated to it should be
increased. Unsurprisingly, a number of Member States have questioned the
Competitiveness objective and a few Member States have even asked for
its elimination. In line with the recommendations from Sapir et al. (2003),
furthermore, some Member States have asked for support being con-
centrated on the least developed Member States – i.e., national as opposed
to regional convergence – rather than on the least developed regions. Thus,
the main dividing lines seem to be the amount of resources that should be
devoted to the respective objectives, whether support should focus on
regions or countries and whether aid should be directed to all regions or
just to regions in the new Member States.
The Commission’s proposal has also raised concerns among students of
European regional policy. For example, Jouen et al. (2005) – while taking
a generally positive attitude to the proposal with respect to reducing
regional disparities, strengthening competitiveness and combating spatial
and territorial imbalances – has questioned whether some of the objectives
of the ECP will be reached. The author argues that the improvement of
general welfare would be hampered by the “[r]emoval of transversal
priorities, such as equal opportunities, …”; that the elimination of Com-
munity initiative programmes would act counter to the aim of increasing
the sense of European belonging; that “making eligibility rules national”
will stop subsidiarity at the national level and thus hinder a modernisation
41
30 i.e., funds get de-committed if not claimed, at the latest, two years after the commitment
year.
31 Position papers from inter alia the Member States’ governments can be downloaded from
the DG Regional Policy homepage on,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/debate/reflex_en.htm. See also Bachtler and
Wishlade (2004); Jouen et al. (2005); and Richter (2005) for summaries of the Member
States’ positions in the Cohesion Policy debate.
of European governance; and, most importantly so far as our study is
concerned, that there is an unfortunate absence of a policy to “accompany
future developments of the new Member States” (Jouen et al. 2005, pp.
30-31). The main argument, with which this study concurs, as we will see,
is that “the actions eligible for the convergence objective are identical for
both old and new Member States, although the needs are different” (Jouen
et al. 2005, p. 31). The extent to which the needs differ will become clear
in the next chapter.
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3 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEW
MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Michael A. Landesmann and Roman Roemisch
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of regional developments in the new
Member States (NMS) of the European Union and two of the candidate
countries (Bulgaria and Romania).32 It first presents in section 3.2 an over-
view of income and growth disparities at the NUTS 2 and (for the smaller
NMS) the NUTS 3 level and compares measures of regional disparities for
the NMS with those of the EU15.33 Section 3.3 develops a taxonomy of
regional types identified by the relative representation of different sectors in
the overall employment structure: hence we identify, apart from the capital
city regions, agricultural regions, mining regions, basic and forward looking
industry regions, basic services and tourism regions. It turns out that
regional types thus identified differentiate with respect to income levels and
income growth and in section 3.4 we also show that the regional taxonomy
also captures distinct features with respect to labour market conditions in
terms of employment rates (also differentiated by age groups) and employ-
ment opportunities for different sections of the labour force distinguished by
educational attainment levels. In section 3.5 we analyse further differences
across regions in terms of the distribution of foreign direct investment and
of infra-structural (particularly transport) facilities and in section 3.6 we
focus on particular features of “problem regions” (mostly concentrated in
agricultural and traditional basic industry regions as well as those singled
out by their geographic peripheral position). Section 3.7 summarises the
results and offers some policy suggestions.
3.2 Economic growth and regional disparities
in the NMS
The new Member States of the European Union have experienced a
turbulent decade and a half. After the sharp recessions in the period
immediately after the start of the “transition” in 1989/90, the 1990s were
still not an unqualified growth period as growth continued to be inter-
rupted by banking and restructuring crises (Hungary mid-1990s, Czech
and Slovak Republics towards the end of the 1990s) often combined with
32 We restrict the “new Member States” (NMS) to the eight new EU Member States from
Central and Eastern Europe, i.e., excluding Cyprus and Malta. We shall also cover in our
analysis the candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania and include these with the NMS in
our region-wide calculations.
33 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is based primarily on the
institutional divisions currently in force in the EU Member States. NUTS 1 is defined as
an area with 3-7 million people, NUTS 2 to 800 000-3 million people and NUTS 3 to
150 000-800 000 people.
fiscal and monetary policy blunders as well as exchange rate crises
(Poland and Hungary in the early 2000s). Overall, however, one can say
that from 1993/94 onwards, economic recovery gained momentum in the
NMS and their average GDP growth began to exceed that of the EU15.
Taking the period 1995-2004, we find a growth rate differential between
the NMS8 and the EU15 of 1.7% p.a. (NMS grew at 3.8% p.a., the EU15
at 2.1% p.a.). In some countries, particularly in the Baltics, the differential
was significantly higher.
Nonetheless, one should not forget that all the NMS are still substantially
below the EU25 average in terms of GDP per capita (see Table A.1,
Appendix A34) and the closure of this gap, while proceeding, will take
another few decades to be achieved. Hence, at an aggregate level, the NMS
are on a path of “catching-up”, with the distance to be covered being quite
different across the NMS as their current income levels vary significantly.
What is the pattern at the regional level? Tables A.2a and A.2b present a
lot of information on this account. The regions for each country have been
ranked by GDP per capita (measured in PPS) in these and all the following
tables so that we can look at other characteristics (growth, employment
structures, employment rates, FDI. etc.) in relation to this ranking.
The first item which strikes one is that in all countries, the richest region by
far in each country is the region which includes the capital city; there is no
exception to this. The degree to which this is so varies: Prague, Bucharest
and Bratislava show income levels more than double the country average,
while the regions containing the capital city in the other countries show a
somewhat smaller but still very sizeable gap. One of the reasons for this
difference across countries, is that the NUTS 2 regions (and the NUTS 3
regions presented in Table A.2b for the smaller countries; see discussion in
Box 3.1 at the end of this chapter) are differently defined and might include
more or less of the “hinterland” of the capital city, thus reducing or
widening the gap in income levels to the rest of the country. Notwith-
standing this difference, the gap in income levels between the capital city
regions and the rest of the country is very substantial throughout. Two
caveats should be mentioned here: in calculating the GDP per capita at PPS
for the regions, no adjustments have been made to inter-regional price level
differences as PPS comparisons so far account only for country-wide
differences in price levels. As price levels are significantly higher in capital
cities (although we do not have detailed statistical evidence to document
this) the income gaps shown here are likely to be a (significant) over-
estimate. Furthermore, enterprises in particular might record their corporate
incomes in the headquarter locations and not always where that income is
regionally generated. This creates a further bias in the direction of over-
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34 All tables and figures to this chapter in Appendix A.
estimating the income gaps between capital cities and the rest of the
country. In spite of these two caveats, the large gaps in income levels
between the capital cities and the rest of the countries should feature as an
important stylised fact in the NMS. We shall come back to this issue further
below. In this context we should also point to the wide divergence in (GDP)
growth between the capital cities and the rest of the economies in all the
countries (see last columns in tables A.2) which are very striking. Again we
should keep in mind the two caveats from above: it is likely that the very
high growth rates recorded for the capital city regions are an overestimate
due to the lower GDP deflators used for the country as a whole in a period
when price levels would have diverged between capital cities and the rest of
the economies and a concentration of (especially foreign companies’)
headquarter locations has taken place. We come back to the role of the
capital cities in relation to regional uneven growth below.
We now turn to the general issue of regional disparities: Table A.3
presents information regarding the coefficients of variation calculated
across the regions of each of the EU25 economies. The upper half contains
calculations at the NUTS 2 level, the lower half at the NUTS 3 level.
Furthermore, the coefficients were calculated first for all regions including
the capital cities, and second, excluding the capital cities. The table shows
some interesting features if one compares levels and changes in regional
disparities between the NMS and the old Member States (OMS):
First the levels: If one compares coefficients of variation calculated across
all regions (i.e., including the capital cities), we find that the NMS show
measures of regional disparities at the higher end (the averages for the
NMS are around 0.5 at the NUTS 2 level as well as at the NUTS 3 level;
for the OMS the values are 0.29 and 0.38 respectively), both at the NUTS
2 and NUTS 3 levels. We find that Poland and Bulgaria and Slovenia and
Lithuania are more or less in line with the values measured for the bulk of
the OMS. The situation changes strongly if we look at the measures of
regional disparity without the capital cities: in this case the NMS are at the
very low end of the spectrum for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Bulgaria, as well as Estonia and Slovenia, and only Hungary, Poland and
Romania, as well as Lithuania and Latvia are in line with the bulk of the
measures of the OMS.
Second the trends: Including the capital cities in the calculations, we
definitely measure very substantial increases in regional inequality
amongst the NMS over the period 1995-2002 (with the exception of
Bulgaria and Slovenia), way above those measured for the OMS (overall
there is also an increase in intra-country regional disparities in the OMS
over this period, but there are also a few countries where there is a
decline). Furthermore, the trends in all the NMS indicate an increase in
intra-country regional disparities; there is no decline for any NMS. In the
calculations without capital cities, we obtain quite high values for in-
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creases in regional inequalities for some of the NMS (particularly Hungary
at the NUTS 2 level, and Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and again
Hungary at the NUTS 3 level) but the size differences compared to the
OMS are not as high as in the calculations with the capital cities. For a
few NMS, there are even declines in this case for some of the NMS
(specifically at the NUTS 3 level for the Czech Republic, Latvia and
Slovakia).
Summing up: Capital cities account for a significant part of the gap in
overall measures of regional inequalities between the NMS and the OMS.
This also very strongly affects the trend increases in measures of regional
inequality in the NMS over the most recent period. The two caveats
mentioned earlier with regard to the measurement problems of real income
levels of capital cities should also be kept in mind when considering these
results regarding levels and trends in NMS’ regional disparities.
3.3 Economic structure and regional disparities
In the following we want to bring together information regarding economic
structure in Table A.4 and the regional development indicators contained in
Table A2 (particularly the real income growth columns on the right hand
side of the table). As regards structure, we are limited to the data which are
available at the regional level: lacking output or value added data by
individual sectors, we can only use employment statistics by sector and
region.
In the following we shall refer to the following qualitative grouping of
regions in terms of their structural characteristics (in particular sectoral
employment shares):
• Capital cities: as we have seen above, capital cities have a very
special position in the NMS in terms of real income levels (and
growth). Examining their economic structures we find that they also
emerge distinctly – as one would expect – in terms of the share of
employees in services in general and – more specifically – in terms of
those services which we shall call “modern services” (NACE35
categories J + K, comprising financial and business services). With
regard to the position of these types of services there is a particularly
wide gap between the capital city and the rest of the country in the
NMS. We shall see later (section 3.4) that this plays a major role in
explaining labour market features in capital cities.
As to the other region types, they will be defined by the sectoral
employment shares which distinguish them most strongly from the national
employment structure. 
35 NACE is the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community.
• Agricultural regions are defined as those regions in which the agri-
cultural sector is more prominently represented (relative to the national
average) in the employment structure than any other sector. Similarly,
• Mining industry regions are those regions where the employment
share of the mining industry distinguishes the region most from the
employment structure in the country as a whole.
• Basic industry regions: these regions show a particularly strong
presence of two types of industries: heavy industries such as
metallurgy, but also labour-intensive industries such as textiles and
clothing. The interest in these types of regions arises from an ex-ante
hypothesis that a strong presence of these industries reveals a legacy
from the past in which highly capital-intensive industries were
supported by communist industrial (and regional) policy and these
have – following the transition – become problem regions; on the
other hand, the strong presence of labour-intensive branches indicates
a potential competitive threat (especially in the more advanced NMS)
from countries with even lower wage rates.
• Forward-looking industry regions: given the level of classification
chosen (NACE 1-digit) we include here the various engineering
industries (mechanical, electrical and instrument engineering) as more
detailed analysis (see, e.g., Landesmann 2000 and 2003) has shown
that these industries in the more advanced NMS experienced the
fastest productivity developments, strongest FDI inflows and also
growth in exports on EU markets. A strong presence (in 2003) of
such industries in a region thus reveals a comparative advantage in a
part of the industrial sector which had undergone quite successful
modernisation.
• Basic services regions: a strong presence of these types of services
(comprising wholesale and retail trade, transport, postal services, etc.)
are evidence of urbanisation, but it could reflect a relative lack of any
other types of employment opportunities.36
• Tourism regions: it turns out that some regions which have a high
share of agriculture and of services in general are also important
tourist destinations and hence show some distinct features compared
to basic services or agricultural regions. Hence we wanted to identify
them separately.
Table A.5 gives a summary of the features of these regions across the
whole of the Central and Eastern European region. We have singled out a
number of variables: real income levels in 2002, real income growth over
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36 In principle, we also wanted to identify a cluster of regions in which a high representation
of “modern services” (financial and business services) was the most distinguishing
characteristic. It turned out that this was almost uniformly just the case for capital city
regions in the NMS and hence no separate regional cluster of this type was identified.
the period 1995-2002, employment rates in 2003 (also for different age
groups), employment growth 1998-2003, the shares of different qualifica-
tion groups in the population aged 25-64. All these variables have been
calculated for the regions relative to the national average (sometimes –
when indicated – without capital cities to avoid distortions emerging from
the different weights of these in different countries). In this section we
shall restrict ourselves to discussing income levels and income growth in
relation to the above classification of regions in the NMS; in the next
section we shall discuss labour market features.
Let us start with an overview: The differences in the sectoral structure of
regions are associated to some degree with differences in economic
prosperity and performance. GDP per head is by far the highest in the
capital cities, followed by a long way by mining regions and then by the
forward-looking industry regions.37 More advanced industrial structures
and the historically high incomes in mining regions shows up in GDP
levels more than 10% per cent higher than the average national GDP per
capita levels (calculated without the capital cities).
GDP per head in the NMS is lowest in the agricultural regions, followed
with some distance by the tourism and basic industries regions. This is in
contrast to the EU15 agricultural regions which have partly developed into
basic services regions by diversifying into tourism, increasing their GDP
per head as a result. A similar tendency is not yet evident in the NMS and,
given the geophysical features of most agricultural regions in these
countries, there has to be a question mark over their tourism potential (see
also Roemisch and Ward 2004). The implication is that economic activity
in such regions may advance much more slowly than in comparable EU15
regions.
Even excluding the capital cities, the differences in GDP per head between
these region types have become more accentuated in the NMS over recent
years. Thus, the average annual growth rates from 1995 to 2002 (relative to
the country averages) in the forward-looking industry regions were higher
than for other regions. Though the gaps in growth rates to the basic
services, the basic industry and the tourism regions were relatively small,
disparities amongst regions with a more and a less advanced sectoral
structure widened. This is even more true for the agricultural regions that
had the lowest growth of GDP per head in this period. 
Let us now return to Table A.2 and discuss some of the sectoral features by
country: we shall see that in many instances the sectoral structure does
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37 It should be borne in mind that the mining group contains very few regions, 
so that conclusions from this classification are of a tentative nature.
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indeed provide explanatory power for both levels of income as well as for
relative growth of real income over the period 1995-02.38
In the Czech Republic, it is those regions that formerly depended on a
relatively large mining sector and developed either into basic industry or
basic services regions which experienced the strongest negative growth
rates over the period (Moravskoslezko and Severozápad region). Regions
with a higher share of industry (either basic or forward-looking) have
higher income levels than less industrialized and more services-oriented
regions (with the exception of the Strední Morava region).
In Hungary, it is the agricultural (at times combined with a high share of
basic industries) and former mining and now basic industry regions which
are the regions with the most strongly negative growth rates and low real
income levels. In addition, one must mention another variable, i.e., the
geographical location in the periphery of the country (North and East)
which also accounts for these features.
In Poland (where we do not have detailed industry data to distinguish
between industry in general and basic vs. forward-looking industry
regions) the sectoral characteristics as being an agricultural or (basic)
industrial or mining region also accounts for a very low ranking in terms
of real income growth; however, as in a number of other countries the
main mining region, Slaskie, features as one of the highest real income
regions reflecting the strong past position of miners in the wage structure
of NMS (similar features can be seen in Bulgaria and, see above, the
Czech Republic).
In Slovakia (although here only a small number of NUTS 2 regions are
identified), it is again the basic industry regions which belong to the
relatively low income regions, whereby the regional income distribution
follows a distinct West to East pattern. Still, growth rates are higher in the
more peripheral regions. 
Bulgaria follows the same pattern as above, with the agricultural and
tourism regions positioned towards the bottom of the list of real income
growth and levels. But there are two specific features in that the two
regions, Yugoiztochen and Severoiztochen, which developed from agri-
cultural regions into tourism regions, income growth and – as we shall see
below – employment growth is considerably higher than in the purely
agricultural region (Yuzhen tsentralen). Another specific feature is that
38 Table A.2 shows the allocation of individual regions to the different types of region (the
type of region is indicated in the first column) characterised by the sectoral specialisation
features discussed above; this provides a convenient way to analyse to which extent the
relative sectoral composition of a region can contribute towards an explanation of a region’s
ranking in terms of income levels and income growth. The same coding is used in later
tables (A.4 and A.5) to analyse employment and other features of economic performance.
Bulgaria’s main mining region, Severozapaden, is not only a high income
but also a relatively high growth region. 
In Romania it is clear that the predominantly agricultural regions account
for the bulk of the low real income and highly negative growth regions.
Again the geographical location variable (periphery) is important to
explain the very bad performance of another crisis region, Sud-Est.
3.4 Employment rates and employment growth
The next feature we want to discuss is the employment record of the
different regions and also present some information on the “skill structure”
of the population in the regions. Skills will be measured by educational
attainment levels and we shall distinguish three groups (using the standard
international ISCED classification): those with completion of only primary
schooling (the “low” skill group), those with completion of some type of
secondary schooling (the “medium” skill group), and those with a
completed tertiary degree (the “high” skill group). Information on these
skill characteristics of the population in the different regions, as well as on
employment rates and employment growth have been calculated from
national Labour Force Surveys (LFS)39 and are presented in Table A.6.
We start the discussion of the regional employment record by looking at
employment rates,40 i.e., the shares of people that are employed in the
population aged 25-64.41 If we plot the employment rates relative to re-
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39 The series of labour force surveys exists for the NMS for the period 1998 to 2003 and have
been compiled under the supervision of Eurostat. They therefore follow a common
methodology. We consider the quality of the data contained in these statistics and their
cross-country comparability as relatively high.
40 In this article we shall only deal with the employment situation of the total population, i.e.,
we do not take account of differences in male and female employment opportunities,
although these vary greatly across the NMS and also across the EU15 countries (see e.g.,
Landesmann, Vidovic and Ward, 2004). Yet unequal employment patterns between males
and females follow a national rather than a regional pattern. The ratio of female
employment to male employment rates is relatively stable across the regions within each
country. Given that this chapter focuses on sub-national regional patterns and gender
characteristics in employment patterns do not differ that much across regions but rather
across countries we shall not follow this feature up any further in this chapter. Nonetheless,
we should mention that the one striking difference between female employment rates in the
OMS and the NMS is the much lower proportion of part-time employed in the NMS (for
details, see again Landesmann, Vidovic and Ward, 2004).
41 We chose the population 25-64 years old, rather than the more commonly used definition of
working age population 15-64 years, as employment rates can be quite low and/or falling in
the age group 15-25 years if there is a high rate of further education beyond primary
schooling or if such rates are increasing, as has happened in the NMS over the analysed
period (for details see, Landesmann, Vidovic and Ward, 2004). As we are interested in using
employment rates as indicators of labour market conditions, we prefer to exclude the young
(15-24 years) age groups from our calculations of employment rates, as changing
employment rates for this age group reflects two things: changes in the years of schooling
and labour market conditions and we want to focus on the latter.
gional GDP per capita (see Figure A.1a, Appendix A) we do not see any
relationship at all, i.e., there is no evidence that regions with low GDP per
capita have lower employment rates than higher income regions. However,
if we redefine employment rates to include employment only in non-
agricultural activities (see Figure A.1b) we see a strong correlation. Hence
we can say that employment rates in non-agricultural activities are high in
high income regions and low in low income regions. To make the two
pictures consistent (Figures A.1a and A.1b) we can also say that agriculture
acts as a “sponge” to absorb people into employment in low income
regions who do not find employment opportunities in non-agricultural
activities. In other words, one can interpret (at least to some extent) the
relatively high employment rates in agricultural regions as “disguised” or
“hidden unemployment” (this can be corroborated by the evidence of low
productivity levels in agriculture in such regions). 
If we return to our summary table regarding the types of regions by
sectoral specialisation (Table A.5) we can see the following features with
respect to employment rates, employment growth and the educational
attainment structure of the working-age (25-64) population:
– Agricultural regions have in general a relatively high employment rate
(see the discussion above) but it is interesting to see that the employ-
ment rates are rather low for the young (25-29 year olds) and very high
for the older age groups (50-54 year olds). These regions belong –
together with the basic industry regions – to the regions with the most
negative trends in employment rates. As to the skill structure of the
population (25-64 age group), we find that the agricultural regions are
those – together with the tourism regions – with the highest shares of
the least qualified with the lowest shares of those with the highest
educational attainment levels.
– The Mining regions are the regions with the worst employment growth
record; they also show the lowest overall employment rates and – in
contrast to the agricultural regions – the employment rates are especially
low amongst the older age groups (50-54) while being higher for the
young (25-29 years). There is one of the lowest shares in this region of
people with completed tertiary degrees and the skill structure is very
strongly skewed towards those with “middle skills”, probably reflecting
the training traditions (in non-agricultural activities) in these regions.
– Basic industry regions show country average employment growth and
low employment rates overall, especially amongst the older age groups.
Interestingly, the share of highly educated is relatively high, possibly
reflecting an urbanised character of these regions and the availability of
institutions of further education.
– Forward looking industry regions: the differentiation of industry regions
into the two categories gets strong support from the differentiated labour
market features which characterise these two types of regions: while the
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basic industry regions show a poor employment record, the forward-
looking industry regions show exceptionally high employment rates (in
fact the highest amongst all the regional types) and also high positive
employment rate changes. The share of medium-educated (qualified
industrial workers) is rather high.
– The Basic Services regions have relatively low employment rates, a high
share of the least qualified and a relatively low share of highly
qualified, employment growth is below the country average.
– Tourism regions: we identified only two Bulgarian regions as “tourism
regions”. From a labour market point-of-view they are an example of
regions in which the shares of the low skilled is relatively high and
nonetheless employment rates are quite high; employment rates for the
older age group is significantly lower than for the younger age group, in
contrast to agricultural regions, though both groups have a largely
similar sectoral structure. However, these regions showed above country
average employment growth while agricultural regions in general
experienced below country average employment growth.
To sum up the labour market features of the different region types, we can
say that:
Employment rates in the NMS are highest in the forward-looking industries
regions, though the difference to the other regions is not as pronounced as it
was in GDP and GDP growth differentials. This might reflect the well
observed phenomenon of job-less growth in the NMS (Havlik and Landes-
mann 2004), where rising GDP is rather due to increases in productivity
than in employment. Therefore, although regions might benefit from an
advanced sectoral structure in income terms, high GDP per head is not
necessarily associated with a high level of employment. Employment rates
are – if only slightly- above average in the agricultural regions, reflecting
the tendency for those unable to find jobs in other activities to make a
living from subsistence agriculture.
In contrast, the lowest employment rates – despite relatively high levels of
GDP per head- are found in the mining and basic services regions. In the
mining regions the restructuring and closure of mines and related industries
largely contributed to the under-proportionate employment record. In the
case of basic services and basic industry regions the relatively low
employment rates are due to the failure of basic services to fully offset the
losses of jobs in other sectors, particularly in industry.
The sectoral structure of economic activity across regions in the NMS also
reflects variations in the educational attainment levels of the working-age
population. Agricultural regions, tourism and basic services regions tend to
have a larger proportion of people with only basic schooling than other
regions (see correlation in Figure A.2), while forward-looking industry
regions and also basic industries regions tend to have a larger proportion
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of people with medium level education (see correlation in Figure A.3).
Thus the shares of the low educated in population is about 20 to 30
percentage points higher in agricultural and basic services regions than in
industrial regions, while in the latter the share of medium educated is
higher than in other regions. Similarly the share of medium educated in the
population is larger in the mining as well as in the forward-looking industry
regions than elsewhere. This reflects the twin tendency for economic
activities to develop in places where the available labour force has the
necessary skills required and, at the same time, for people with such skills
to move to – or remain living in – areas where they are in demand. 
3.5 Distribution of FDI and infrastructural facilities
across the regions
3.5.1 Foreign direct investment
Due to their relatively small size the share of the NMS in global or
European FDI is marginal – in 2003 the share of the NMS in global FDI
inflows was around 3 per cent. Yet, when compared to the size of the
economies, FDI in the NMS is slightly above European standards, as the
inward stocks of FDI in the NMS amounted on average to 35 per cent of
GDP compared to 33 per cent for the EU15 (and 23 per cent worldwide)
(UNCTAD, 2004). While already sizable in terms of GDP the role of FDI
inflows into the NMS was even greater as far as the restructuring and
upgrading of the NMS economies is concerned (see Hunya and
Geishecker, 2004). There is clear evidence that FDI inflows strengthened
the private sector, introducing new technologies, organisational practices
and knowledge, opening new (export) markets and thereby raising the
competitiveness of the NMS in general.
In terms of employment FDI inflows had on the whole positive effects: on
the one hand, job losses occurred as a result of the restructuring of pri-
vatized formerly inefficient state-owned companies; on the other hand,
greenfield investments created new jobs, especially in services sectors like
banking, retail and real estate. The net effect is estimated to be positive.
This was also the case in manufacturing, where – by and large – domestic-
ally owned enterprises reduced jobs, while foreign investment enterprises
expanded them (Hunya and Geishecker 2004).
However the positive effects of FDI are quite unevenly distributed across
the regions in the NMS as the FDI intensity varies across the regions. This
is indicated by the data in Table A.7 that show the regional distribution of
FDI (measured as FDI per head relative to the country average). Regional
FDI data were available to us only for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia and hence only these countries are examined.
In the four NMS the – by far – largest FDI stocks can be found in the
capital cities, though the actual numbers might overestimate the amount of
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FDI pertaining to the capital city regions, as FDI flows are often accounted
for by the headquarter of a firm. Nevertheless, given the advantageous
position of the NMS capital cities because of their market potential, well
educated labour force and agglomeration spillovers, it is clear that these
regions were the main target for FDI amongst the NMS regions over the
last decade. In part this explains the vigorous GDP growth, the high GDP
levels and the good employment situation observed in the capitals; a strong
correlation of FDI and GDP per head and employment rates is found for
the other regions too. This is shown in Figures A.4 and A.5 where the
regional FDI stocks per head are plotted against regional GDP per head
and regional employment rates (excluding agricultural employment) – all
variables are expressed relative to the respective country average. Given
the high correlations in Figures A.4 and A.5 it can be deduced that the
uneven distribution of FDI across the NMS regions contributed signific-
antly to the increase in regional disparities, as the prosperous regions
located mainly at the Western borders or around larger agglomerations
received higher FDI inflows than peripheral and less prosperous regions in
the Eastern parts of the four NMS (see also the detailed study by Fazekas
and Ozsvald 2004).
3.5.2 Infrastructure
Over the last decade the fast economic development in the NMS was
accompanied by marked shifts in the pattern of individual and commercial
transport use (the so-called “modal split”) towards road rather than rail.
Due to increased competition, prices charged for transporting freight by
road have fallen markedly, while prices charged for transporting freight by
rail tended to increase as subsidies were reduced. The road network was
however substantially under-developed in the NMS, since under the (pre-
1989) regimes freight transport was concentrated on rail instead of roads,
while passenger transport was centred around busses and trains instead of
cars (Ward 2002). 
Although the NMS started to improve their transport systems in recent
years, these are in many regions still underdeveloped and thus potentially
impeding regional economic development. Table A.8 presents data on the
NMS regions’ endowments with motorways, roads, electrified railway lines
as well as an indicator on the region’s accessibility. More recent data are
not available, so that we have to restrict ourselves to using data up to 2001;
the actual situation in some of the regions might have improved over the
last years.
Up to 2001 the motorway network in the NMS was largely underdeveloped.
Thus in Poland there were only around 400 km of motorways, hence less
than in Slovenia (435 km), Lithuania (417km), the Czech Republic
(517km) and Hungary (448km). In Romania the length of the motorway
network is particularly small (given the size of the country) and with 113
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km only slightly less long than in Estonia (93km). In Latvia no motorways
existed at all.
Although construction of new motorways proceeded at quite a high pace in
some countries (as the length of the motorways increased from 1996 to
2001 by 54% in Poland, 40% in Estonia and Slovenia, by around 34 % in
Hungary and Slovakia and 22% in the Czech Republic), this is largely
concentrated in a few regions mostly around the capital cities or on transit
routes to the West. Thus, in Poland motorways are exclusively found in
regions bordering Germany, the Czech Republic and also Slovakia, as well
as in adjacent regions that connect the border regions with the main
regions in the Polish hinterland. The situation is similar in the Czech
Republic and Hungary, where motorways exist mainly in the regions that
connect these countries to the West as well as in the regions surrounding
the capital cities. 
Furthermore, the density of the NMS motorway network, measured by
dividing the length of motorway by the surface, also clearly demonstrates
the uneven regional distribution of transport infrastructure. Overall, the
average EU15 motorway network density is much higher than that of the
NMS countries with the exception of Slovenia, being twice as high in 2001
compared to the Czech Republic and 33 times higher than in Romania.
However, in certain NMS regions the density is increasing fast, pred-
ominantly on the main routes to the West, though occasionally also in
more remote regions where no or only few motorways existed before; this
was the case e.g., in the Hungarian regions Dél-Alföld (on the Romanian
border) and Észak-Magyarország. 
As there are only few motorways in the NMS, the network of roads and
their condition are also vital to the regional economies especially for those
regions that are most distant from the main agglomerations. To get a
notion of the accessibility of roads in the NMS regions, we use the
estimates provided by Ward (2002) on the average time that is needed to
reach a motorway. The most striking feature of these estimates is that only
in 13 out of the 53 NMS regions the time needed to get to a motorway was
below the EU15 average of 27 minutes. Not surprisingly these are the
regions with the highest motorway density. In contrast to that, the time
needed in the most peripheral regions especially in Poland and Romania
was three hours or more.
3.6 Problem regions
In the following we focus on a sub-set of regions we call the “problem
regions”: In almost any NMS employment opportunities vary a lot across
the regions. Thus the difference between the regions with the highest
employment rates and the regions with lowest employment rates amounted
in 2003 10 to 14 percentage points in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and the Slovak Republic. 
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As far as the differences across Polish and Romanian regions are con-
cerned, they are prima facie slightly less pronounced (9.9 and 6.6
percentage points respectively) than in the other NMS. However for both
countries, employment rates are blurred by the fact that a large part of
those unable to find jobs elsewhere move into subsistence agriculture.
Thus in both countries – especially as far as the agricultural regions are
concerned – employment rates incorporate a considerable amount of
hidden unemployment. Correcting for this – by simply subtracting the
agricultural employment rate from the total employment rate – reveals for
Poland a gap between the region with the highest and the region with the
lowest “non-agriculture” employment rate that is of similar size as in the
countries above (11.6 percentage points). In the case of Romania this
difference grows to 22.8 percentage points.
Focussing on the regions with the least employment opportunities and
prospects, they can be broadly distinguished into one group containing old
industry regions and one group containing agricultural regions.
Using the NUTS 2 level regional breakdown, old industry regions with
over-proportionate labour market problems are: the Moravskoslezko region
in the Czech Republic, the Észak-Magyarország region in Hungary, the
Vy´chodné Slovensko region in Slovakia, the Slaskie region in Poland and
to some extent also the Nord-Vest region in Romania.
In contrast to other regions within the respective countries, in many of
these old industry regions the restructuring process and industry up-
grading was hampered by a comparatively low inflow of FDI. This was
partly due to the low attractiveness of privatised objects (as all those
regions formerly were centres of heavy industry) but also because of the
disadvantageous geographic location at the Eastern borders combined with
an underdeveloped transport infrastructure. Consequently the massive loss
of industrial jobs that occurred at the early stage of transition was neither
compensated for by the creation of new industrial jobs nor by the relatively
slowly developing services sector. Hence these regions still rely to a
relatively large extent upon the old declining industries and, to a much
smaller extent, on forward-looking industries and services.
Agricultural regions with prospective labour market problems are con-
sidered to be the Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie and Swietokrzyskie
regions in Poland, the Nord-Est, Sud and Sud-Vest region in Romania and
also the Dél-Alföld region in Hungary. A common feature of the agri-
cultural problem regions is that, though they have in general a relatively
high employment rate, a great deal of employment is attributable to the
agricultural sector, while there is an absence of employment opportunities
in industry and services. Thus in the Romanian agricultural regions the
ratio of agricultural employment to total employment is between 40% and
48%, while in the Polish regions this ratio ranges from 27% to 37%. In the
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Hungarian Dél-Alföld region the share of agricultural employment in total
employment is slightly above 11 per cent. Though this is low by Polish and
Romanian standards, it is more than twice as high as the Hungarian
country average. 
The high level of employment in agriculture, though at present greatly
mitigating (un-) employment problems is a matter of concern once a
rescaling of the agricultural sector starts, as hidden unemployment will
turn into open unemployment of considerable size.
Low educated: The low employment opportunities in both the old industry
as well as the agricultural problem regions have especially severe effects
on the lower educated work force. The relatively few available jobs – even
those with low skill requirement – are occupied by the highly and medium
educated workers, for which there is also an excessive supply in those
regions. Thus the substitution of lower educated workers with medium or
even highly educated workers led to particularly low employment rates for
the lower educated.
Youth employment: Another consequence of the low employment opport-
unities in the problem regions is that the young age groups of the labour
force (aged 25-29) have particular difficulties in finding jobs. Correspond-
ingly, youth employment rates in old industry regions (except for the
Romanian Nord-Vest region) are amongst the lowest if not the lowest in
the respective countries with the gaps to the average youth employment
rates ranging from 3 to 5 percentage points. The situation appears worse
again in agricultural problem regions if the absorptive capacity of the agri-
cultural sector is accounted for. Given the low labour demand in industry
and services, the youth employment rate (without agriculture) is only
around 10 to 15 per cent in Polish and Romanian agricultural regions and
thus much lower than in other regions. 
Educational attainment levels of working age population: One dilemma of
the agricultural problem regions is that, on the one hand, economic
activity expands in locations where the workforce has the necessary skills
demanded by employers. On the other hand the potential skills of the
workforce adapt (e.g., via migration) to the skill-demand at a certain
location. With respect to the future potential of regions to attract investors
the educational attainment levels of the young age group (25-29 years)
deserve special attention. Two things are noteworthy. Firstly disparities in
the proportion of the lower educated (and the highly educated) for the
young age groups between the problem regions and other regions are
smaller than for the total population (except for the Hungarian Észak-
Magyarország region). Secondly across all NMS regions the share of
lower educated is much lower within the young age population than
within total population. Thus over time the average skill level within the
NMS regions (including the problem regions) is expected to rise, as the
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old, less educated groups phase out of the labour force and young and
better trained groups enter.
Regional GDP and market potential: The prevailing conditions for
economic development – besides being reflected in a region’s employment
opportunities – are to a large extent measurable through the income a
region generates. In fact, not only is a region’s income level directly related
to the past and present economic performance, but it also relates indirectly
to future economic development as it partly reflects this region’s market
potential, which in itself is an important determinant for prospective future
investment.
Regional income differences between the agricultural and industrial
problem regions on the one side and the other regions on the other side
are, therefore, not only an expression of an unfavourable sectoral structure
or of large scale industrial decline. They can also be associated with
different potentials for future economic development, especially with
regards to the services sector development, given the tendency that higher
income regions expand this sector at higher rates than low income regions.
An additional determinant of a region’s market potential is its geographic
distance to prospering markets. In this respect, too, most problem regions
are not favoured because of their peripheral geographic location.
Especially the old industry regions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia – at least in relative terms – suffered from their geographic
location. Being located at the Eastern borders and thus further away from
Western markets than the other regions was not only an impediment to
large-scale FDI inflows. It also inhibited the development of small scale
businesses fuelled by cross-border shopping from Austria and Germany,
which happened in Western Hungarian and Czech regions. Similar
arguments apply to the four agricultural problem regions in Poland that are
located adjacent to or near to the Belarus or Ukrainian border, as well as to
the Nord-Est region in Romania, which borders Moldova.
3.7 Summary and conclusions
The following provides a summary of the findings of this study.
– Regional disparities within the 8 Central East European EU new Mem-
ber States as well as in Bulgaria and Romania are relatively large and
more pronounced than in the old Member States.
– The main reason for the size of regional disparities in the NMS is the
income gap between the prosperous capital city regions and virtually all
other regions.
– Over the last seven years regional disparities in the NMS increased
strongly; again, this was mostly due to the capital cities, which experi-
enced high growth whereas in the bulk of the other regions economic
development was relatively slow.
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– An exclusion of the capital cities from the analysis results in a quite
even and relatively stationary distribution of incomes across the
remaining NMS regions (with the exception of Hungary).
– Grouping the NMS regions according to their sectoral structure reveals
relatively big differences between different types of regions: capital city
regions as well as regions with a larger share of more modern industries
(or services) show higher incomes and higher income growth than
agricultural regions or regions that rely to a large extent on basic in-
dustries or services.
– The employment record within the NMS regions is not necessarily
connected to their income level. This is because of the absorptive
character of the agricultural sector, which is the main source for
employment especially in the least prosperous NMS regions. Looking
particularly at agriculture though, the analysis reveals a strong correla-
tion of non-agricultural employment rates and income levels; cor-
respondingly (except for the agricultural regions) the sectoral structure
is of major importance as far as employment opportunities are con-
cerned.
– Moreover the sectoral structure of the NMS regions corresponds also to
the educational attainment level of the population. Thus the share of
population having completed tertiary or upper secondary education is
higher in regions with a larger share of modern (and skill intensive)
industries and services. Conversely, the share of lower educated popula-
tion is especially high in the agricultural regions, but also in basic
services regions.
– Foreign direct investment is unevenly distributed across the NMS re-
gions and has become one of the main sources for regional inequalities,
as it tends to locate primarily in the capital cities and in regions close to
the capital cities or to the Western borders.
– Furthermore, the infrastructure (especially motorways) is much better
developed in regions close to the Western borders and in and around the
capital city regions, and thus an additional source for the regional
inequalities in the NMS.
– In addition to the general level of regional disparities, one can identify
in most of the NMS what we called “problem regions”. Common to
these regions is the adverse economic structure and low attractiveness to
(foreign) investors, due to a low market potential and a less qualified
labour pool, that leads to significant problems on the labour market –
especially so for those having completed only primary education as well
as for the young age groups in general.
The analysis has presented a picture of uneven regional distribution of
economic development across the NMS, which is expressed as significant
disparities in income, employment opportunities, educational attainment,
involvement by foreign investors and infra-structural facilities. Moreover,
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latest trends clearly indicate a widening of these disparities, and there is no
good reason to believe that this trend will reverse in the near future –
without public policy intervention. 
Before attempting to formulate any concrete regional policy recommenda-
tions, one has to be clear about the challenges such a policy will face. One
of the main challenges is the diversity of regions with respect to their
sectoral structure, their geographic location, their market potential, etc. A
second challenge is of strategic nature, as it comprises a decision whether
to support core (or agglomeration) regions, which might generate high
growth in some regions (that eventually might trickle down to the other
regions), or whether to relocate funds to the least prosperous regions,
which might generate lower country-level growth but counteract some of
the tendencies towards peripherisation and further agglomeration. A third
challenge is – independent of the actual regional policy – the provision of
a well-functioning (policy) transmission mechanism, in the form of
effective administrative bodies, NGOs, and other institutional facilities.
As the following chapters of this study will elaborate on the above points
at the detailed country level and the existing literature offers a wide range
of policy proposals (see e.g., Brücker, Trabold and Ward 2004), we restrict
ourselves to emphasising three points of relevance to regional policy at the
current juncture of development in the NMS:
Firstly, education and training policies i) raise the probability of
individuals to become employed, ii) create a pool of qualified labour that
potentially attracts investors, iii) facilitates restructuring as it raises peoples
mobility between jobs and locations.
Secondly, theory as well as empirical evidence does indicate that “core
regions” develop much faster than more remote regions. Thus any policy
geared towards the support, creation or revitalisation of core regions (i.e.,
those with major agglomerations, towns and cities) will lead to higher
growth in those regions and stimulate such growth at the country level. Yet,
such a policy ought to be accompanied by a supplementary policy that
ensures that more remote regions also benefit from this.
Thirdly and following from the above, infrastructure policy is a viable
option as it raises the mobility of workers and facilitates commuting from
remote regions to (local) centres. It also raises the mobility of consumers
and small firms, which is important for the development of local
businesses (though increased mobility could also encourage shopping in
larger agglomerations). Moreover infrastructure investment (in road and
rail) raises the regions’ attractiveness for large(r) scale investment, as
transport costs and the time required to reach potential markets are
reduced. Additionally an enhancement of the connectivity of remote
regions should also raise their tourism potential.
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4 POLAND AND COHESION POLICY
Magdalena Kaniewska and Katarzyna Zawalin´ska
4.1 Introduction
When the European Union was enlarged on 1 May 2004, it gained an
additional large Member State and an important player on the European
policy arena. Poland, which is the sixth largest EU country with population
amounting at 8.5% of the total EU population, will by virtue of its size
play a dominant role in future European policies. On the one hand, Poland
will have to adapt in the years to come and catch up with more developed
EU members, on the other hand it will have to speak with its own voice
and switch from having been a policy taker to becoming a policy maker in
its own right.
After the accession, there was a question mark whether sufficient prepara-
tions had been made for adaptation of the European Cohesion Policy to the
enlarged Union and the needs of NMS. As we will see in this and the
subsequent chapters, there are a number of features in both the current
Cohesion Policy and in the Commission’s proposal for the future policy
that will still create problems in the NMS. Some of them may be unique to
Poland or to a limited number of NMS, while other features may be pro-
blematic to all NMS. The one issue that can perhaps be singled out as the
most common among them is the budgetary strain. Constraints on public
funds are often put forward as a justification for cuts to the cohesion
budget, but the complexity of the procedures in relation to the funds avail-
able is often perceived as a root cause of inefficiency. There is a clear risk
that many NMS, including Poland, will be forced to return funds to the EU
budget, which means the funds will not target what they were aimed to
target. 
Of course, the problems are not restricted to the Cohesion Policy per se.
We also identify a number of weaknesses in the Polish approach towards
EU regional policy, particularly those manifested and criticised in the
National Development Plan (NDP) for the years 2004-2006. While the new
NDP, which covers the next Financial Perspective 2007-2013, has improved
on several issues, some problematic issues remain unsolved.
We argue that the future ECP should strive towards addressing a number of
basic challenges that Poland faces in the process of integration with the
EU. To mention but a few, regional policy should focus on the upgrading
of human capital, help transform Poland to a knowledge based economy
through R&D initiatives, help improving environmental standards and
support the implementation of institutional reforms.
We also propose the creation of a Common European Education Policy,
that is to say, that domestic education policy should be reinforced by an
education policy that is coordinated at the supranational level. For the new
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Financial Perspective, we propose the reinforcement of the actions on
stimulating the quality of education and training in the EU. Since
programmes aimed at improving education at post-secondary and higher
level as well as vocational training have been already planned, we strongly
recommend the establishment of a new fund to finance basic education in
the NMS under the “1a” heading: “Competitiveness for growth and em-
ployment”. The main priority of the fund would be the improvement of the
primary and secondary education in the NMS, in order to catch up with
other EU countries’ educational standards. Since the benefits of human
capital upgrading in one country are spread over the EU, common action
should be taken to reinforce individual country efforts and take account of
“positive externalities”.
Last but not least, we also stress the importance of decentralisation of
public finance and consider some of its consequences on the effectiveness
of regional policies and actions. From the view of managerial aspects of
regional policy, we also stress the importance of horizontal programming
rather than sectoral programmes, and call for higher competencies of local
governments in regional development programming. 
4.2 Lessons learned and future implications
from the pre-accession instruments
The primary goal of pre-accession support was to prepare Poland for a
smooth integration into the EU. At the time, cohesion as such was seen as
a secondary goal, even though it was a goal expected to gain importance in
the future. The most vital task was rather to learn the logic of Structural
Policy and to begin implementing the acquis. The EU pre-accession
programmes introduced an administrative organisation and a financial
discipline that was new to Poland. Polish public administration and Polish
policy-makers were totally focused on learning the new rules, such as
planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the programmes, which
implied that they were not in a position to contribute to it or adjust it to
the particular needs in Poland: they were all policy takers at that time.
Since the most pending need before accession was to learn the EU’s
policies, there were no reflections or thoughts on possible changes, or how
to adjust the Cohesion Policy. Rather, concerns were geared toward the
ability to absorb the resources offered by the funds. At first, therefore, it
was quite natural that “simple” projects dominated Polish propositions, i.e.,
goals tended not to be diversified and although they made absorption easy,
they did not necessarily bring the highest possible development in the
areas where they were implemented. Good examples are provided by some
of the infrastructure projects, which allowed Poland to focus major
amounts of funds into one large investment which, however, did not
necessarily improve entrepreneurship. To name but one example, a new
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highway may cause increased traffic at a certain area without the existence
of positive effects. 
The projects financed from the pre-accession funds were accepted on the
basis of the fulfilment of formal requirements, rather than on the
justification of their strategic and operational goals. Again, as focus was
laid on the ability to absorb all funds available, this meant that practically
all projects that qualified were granted support, without any distinction
between projects that might have brought higher (or lower) development.
However, there was never really a risk that a project was not needed: the
Polish infrastructure was so underdeveloped that each euro invested with
high probability brought some changes (unless the projects overlapped or
contradicted). So, all in all, we may conclude that Commission officials,
quite naturally, had much more impact on the content of the pre-accession
programmes than did Polish officials, who more or less acted as con-
sultants. In fact, this could be viewed as a natural introduction to a more
active future participation in the decision process.
Once the implementation of the pre-accession funds started in Poland,
specific problems appeared due to a sometimes inadequate Polish institu-
tional capacity, insufficient human capital and under-developed organisa-
tional structures. In order to avoid these problems in the future, the recom-
mendations that resulted from the ex-post evaluations of the PHARE, ISPA
and SAPARD programmes, illustrated below, should be taken into account.
We can generalise them as follows (see AGROTEC 2003; NIK 2003a and
b; and EMS 2003):
1. There is room for simplification of procedures without loosing rigour.
For example, business plans and application forms could be simplified
substantially while still being based on sound economic indicators.
Otherwise, chances are that the rate of uptake will be slow. Further-
more, complexity indirectly benefits larger and wealthier beneficiaries,
who can afford to pay for advice and help. A simplified procedure will
also allow for a reduction in both the amount of supervision needed
and the number of errors to be dealt with.
2. Since infrastructure projects usually have a high uptake but not always
assure a positive impact, it is advisable to introduce stronger economic
assessments for these projects. A proven “good value for money” and a
positive long-term impact from the infrastructure projects should be
primary and compulsory requirements.
3. Since it was observed that smaller projects had difficulties in
competing with larger projects, a good practice would be to have
separate project schemes directed to small projects (firms). It would
guarantee that a certain amount of the funds would be reserved for
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which are believed to be
“engines of growth” in developing countries. It would also allow for
simplification of the procedures up to a certain level of the budget.
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Different types of calls for proposals could also be considered.
4. In some of the structural projects it seems reasonable to introduce an
age limit (requirement) into the qualification procedure. This is
especially important in the fields or regions where young people are
particularly disadvantaged. A good example is the rural labour market
in Poland, where employment opportunities are in short supply.
Therefore, as advised in SAPARD, “youth proofing” should be used
as a criterion in the ranking procedure of project selection.
5. A common problem for all of the pre-accession funds was delays in
starting-up. This problem could possibly be avoided or at least
diminished if the programmes were designed in careful relation to the
resources that were available to implement them. The common
problem of an accumulated workload could be addressed by shorten-
ing the lapses between calls for proposals. On the other hand, in-
troduction of some standards for the number of applications checked
per person per week or month (e.g., 60 projects per person per month)
would allow for planning the sufficient human resources needed to
deal with the accumulated workload.
6. It seems important to differentiate the rates of subsidies in the
projects in order to give higher priority (higher subsidies) to disad-
vantaged areas and groups of people and to “public good” types of
investments, as well as those creating positive externalities (e.g.,
knowledge and technology). This can be introduced by specifying
accurate conditions for qualification of participants.
7. Pre-accession trans-border cooperation proved to be a very efficient
tool of development in the form of economic exchange (trans-border
trade), cultural exchange and tourist and environmental cooperation –
over the years 1994-2001 Poland had realized 320 such projects, where
the main partners were Germany, Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Especially in the field of environmental cooperation, physical country
borders lower the efficiency of environmental protection since the
environment itself is not limited by borders. In that sense the
cooperation is a good example of the value added at the EU level of
these programmes. There are also positive externalities from learning
good practices and exchanging ideas with more advanced “neigh-
bours”, at the level of local administration, entrepreneurs and citizens
in the regions. Therefore, it would be advisable to further promote the
trans-border initiatives, especially in the case of activities that generate
externalities, both positive and negative. In the case of positive
externalities, cooperation should be based on higher exchange and
integration (e.g., in the case of transfer of knowledge and of innova-
tions), while in the case of negative externalities, cooperation should
focus on more effective common prevention (e.g., crime, etc.). In-
centives should be created to encourage local governments to create a
good legal basis for such cooperation for all local societies.
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To conclude, it seems that the pre-accession programmes revealed a need
for better implementation of the pre-accession programmes rather than the
need for a change in their design – although the latter is usually less
problematic. The recommendations suggested above may contribute to
eliminating some of these problems in the future.
4.3 Controversial accession negotiation issues
The Polish approach to the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Policy has
been changing with advancements in integration and by the learning
process initiated by the pre-accession aid. At the final stage of negotia-
tions, Poland had a clear view on what was beneficial for it and it also had
more political power to execute its position, for the simple reason that
Poland was the largest country among the candidates and had a favourable
geographical position lying in the centre of Europe and separating the
Baltic countries from the EU15 Member States. Besides, during the final
negotiations the financial issues became much more important for Poland
than it was in the case of the pre-accession programmes. The funds that
now were to be negotiated were no longer non-refundable, but would be a
part of Poland’s contribution to the EU budget.
Then, unsurprisingly, in the final stages of negotiations some controversies
appeared, even though in the case of Structural Policy they were not very
contentious and were closed quite quickly (long before the final summit) –
unlike agricultural issues, which were discussed until the very last minute
of the summit. The negotiations in the field of “Regional policy and
coordination of the Structural Funds” were opened on 6 April 2000 and
closed on 1 October 2002 (RM 2002). Controversies were mainly related
to financial issues, rather than to the content of European regional policy.
First, Poland claimed that the absorption of the Structural Funds would be
difficult for the country (as the pre-accession programmes revealed), so the
negotiated funds might not be fully utilised. Therefore, Poland proposed
that its contribution to the EU budget should be gradually phased-in,
reaching 100 per cent over a 5-year period, in order to avoid the possibility
of becoming a net contributor to the EU budget during the first years as an
EU Member State. The EU did not agree: the argument was that Poland
had already gained much pre-accession aid and with this aid taken into
account, there should not be a problem of Poland becoming a net con-
tributor. It was expected, however, that Poland would not be able to fully
utilise the allocated share of the Structural Funds from the start.
Second, the Polish negotiation proposition was to shift some funds from
rural development – partly financed from the Structural Funds – to direct
payments to farmers. According to the EU proposition, the system of direct
income payments would be phased-in in Poland (like in the other NMS)
over the period 2004-2013, starting with 25% in 2004 (of the EU-15
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level), 30% in 2005, 35% in 2006, 40% in 2007 and then with added 10%
every year until reaching 100% in 2013. Such a slow pace in the phasing-
in of direct payments was difficult to accept by Poland for both political
and economic reasons. Therefore, Poland suggested the possibility of shift-
ing some rural development funds, which were supposed not to be able to
be absorbed anyway, to the funds for direct payments. The compromise
reached at the European Council in Copenhagen, December 2002 was that
Poland was able to top-up direct payments from rural development funds
up to the levels of 36% in 2004, 39% in 2005, and 42% in 2006 and even
additionally top them up from the national budget up to the limit of 55%
in 2004, 60% in 2005, and 65% in 2006.
Third, Poland was in favour of a higher share of the Cohesion Fund within
structural support because of its more absorbable form, having more
favourable co-financing conditions, quicker procedures, etc. than other
funds. Eventually, Poland obtained €1 billion more for poor regions than
initially proposed by the EU.
Poland also negotiated the territorial division of the country into NUTS
units since the division affects the eligibility criteria of the objectives. All in
all, the whole of Poland was classified eligible for Objective 1 support (but
excluded from Objective 2 and 3) and it also qualified for INTERREG,
EQUAL, URBAN and LEADER.
It is thus clear that the debate during the accession negotiations did not
concern the priorities of the ECP or, for that matter, its congruence with
specific Polish goals, but rather financial and absorption issues. The Polish
government probably followed the logic that overall funds must first be
secured and only then, as a second step, could talks on their distribution
start. Notably, this sequence of events has also been adopted by the EU.
First the budget is given an expenditure (or appropriations) limit and then
distributional issues are raised. Should the opposite sequence be im-
plemented – that is to say, if all countries started their negotiations by
making individual claims on the budget, according to their specific needs
– it would mean that Member States had incentives to maximise their
claims. This would in turn mean a risk of costs sky-rocketing, no matter
how tough the negotiation constraints. A good case in point was the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which substantially increased the EU
budget before any limits on the CAP budget had been implemented.
4.4 Polish problems linked to the conditionality
of the Structural Funds
It was only after Poland had gained experience from the Structural Funds,
that it also gained insight into their full meaning: it thus became clear
which conditions were favourable with respect to Polish preferences and
limitations which were not. Some problems resulted from economic and
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institutional differences between Poland and OMS, differences such as a
different level of development, specific economic needs related to an
unfinished economic transformation, institutional shortcomings, etc. We
may divide Polish problems linked to the conditionality of the Structural
Funds into at least three categories:
1. problems related to the budgetary envelope and the resources of
Cohesion Policy;
2. problems related to the new ECP priorities; and,
3. problems related to the general provision of the Structural Funds,
such as concentration, partnership, programming, co-financing, etc.42
4.4.1 Conditionality linked to budgetary envelope and resources
In the debate on the size of the overall EU budget, Poland does not in
theory perceive any problems, unless the size of the reduced budget affects
the transfer of funds for important priorities. However, there is a real threat
that the small budget option of one per cent or less of EU GNI would
crowd out priorities – possibly important ones – that are not represented by
strong lobbies in Poland. This comment stems from a general observation
of political processes, which show that budget capping never means
proportional cuts. The higher the shortage of funds compared to the needs,
the higher the discrimination against certain priorities. Therefore, in order to
reserve a sufficient amount of funds for important developmental goals and
to avoid crowding out, the one per cent option may be too meagre.
The absorption cap of four per cent of a country’s GDP for Cohesion
Policy, taking into account co-financing abilities and institutional capacity,
seems from the outset to still bring quite enough resources to Poland from
the EU budget (Grosse and Olbrycht 2004). However, it would be harmful
if this cap were to apply for both rural development and the fishery
policies. First, it would in practice imply a trade-off between the goal of
cohesion on the one hand and the rural development goals on the other. As
they are both crucial, they should not be substituted with each other.
According to the Polish National Development Plan, the scheme would
mean that at most 3.55 per cent of GDP would be devoted to Cohesion
Policy and up to 0.45 per cent to rural development and fishery (MG
2005). This implies a decline in funds devoted to Cohesion Policy as such
and a room for manipulation with rural development and fishery funds
(because of the trade-off). Second, it seems quite illogical (or the logic is
hidden) when rural development funding is eliminated from the Structural
Funds and at the same time included into the calculations of the Cohesion
Funds’ absorption level.
42 Some of them are already expressed in the proposed National Development Plan for
2007-2013.
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4.4.2 Conditionality linked to priorities for the
new European Cohesion Policy
As mentioned, the Commission has proposed to exclude rural development
and fishing industry restructuring from the Cohesion Policy framework.
Although it may be perceived as a step towards management simplifica-
tion, which in general is desirable, this step has in fact far-reaching con-
sequences for the scope of Cohesion Policy and the hierarchy of priorities
supported by it. That is to say, the benefits from simplifying policy may be
outweighed by the cost of giving up important goals. As a matter of fact, it
weakens the political significance of the new ECP and strengthens
agricultural policy, which is already dominating the EU budget.
Poland is a very rural country and most of its structural problems are
concentrated there. We agree with Grosse and Olbrycht when they con-
clude that taking funds intended for the development of rural areas out of
regional policy – rather than bringing them closer together – will not con-
tribute to structural improvements in the country (see Grosse and Olbrycht
2004). Nevertheless, the Polish government does not officially reject the
proposal to exclude rural development from Cohesion Policy, since it
probably expects the EU to compromise in areas deemed more important
by the Polish government. 
However, there is an inconsistency in the Polish strategy: on the one hand
it is supporting the idea of a single fund, but, on the other, it forces
through 16 regional programmes.43 We believe that both the single fund
approach and the exclusion of rural development from Cohesion Policy
will be non-beneficial to Poland. We rather support the idea of creating
decentralised Operational Programmes, since they would give more power
to the regions to decide about their own development. Even the Commis-
sion admits that regionalised management is a more effective way of build-
ing regional competitiveness and increasing employment than centralised
management (COM 2004b).
However, we have to keep in mind that it would require a reform on both
European and Polish levels. The EU would have to adjust to deal with 16
representatives of regional administrations – instead of one central
administration – while Poland would have to complete a reform of public
finances and build a solid regional administration structure with well
trained civil servants. Although a step in the right direction, it will take
time and require strategic planning.
The Commission’s proposal to strengthen the priority of competitiveness
within the framework of sustainable development is very much in line with
43 Poland insists on the proposition to include 16 regional operational programmes into
structural policy organisation framework, 50% of the total SF would be spent on these
programmes. So far there was no EU acceptance for this change.
Polish development needs, as Poland suffers from high unemployment and
an unfinished restructuring of the economy. Therefore, the creation of new
objectives, such as the Competitiveness objective and territorial coopera-
tion programmes based on the Lisbon and Gothenburg priorities, seems
beneficial to Poland.
However, it appears that OMS, with few exceptions, are to be sole
beneficiaries of this new objective (see Bachtler and Wishlade 2004).
Although it seems possible to realise some of the activities that are aimed
at raising the level of economic competitiveness and innovativeness under
the Convergence objective (which is directed mainly toward NMS),
experience clearly shows that the financing of these priorities will be
marginalised within this objective (Grosse and Olbrycht 2004), as it
mainly focuses on infrastructure and environmental issues. So if Poland
wants to build an economy based on knowledge and advanced technologies
as well as to develop its human resources – which should be viewed as
absolutely crucial for creating a competitive economy with well function-
ing institutions – it should be either a) in favour of a higher participation
of the NMS in the new Competitiveness objective, or, b) try to find ways
of realising these goals by the resources available through the Cohesion
Fund.
As for the first option, it could be done simply by switching from the
current qualifying condition – which says that the Competitiveness
objective is intended only “to assist all the areas not covered by the Con-
vergence objective” and thus “the current Objective 1 regions no longer be
eligible as a result of their economic progress” (COM 2005) – to condi-
tions based on comparative advantages in the Member States’ product and
labour markets. Thus, the higher the opportunity to utilise comparative
advantage through the funds, the more eligible the country should be for
participation in the programme.
As for the second option, we have to conclude that the possibilities are
limited since the efficiency goals (interpreted as “the utilisation of com-
parative advantages”) are not always in line with the cohesion objectives
(interpreted as “achieving higher equality”). Only in cases where those two
do not contradict can we say that the Cohesion Fund could realise the
policy of higher competitiveness (and in certain cases the employment
objectives).
The proposition of including priorities related to urban areas (including
public transport) and renewable sources of energy is also very much in line
with Polish needs. As pointed out by Kaniewska (2003), increasing the
level of available technical infrastructure in agglomerations in Poland adds
to positive external effects and makes the effective markets larger.
Therefore, regional actions should aim at upgrading the existing transport
infrastructure, including public transport in the dominant urban areas. The
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public transport constitutes the driving force of local development and fast
railway networks around the cities should be considered an important
priority, as they increase the shuttle migration and thus makes local labour
markets more flexible. Second, Poland has a potential to become a
significant producer of renewable energy, especially biomass, since it is a
major producer of wood, straw, oil and alcohol in Europe (Council of
Ministries 2000). In addition, extending the priorities within the Cohesion
Fund to include local transport would increase flexibility of measures, such
as the possibility of combining the trans-European infrastructure with the
transport infrastructure of agglomerations.
At the same time, the introduction of this priority implies an increase in
local governments’ decision power and financial autonomy, because the
scale of the agglomeration projects is local and would not require inter-
regional actions. Self-governments would thus be able to programme and
finance the policy themselves. So far the programming in the area of
transportation within the Cohesion Fund has been much centralised and
this proposition would be beneficial from both the viewpoint of Polish
development priorities, as well as from an institution building perspective.
However, there is a risk that the expected increase in the share of the
Cohesion Fund in financing Cohesion Policy (see Table 4.1) may lead to a
centralisation of management. Therefore, the advice would be to use more
regional initiatives within the framework of the Cohesion Fund.
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However, problems will arise if too much priority is given to transport
infrastructure investments (as pointed out by Grosse and Olbrycht 2003b).
First, it may strengthen the political and programme-management role of
the central authority at the expense of territorial self-governments. Second,
as experiences with ISPA have shown, the Polish administration has had
difficulties with the management of such projects when they have been too
large. Third, it is clear from the evaluation of the pre-accession funds that
the effectiveness of these investments differed significantly across the
country – e.g., the building of a road may not necessarily boost develop-
ment (the Greek experience too serves as a good example of this insight).
4.4.3 Conditionality linked to the general provision
of the Structural Funds
Generally, it seems important to simplify the provision of the funds wher-
ever possible, while at the same time preserving their main principles of
assuring efficiency and effectiveness of policy. There is a general percep-
tion that the procedures and centralisation of the management system
caused many delays and constraints in Poland, so there is a postulate to
focus management and the provision of the funds more on the results
rather than on advancing the procedures (Grosse and Olbrycht 2003c). In
this context, the Commission’s proposal to include the principle of pro-
portionality – which would make requirements toward programming,
monitoring and evaluation of programmes proportional to their size, thus
reducing the red tape in small projects – should be viewed as a positive
element in the proposed ECP reform.
Another problem concerns the proposal related to the n + 2 principle,
which has applied so far to the Structural Funds and is now proposed by
the Commission to be extended to the Cohesion Fund. Hence the financial
resources assigned for a given year must be absorbed by the country in
question within the next three years. This may become a problem in
Poland, at least during the first years after accession, because of a less
experienced administration (as revealed during the implementation of the
pre-accession programmes). We can therefore expect to see a situation
where a large proportion of granted resources will not be used in the
required spending period. Although the unexploited funds would not be
wasted, but transferred back to the EU budget and distributed differently,
the fact is that they would not be used by Poland and it is therefore in the
interest of Poland not to extend the n + 2 rule to the Cohesion Fund, at
least in the early stages of its membership.
Some problems may also appear due to the proposal to exclude VAT from
eligible expenditures in projects co-financed through both the ERDF and
the Cohesion Fund (although it would still be eligible expenditures in ESF
projects). The proposition to exempt VAT from the country’s own con-
tribution makes the co-financing requirements for the beneficiary country
harder to fulfil, since the domestic contribution will rise dramatically. For
those beneficiaries of the policy that are not registered as VAT payers –
that is a large part of public administration e.g., local governments and
universities – the domestic contribution for the realisation of projects from
the ERDF will increase from the current share of 33.3 per cent of the EU
funds to 62.7 per cent and, in the case of the Cohesion Fund, from 17.6 per
cent to 43.5 per cent. The problem may also arise in some cases for
beneficiaries who are VAT payers (MG 2005). The old system is therefore
more beneficial for Poland than the proposed new one.
Furthermore, it is in the interest of Poland to postulate a higher flexibility
in the allocation of the funds. One step towards achieving this objective
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would be to let the funds allocated to the country be transferable. The flow
between funds within a country would go from operational programmes
(or regional programmes) that do not use up the funds to programmes that
need more funding. It would create a positive incentive – to focus on high
efficiently rather than on absorption capacity (the latter is the case when
there is a threat of unused funds being returned to the EU budget). The
Commission’s proposal to start management and allocation of the funds at
the level of priorities rather than measures is a good step towards higher
flexibility.
The concept of matching funding represents another challenge. However,
the problem lies mostly on the Polish side, as the country has an alarm-
ing situation with respect to its public finances.44 This has at least two
consequences: first it may result in problems co-financing the programmes
(at the required level up to 25%) and, second, even if the funds are set
aside for co-financing, there may be little or no resources left for the
realisation of a domestic regional policy. So, on the one hand, there is a
threat that domestic policy will be marginalised – that is to say, that the
ECP will be prioritised at the expense of domestic policy – but, on the
other hand, the situation may cause a positive pressure on Poland to make
the programmes financed within the EU policy consistent and synergic
with those planned within the scope of domestic policy.        
The principle of partnership, introduced within the Structural Policy
framework, is a useful tool for reducing the problem of asymmetric in-
formation among different agents involved in the regional development
process. Unfortunately, the law on public-private partnership has not yet
been introduced in Poland. The current law proposal seems to be quite
unfavourable to private entrepreneurs. This threatens the involvement of
the private sector in projects and their contribution, as a consequence, may
become negligible. The other aspect of the partnership principle, which
concerns the relationship between local and central levels of administra-
tion, is the strong centralisation of decision making and finances for
regional programmes, caused by the delay of the public finances reform
and amplified by the government’s much stronger position at all stages
when negotiating with local representatives. It may result both in conflicts
of interests and sector policy domination, rather than the predominance of
regional/horizontal perspectives.
The principle of concentration of funds also seems to be a good proposal,
but should in the Polish case give much more support to priorities related
to development of an advanced economy and of entrepreneurship, rather
than the transport and environmental infrastructure (as has been the case
44 To name but two telling examples: the central budget deficit amounts to almost five per cent
of GDP, which is above the three per cent threshold that applies for Member States that wish
to join the Euro, and the decentralisation of public finances has not been carried out yet.
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so far). They ought to be based on a domestic strategy of structural
economic development and a domestic regional development policy. While
the plan should take into account the evolving ECP, it must nevertheless
consider Polish strategic interests, which so far seem to be missing.
Concentration causes selection bias towards larger projects and crowding
out of smaller and more demanding projects (related to entrepreneurship,
knowledge, etc.). This is because investment in infrastructure is less
troublesome for public administration than investments in innovation
programmes, which to some extent makes it easier to utilise a greater share
of the EU’s resources.
However, as shown by the experience gained in other parts of the world,
the impact of infrastructure investments on economic development is
limited, while investments in production based on advanced technologies
are much more effective for stimulating local economic network resources.
Besides, it can be expected that large infrastructure development contracts
will be won by more competitive EU enterprises.45 However, despite the
fact that innovations and technologies are the driving forces of a higher
development, it is not certain to what extent Poland would be able to
absorb such projects given the current state of human capital. So all in all,
a mix of basic infrastructure and innovative projects seems optimal, with a
tendency towards increasing the share of the latter over time.
Another challenge linked to the provision of the Structural Funds is long
term planning. An examination of the projects submitted within pre-
accession programmes shows that many potential beneficiaries lacked
administrative imagination and long-term planning skills. In particular,
there was a deficiency with respect to sequential thinking abilities and
strategic planning. Local strategies, often developed just for show, were not
helpful in specifying development priorities and creating good business
plans. The practice of filling out PHARE project applications showed that
the wish to spend the EU’s funds, for whatever purpose, rather than use
them sensibly and for the benefit of local interests, was more important
than their real impact (Grosse and Olbrycht 2003a).
The National Development Plan (NDP) for 2004-2006 also shows a lack of
visions and strategic planning as regards development policy and has been
widely criticised for the lack of long-term targets. Besides, despite proper
definitions of Polish needs, there is no clear list of priorities of development
goals. The document only provides an institutional framework for regional
spending financed through the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, but
gives no clear guidance as to how these goals should be achieved.
45 This proved to be the case with most contracts on projects that were conducted within the
framework of PHARE; see Grosse (2003a).
A lot of attention is given to two specific sectors of the economy: public
infrastructures (mainly roads) and environmental infrastructures im-
provement; it is, however, not clearly justified as to why they are perceived
as top priorities. It gives yet again the impression that absorption is the
priority, which would explain the focus on large, “easy-to-absorb”,
projects. Furthermore, despite the obvious importance of small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), clearly defined priorities are lacking. In
general, there is little evidence of a national development strategy in the
NDP, such as actions that stimulate economic growth in the medium and
long term: rather, it looks like a shopping list.
The new NDP for 2007-2013 has retained similar deficiencies as regards
priorities and the setting of long term targets, even though improvements
are visible. The recommendation from this experience is to call for the
initiation of all types of learning schemes that would solve these problems,
examples of which could be training provided by the Commission, setting
up networks of experts between OMS and NMS, as well as between the
Commission and NMS, to communicate advice and experience.
4.5 What should be done?
According to some countries’ propositions, priorities within the Structural
Policy framework should be given to regions lagging behind, and in
particular, the objective of Cohesion Policy should change from reducing
disparities between regions to reducing disparities between countries,
allowing the countries to reduce territorial imbalances themselves.
From a Polish perspective this sounds reasonable as, firstly, it prioritises
CEECs with respect to financial flows; secondly, for countries that have
recently experienced a liberalisation process, the territorial divergence may
increase in the early stages when the economy faces strong international
competition. As transaction costs diminish over time and adequate economic
reforms are implemented, regional disparities are expected to decrease. In
this case, the efforts should focus on overall economic growth and leave
aside territorial imbalances, as they can be seen as temporary or at least
influenced by forces outside the scope of Structural Policy, e.g., tax policies.
It also means a gradual re-nationalisation of regional policy, compared to
its current shape and form, which should be linked to national priorities
and managed on the national rather than the European level. There is still
room for action coordinated “from Brussels” when a particular Member
State cannot manage some of its regional problems alone, or when they are
making others worse off. Concerning the general aim of the regional
policy, even though national rather than regional convergence seems to be
a reasonable approach to us, the question remains as to which factors
stimulate growth and should be prioritised within a growth-oriented
Structural Policy. This is true regardless of whether Structural Policy is
managed on a regional, national or supranational level. 
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To answer these questions we start with the official proposals made by the
Polish government. They have been presented in many documents on
economic strategies, but the most important document is the NDP. The
first draft of the NDP for the period 2007-2013 (MG 2005) was approved
by the Cabinet in January 2005 and subsequently put for further public
discussion. In contrast to the previous Plan for 2004-2006, the document
proclaims a diversified and complex set of programmes and actions that
target social and economic reforms. Some of the activities have to be
covered under the ECP’s financial scheme, and some of policy actions are
designed to be financed solely from domestic sources (central or local
government financing). 
The fundamental questions, from the point of view of directions and
targets, set out in the NDP, are:
• how to reinforce competitiveness and maintain social, economic and
territorial cohesion priorities;
• how to sustain a high rate of economic growth;
• how to transform the regions in economic and social decline into the
growth poles;
• what kind of institutional changes should be implemented in order to
make Poland a citizenship country with a self-governmental base;
• how to redefine economic and social priorities into goals and strategies
which are much more knowledge and information oriented.
The above issues are very broadly defined and need to be followed by
more strict and detailed strategies (see Table 4.2 for a detailed distribution
of financial means for operational programmes).
Unfortunately, we do not see clear answers to the above problems in the
NDP, which lacks a transparent vision on the development prospects for
Poland. Grosse showed that the NDP lacks a definition of national
priorities and suggested that building a knowledge based economy should
become the principal strategic goal for the years to come (Grosse 2005). In
this paper, we would like to focus on a number of other aspects of
development, which we consider to be the basic challenges facing Poland
in the process of integration into the EU:
• to improve human capital through basic education (primary and
secondary education), life-long learning opportunities for workers,
and socially related initiatives;
• to improve environmental standards;
• to improve transport networks; 
• to build a knowledge based economy through R&D initiatives;
• to implement institutional reforms and  to restructure the budget.
At first glance there are similarities with the priorities defined in the NDP.
However, there are also differences in the details, which we would like to
address here. Some of the strategic target areas are closely linked to the
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orientation of the ECP, such as environmental and transport policies, but
others, like institutional reforms, are also related to a wider EU policy
framework, since they are crucial for improving the ECP’s effectiveness in
Poland.
We also provide novel insights with regard to policy on human capital
formation, in particular a proposal for a “Common European Education
Policy”. From the viewpoint of Lisbon Strategy targets, there is a need to
set priorities for the EU as a whole in areas in which there is a role for
82
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????? ??????? ???????
???????????????????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????????????? ????? ?????
????????????????????????? ??????? ??????
??????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
???????????????????????? ??????? ???????
?????????????????????? ??????? ???????
??????? ????????????????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????????? ?????? ?????
????????????????? ??????? ??????
?????????????? ??????? ??????
?????????????????????????? ??????? ??????
???????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
???????????????????????? ??????? ??????
????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
???????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
?????????????? ????? ?????
????????????? ????? ?????
???????????????? ????? ?????
???????? ???????
????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
????? ???????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????
???????? ????????
supra-national authorities to supply European public goods – and basic
education is arguably one of the most important public goods which
generates positive external effects. Financing basic education should then
be channelled through the Structural Funds in order to increase the
European Added Value and reduce market failures in the provision of
educational services in the EU. 
4.5.1 Upgrading skills through education
One of the main factors that influences regional, as well as national,
competitiveness in attracting direct investments is the level of skills of the
average worker. The higher the educational level in a region, the higher the
expected labour productivity in the eyes of potential investors. That is to
say, the localisation decisions of R&D intensive industries are strongly
linked to the educational level. Furthermore, the literature on economic
growth shows a positive and significant relation between education, human
capital and growth (see, for example, Mankiw et al. 1992). Numerous
studies have focused on positive externalities from education, in particular
basic education, and its importance in social capital formation (see Temple
2000 or McMahon 2004 for a review of the literature).
The existence of positive externalities calls for public financing in the
education sector, as private agents choose a level of education that is re-
garded as lower than the socially optimal level. While it can be regarded as
obvious that public financing or co-financing of educational services needs
to take place on the national level, we would like to stress the necessity of
supra-national co-ordination of educational services in the EU, especially
at the primary and secondary levels as these externalities are spread
Europe-wide as barriers to migration diminish. We start with a short
presentation of the characteristics of the education sector in Poland, and, to
some extent, in other NMS.  
The research conducted by Barry revealed that educational attainment –
the percentage of persons with at least upper secondary, tertiary B
(diploma level), or tertiary A (degree level) – of the population aged 25-34
in the late 1990s in Poland was below the OECD average (Barry 2003).
The general opinion that Poles have an insufficient command of foreign
languages, such as English, French or German, seems to us to be true. This
is partly explained by the fact that Russian was the only obligatory foreign
language taught in most primary and secondary schools until the late
1980s. As other studies have shown (see EC COM 2004), foreign language
skills among young Europeans are low: in 2000, one and a half foreign
languages were taught per student, but the target set at the Barcelona
summit in March 2000 was for 2 foreign languages per student.
Furthermore, the situation in NMS is worse than in OMS, as indicated by
the overall results of students from NMS, which were much below the
OMS average in 2000. PISA studies (OECD 2000) have revealed that 23.2
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per cent of students below 15 years of age in Poland showed the lowest
level of generic skills, compared to the EU average of 17.2 per cent (in
Bulgaria and Romania it was more than 40, in Latvia 30.1, in Hungary
22.7 and in the Czech Republic 17.5 per cent).46
When human capital is low, it causes severe constraints on development
prospects, particularly in the case of regions that are located outside
agglomerations. Limited access to education in rural Poland undermines
social cohesion. In the cities the situation is the opposite; a higher level of
foreign language courses in schools (i.e., more lessons), better access to
private educational services and higher aspirations of inhabitants, increases
the gap in human capital level between core (the cities) and periphery.
There is no doubt that Poland and other post-communist countries will
have to increase their investments in education (as a share of GDP) and
upgrade skills in order to catch up with other European countries and to
draw the benefits from integration and the world division of labour. A
survey conducted by the World Bank revealed that the levels of public
expenditure on education remained broadly stable in 1995-2000 in the
NMS. In 2000 it ranged from roughly 3.1 per cent of GDP in Romania, to
6.5 per cent of GDP in Estonia and Latvia (Funck 2002). Bulgaria,
Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced particularly severe
declines in this period.
However, growth in public expenditure for education in Poland is relatively
high (the growth in education expenditures has been 36.5 per cent since
1995). Unfortunately, this moderate education sector rise is not accompanied
by a rise in efficiency and quality of education, since a major share of the
increase can be attributed to a rise in wages. The authors of a report on rural
education in Poland proposed a significant reallocation of resources within
the education sector, as well as new public spending over the next 5 to 10
years (Golinowska et al. 2001). Indeed, because of the already high fiscal
burden on Polish taxpayers, they were convinced that over the long term the
improvement in Polish education must rely principally on a better use of
existing expenditures, in particular the reallocation of resources and also
moderation with respect to the new spending proposals.
According to the authors of the World Bank report, decentralisation has
had a crucial and often negative effect on the resources available at the
local level for education (Funck 2002). The small size of local govern-
46 Reforming the educational system has been proposed as one of the basic priorities in Joint
Assessment Papers signed by all Visegrad Countries in years 2000-2001.The Visegrad
Countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The name stems from the
Visegrad agreement, taken in Visegrad, Hungary, in 1991, in which the then three
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) countries agreed to coordinate their policies with a
view to apply for EU membership.
ments is leading to mismanagement, as there is less potential for eco-
nomies of scale and synergy effects. The system also maintains large local
differences in access to educational services, since relatively wealthier
local authorities can finance basic education more generously than author-
ities in poorer areas.
There is greater dispersion in student assessment results for CEECs than
for the OECD average and the differences are much more linked to inter-
school than to intra-school variation. The greater between-school differenc-
es may be attributed to the decentralisation policy within the education
sector in all the CEECs. School attendance is falling gradually in rural
areas, where families cannot afford to cover the costs of transport if it is
not covered by the local communities.
The problem is especially pronounced in the case of secondary and post-
secondary education, since remoteness of schools is often a constraint for
students and their families. As a result, post-secondary education institu-
tions are often under pressure to operate on a week-end basis and it is in
these cases unrealistic to maintain a satisfactory educational quality. The
authors of another report estimated that young people from rural areas
constituted about ten per cent of daily course students at state universities
and about six to seven per cent of evening and weekend course studies –
so the number of young people from rural areas who decide to continue
their studies at the university level is not enough to meet the needs (FRPR
2002). As the Commission pays considerable attention to the quality of
university studies as a factor of regional development, we expect that
further actions must be planned and implemented to ensure equal access to
universities for all candidates.
It is not only the financing of education – where local authorities are under
the obligation to finance basic education – that poses a problem to self-
governments in the CEECs: any attempts at increasing the flexibility of
teachers’ employment status and efficiency of staff management are
hampered by a powerful union, The Union of Polish Teachers (Zwia˛zek
Nauczycielstwa Polskiego). A reduction in the number of redundant teach-
ers, at all levels, would improve the efficiency of the system. The student/
teacher ratio in basic education is low in all the CEECs; in Poland it was
15.4 per cent in 1997, while the OECD average the same year was 17.1
per cent. However, the downsizing of staff is problematic.
As the share of the schooling-aged population is expected to decrease even
further in the future, while at the same time the teachers’ unsatisfactory
employment situation can be expected to remain unchanged, major inef-
ficiencies within the system will be maintained and the financial situation
of local education administration will deteriorate. The process of
establishing a regional-level management for schools – i.e., management
on a higher level than the existing local level – in order to capture the
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efficiency gains from economies of scale is now highly recommended. The
system of per student financing, which allows the allocation to be easily
transferred to students who attend schools in other regions, may also be a
reasonable solution. The authors of the World Bank report concluded that
it was necessary to reorient education so that it would meet global know-
ledge needs, on top of an institutional and management reform (Funck
2002).
In Poland, where the decentralisation of education was only part of a
broader reform of the education system, mainly implemented by Mr
Buzek’s right-wing cabinet, the reform of the education system, as in other
CEECs, can be seen as a partial success. Local education authorities had to
introduce some unpopular changes, such as the closing-down of many
local schools that were dispersed in the rural areas and where the class size
was below minimum, but other rationalisations of the system have still not
been carried out by the central government.
The school rationalisation programme has to this day been limited to the
consolidation process. A small reduction in employment has also taken
place. Furthermore, the education path has been changed, new institutions
have settled and others have been modified. Children are obliged to start
school at the age of 6, which is one year earlier than before, follow a one-
year preparatory “0-class”, then six-year primary school, three-year
gymnasium and three-year secondary school, completed by a Matura exam.
The system contains an external examination at the entrance of each stage
of the education – pupils must pass the exam to enter primary school,
gymnasium and secondary school. When secondary school graduates
holding the Matura certification decide to continue their education at the
university level, they must pass the exams and fulfil other requirements
demanded by the universities. The system is under modification in order to
introduce the commonly accepted Matura certification, which will replace
the examination procedure for entering any institution of the higher
education.
The main difficulty in the education sector that governments in the CEECs
are struggling with is the increase in differences between schools, especially
the gap between schools in urban and rural areas. We therefore opt for a
universal financing of primary and secondary education services. The
central financing of teachers’ salaries and school utilities should be main-
tained and only part of the expenditures should remain under the purview
of local government. It would help reduce national differences in education
level, but without a common policy on the supra-national level it would not
eliminate the uneven situation with respect to human capital endowments
between OMS and NMS. In our view, even if we assume a steady growth of
expenditure on education in NMS, national policies fail to tackle the educa-
tion sector problems correctly.
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In sum, we strongly recommend that domestic education policy should be
reinforced by a common education policy and that common education
policy should be carried out within the framework of Cohesion Policy,
with similar financial priorities as in environment or regional policy. For
the new Financial Perspective, we propose to reinforce the actions on
stimulating the quality of education and training in the Union. As program-
mes aiming at improving education at post-secondary and higher level, as
well as vocational training, have been already planned, we strongly re-
commend the establishment of a new fund to finance basic education in the
NMS under the 1a heading “Competitiveness for growth and employment”.
The main priority of the fund would be the improvement of the primary and
secondary education in the NMS, in order to catch up with the educational
standards in other EU countries. Since the benefits of human capital
upgrading in one country are spread over the EU, common action should be
taken to reinforce individual country efforts.
One of the questions that needs to be answered is how we should deal with
the external effects produced within the education sector. Furthermore,
since local authorities consider spending on education as an investment in
human capital, they expect a high rate of return from these investments in
the medium term. The probability of attracting new investors into the
region, especially R&D intensive FDI, increases, since the region becomes
better endowed with high quality workers. However, until a critical mass of
well educated workers in a specific region is reached, the region will not
welcome new investments, resulting in an outflow of workers. This
phenomenon is called the backwash effect.
The labour force will be looking for employment at another location,
whether it is another region within a country, or, when barriers to interna-
tional migration fall, abroad. The region will be vulnerable to the process
of negative circular causation, even if an internationally comparable level
of the region’s own resources is spent on public education. Local govern-
ments may then be pushed to limit public spending on basic education and
reallocate expenditures to less “mobile” assets, such as transport or public
health care infrastructures.
On the other hand, a region with a high inflow ratio will benefit from an
educated labour force that is well endowed with human capital. At the
same time, the inflow region or country benefits from the external effects
generated by the newcomers. As the market cannot estimate education
costs and the overall external effects of education, it will not be able to
deal with it properly. In this sense, the inflow region will not be able to
compensate the outflow region for either its education investments or for
its own external effects benefits. Therefore, the government, or another
central agency, must intervene.
The policies to be implemented must also eliminate the free rider problem,
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which widens national educational differences, and the prisoner’s dilemma.
The latter keeps basic educational expenditure on a low level in the entire
country, since no region will voluntarily supply a public good. We must
remember that education is a public good and that the government, or the
self-government, is under the obligation to ensure high standards in provid-
ing education as a universal service in all regions.
The problems described above are not confined to the national level alone –
that is to say, to labour flows within a country – they apply to the European
level as well, since they concern the labour flows within the EU. Thus,
supranational action on the European level should be implemented and a
common education policy established within the Cohesion Policy schedule.
It seems to us to be a very convincing argument that common action in
education should be financed “from Brussels” and that an immigration
policy, which may improve the mobility of workers, should be coordinated
with the education policies of each Member State. A European immigration
policy, which should be viewed as crucial to employment policies, is almost
neglected so far as the European agenda is concerned. In the words of
Professor Tito Boeri, immigration policy is “a great absentee in Lisbon”
(Boeri 2005).
In order to improve the effectiveness of public spending on basic
education, strict standards in education as well as in life-long learning
procedures and requirements must be established. Countries lagging be-
hind in keeping high standards would benefit from equalisation grants
managed under a common education policy. To assure higher efficiency of
the programmes, the cooperation between central and local government in
managing the education sector must be much closer than it is now.
Conversely, local governments should be more free in choosing the best
model for encouraging the entrepreneurs to provide life-long learning
opportunities in a region. As life-long learning is not vulnerable to the
negative backwash effect, there is no room for actions (national or supra-
national) under a common policy of all Member States. Increasing labour
productivity through life-long education should be both directly and
indirectly subsidised by national governments. Policy actions in this field
include: tax incentives on training for both employers providing training
and for workers or unemployed taking part in training; subsidies to public
libraries; and tax exemption on subscriptions to professional papers.
Interventions on the European level are not needed. According to Lindley
(2003), generic skills usually relate to:
• communication – literacy;
• application of numbers – numeracy;
• problem solving;
• working with others;
• improving own learning and performance;
• knowledge of information technology – computer literacy.
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As these skills should be acquired during regular basic education (in
primary and secondary schools), we believe continuous education would
be much more effective if students had a sound basic education, so the
priority should be given to the latter, rather than to life-long learning.
There are, however, convincing arguments for managing basic education
on a supranational level, as structural problems in this field call for
international coordination. Martin (1998b) provides a number of arguments
for pursuing a two-level regional policy, namely the European and national
regional policy:
• the “financial targeting” argument – the poorer Member States are
unable to target their regional problems themselves, thus the EU has
to provide the necessary resources;
• the “external effect” argument – solution solving the regional
problems (such as environmental and social problems) in one Member
State will benefit the Union as a whole;
• the “effect of integration” argument – when benefits from integration
are not evenly spread across the EU, a redistribution mechanism is
required to minimise the inequalities;
• the “effect of coordination of other policies” argument – similarly to
the argument  above, some countries benefit relatively less from other
policies (in particular from CAP and transport policy oriented towards
the Trans-European Transport Networks) and therefore the relative
losers should be compensated by EU regional policy tools.
This line of reasoning, i.e., complementing national and European educa-
tion policies, is similar to Martin’s argument. The authors of this study are
deeply convinced that if education policy were to be given a supranational
perspective – the European Education Policy, within the ECP framework
and with its own funds (the “Education Fund”) and supranational
coordination – it would provide better European Added Value than were
management of education to remain solely under national jurisdiction,
since a common coordinated policy would eliminate some of the market
failures. If status quo is to be retained it will result in further distortion of
the labour markets in the EU. In sum, similarities between environmental
problems and education problems, which in our view do exist, suggest that
both should be treated from a similar supranational viewpoint and with
similar financial tools.
The Polish government is rather pragmatically oriented on any aspect of
the ECP and there is no room for a more fundamental discussion on
priorities. In the NDP for 2007-2013, problems related to education are
almost neglected, but the disparities with respect to access to education, in
all CEECs, provide a good argument for having a broader discussion on
the future of the domestic education policy, which should take place
among theoreticians and practitioners. We recommend that the idea of an
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education policy, managed from both the national and supranational levels,
is given consideration in the discussion.
4.5.2Upgrading human capital through social related initiatives
In general, enhancing human capital within the framework of regional
activities is limited to programmes aimed at combating unemployment and
social exclusion, since – marginal programmes notwithstanding – not all
levels of education fall into the scope of Cohesion Policy. The experience
with pre-accession aid showed that discrepancies in targets to be achieved
between EC and Polish authorities seemed to be the greatest in the field of
social policy. Social problems vary between Member States, as there were
different opinions on how to solve some of the most important problems.
In other words, there are differences in both priorities and in opinions as to
the methods that will achieve specific goals. That is why social policy
should be planned and managed under a domestic policy.
We see, however, some room for Community initiatives. Community grants
could be obtained by the most successful NGOs in the field of social
exclusion in order to make the social organisations more independent from
central or local budget financing. In Poland, almost one-third of civil
society organisations’ income comes from public funds, while the rest
comes from a growing amount of contributions and private donations.
Nevertheless, a number of the small NGOs that operate in the field of
social welfare are faced with substantial financial difficulties, despite
using available financial, material and organisational resources very
efficiently. Several examples exist of organisations that have been very
successful in providing non-governmental safety nets for the very poor.47
The possibility of obtaining grants makes the pressure on central budget
financing less constrained.
4.5.3 Upgrading environmental standards
The NMS are obliged to comply with a number of environment related
directives in order to improve the quality of the environment in their
respective countries. Roughly half of Cohesion Fund measures and to
some extent the Structural Funds (for compliance with the sanitary
standards in agricultural production and food processing) will be trans-
ferred directly to the regions under clearly defined programs. However, the
cost of improving environmental protection standards is a considerable
financial burden for central and local authorities alike. This having been
said, the benefits from such investments usually overpass the costs. The
World Bank report revealed that the benefit-to-cost ratio was usually
greater than 1, although not always and not for all NMS (Funck 2002).
47 Reflecting Polish tradition, social aid organisations tend to be linked to the Catholic
Church; see World Bank (2004).
Poland has generally experienced a high benefit-to-cost ratio, but a number
of improvements with respect to the implementation of the directives on
waste management should be introduced.
The problem of co-financing is experienced by all NMS, including Poland,
and further difficulties can be expected until other environmental funds
can be established on the same basis as the previous funds (funds receive
payments from pollution fees and charges), as their consistency with the
EU institutions are not always clear. From the perspective of the World
Bank and IMF, outside-budgetary earmarked funds in environmental
financing are not encouraging. These institutions have almost always asked
for the eco-fund to be part of the consolidated budget (see Funck 2002 for
additional policy recommendations).
Additional institutional changes are crucial for improving the efficiency of
environmental funding – the consolidation of small ecological funds is but
one example – and the privatisation of polluting industries in CEECs are
recommended. The obligation that each individual environment related
investment should be subjected to a thorough cost-to-benefit analysis
should be institutionally implemented. Under the present system, such
analyses are very often only a recommendation.
4.5.4 Upgrading transport networks 
The quality of the road network in Poland is slightly below the CEEC
average. The length of roads with European standards for axle loads
(11.5 t/axle) amounts to 637 km, which represents 3.5 per cent of the road
density. A lack of major modernisation and maintenance investments in the
past, a rapid increase in domestic motorisation and heavy international
trucking resulted in higher transportation costs, as transport is slow and
unsafe, and congestion on some roads. Rail transport also causes obstacles
to rapid growth and development, since almost half of the network only fits
a low standard of transportation, i.e., a maximum speed of 60 km per hour.
Concerning the peripherality of the regions, Schuermann and Talaat
showed that transport infrastructure plays an important role in calculations
of peripherality, where peripherality is measured as the travel costs
between two points within the overall region, weighted by the purchasing
power that each point represents (Schuermann and Talaat 2000, cited in
Barry 2003). According to their paper, the most peripheral regions at
present are the Baltic countries, northern Sweden and Finland, Bulgaria
and Romania. Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and
the southwest corner of Poland are no more peripheral than Ireland,
Portugal or Spain and less peripheral than Greece. 
While deteriorated conditions of the transport infrastructure call for major
investments in order to support local development and growth, attempts at
expanding the motorway network too rapidly and to standards that are not
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always economically justified have already diverted funds away from
maintenance and development, according to the World Bank report (Funck
2002).
The construction of the highway network in Poland, employing both the
Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds, takes up a major part of the
financial budget for the upgrading of the transportation system. With
respect to the financing of such investment projects, road and highway
construction may not necessarily lead to regional development: it may even
cause an economic slowdown if construction is financed by an increase in
tax charges. Regional and industrial mismanagement can lead to further
economic deterioration, which seems to have been the case in Italy in the
1980s, when regional divergence – the North-South dualism – deepened
(Cellini and Scorcu 1995).48
Transport costs play a crucial role in influencing industrial location
because they constitute a large share of total costs. It is usually assumed
that there exists a positive relationship between transport infrastructure and
regional development and growth. However, the causation of this relation
is not defined and higher productivity from transport investments are in
many cases likely to be overestimated. While higher infrastructure invest-
ments drive faster growth, higher development is related to a higher rate of
spending on infrastructure.
Martin (1998b), using data on infrastructure spending in the EU during the
1980s and 1990s drawn from a project conducted by Biehl, demonstrated a
high and positive impact of telecommunications endowments on regional
growth. None of the other infrastructure investments had a similar impact
on regional growth in the EU. The same relation was tested for data on
Polish regions during the period of 1989-1998 by Cies´lik and Kaniewska
(2004). The empirical results confirmed a positive and statistically signi-
ficant causal relationship between telecommunications endowments and
regional income.
49
However, the impact of transportation endowments, as
48 The infrastructure investments are considered to lead to a crowding-out effect when public
investments are financed from taxes. In Italy regional policies failed and caused even
further increase in income differences between northern and southern regions in the 1980s.
Cellini and Scorcu tested the relationship between public spending on infrastructure and
economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s in Italy and showed that there was a negative
correlation between the variables.
49 The authors proposed that regional income differences could be reduced as a result of
government attempts to assure common access to telecommunication services across the
country, possibly by means of adopting universal service regulations, or sharing the cost of
network expansion in the least developed regions. These actions could be complemented by
instituting special programmes for the development of access to advanced
telecommunication services in the least developed regions similar to those implemented
earlier in the cohesion countries in the 1980s and 1990s with the financing scheme under
the Structural Funds arrangements. However, given the rather low effectiveness of the these
programmes and the legal problems of the enforcement of universal service obligations, we
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represented by the public road network density, on income in Polish
regions was not significant and revealed that the role played by the
transportation infrastructure in promoting national and regional growth is
ambiguous.50
The survey conducted by the World Bank revealed that most of the CEECs
continue to finance their motorway expansion programmes by public
resources, since the public-private partnership in this sector has failed. This
failure has in turn been the result of a very weak institutional framework,
an almost nonexistent regulatory capacity and local financial market
opportunities and a risky and unstable economic situation (Funck 2002).
This is especially the case in Hungary and Poland, where road network
building poses severe financial constrains on the central budget and
worsens the budget deficit. Thus, the continuation of the programme calls
for prudent economic evaluation, including traffic projection, impact on
environment (with the use of costs/benefit analysis), and analysis of the
European Added Value of a specific infrastructure investment.51
4.5.5 Building the knowledge based economy
– investments in R&D
A detailed analysis of the NDP suggests that the Polish government has
not been able to produce a clearly defined growth oriented strategy for
Poland. Since economic growth and competitiveness of the cohesion
countries Portugal and Ireland depended on a strategy of attracting FDI
inflows, this strategy could also prove to be successful in the case of the
Polish economy. Ireland succeeded in attracting FDI in high technology
industries, but most of the FDI in Portugal flowed into sectors that were
not technologically advanced.
Grosse has proposed that Poland should build a “knowledge based
economy” and strengthen competitiveness by aiming for a rapid growth in
R&D, upgrading education and orient policy towards supporting enter-
prises in technologically advanced sectors, as well as institutional building
in these fields (Grosse 2005). The Scandinavian countries provide a good
example of how to become successful in this respect, as they caught up
with the most R&D advanced countries in a relatively short period of time.
think now that a liberalisation of the telecommunication market is a much more effective
and less costly policy. The improvement in access to telecommunication services in Poland,
especially in rural areas, was a result of a reduction of monopolistic power in this sector,
and strong competition on the cellular phones market.
50 Whether it had a negative or positive impact depended on the equation specification.
51 The Polish Ministry of Transport is going to expand the road network to the eastern
undeveloped part of Poland. We think that such investments do not guarantee high European
Added Value, as weak economic justification of these investment (road traffic is
dramatically reduced going east of Warsaw, its prospects are uncertain as trade with post-
soviet countries pose many doubts) and high environmental costs give high cost-to-benefit
ratios for both Poles and other EU citizens.
However, since the human capital and average worker skills endowment is
very low in Poland, we assume that such a strategy could only be
considered as a long term target. The average level of budgetary and non-
budgetary spending on R&D in Poland has been falling gradually from the
beginning of the 1990s and is roughly 0.7 per cent per annum the last 12
years, far below the EU average. The aim to increase R&D funds up to 1.5
per cent of GDP in 2006, which is the strategy for the next Financial
Perspective (MG 2005), seems unrealistic. The falling trend in R&D
spending and low competitiveness of basic research areas have resulted in
a low number of submitted patents and deterioration of terms of trade in
R&D intensive industries. Since Poland is a net-importer of high
technology intensive products, a radical decision should be taken to change
the existing situation.
In the area of Cohesion Policy in the current Financial Perspective, roughly
nine per cent of the funds are dedicated to support sectors related to High
Technology (HT). Poland will not build its comparative advantage in HT
with such a modest financing. However, the R&D policy presented in the
NDP represents a departure from the Commission’s official statement on
R&D policy. The official explanation to the rejection of the EU’s R&D
policy is provided on the website of the Polish Ministry of Science and
Information Society Technologies (MNiI 2005), where one can read that:
The Polish delegation, in accordance with an unequivocal instruction from the
Government, did not support the draft conclusions only because they were not
supplemented by a brief reference that Poland had proposed to ensure equal
chances of participating in framework programs for all EU member states. The
Polish opposition to potential inequality of chances is in some statements
interpreted as opposition to the proposed strengthening of basic research in
Europe and to the establishment of the European Research Council (ERC).
Taking the above into consideration, I would like to offer the following explana-
tion: 1. Poland has repeatedly highlighted the insufficient adjustment of the
current instruments of European science policy to the capabilities of the new
member states. The work on the new framework programme provides an
opportunity to introduce systemic changes, and that was the origin of the Polish
proposal to insert the provision on guaranteeing equitable opportunity for all
member states.  Since the proposal was rejected and thus did not make its way
to the draft conclusions (which constitute general guidelines for the Commis-
sion) at a crucial moment in shaping the future research policy of the Union,
Poland could not accept the document as a common position of all the member
states (Council conclusions are adopted unanimously). 2. Poland supported the
theses of the Netherlands Presidency that became the draft conclusions. In
particular, Poland has actively and consistently backed from the beginning the
expansion of framework programs to include basic research, accommodating
also social sciences and the humanities. We have also supported the concept
of establishing the ERC, as it is in agreement with the Polish long-standing
practice of promoting the best researchers and allocating funds based on the
criterion of scientific excellence. Representatives of the Minister of Scientific
Research and Information Technology were co-authors of the ERC concept, and
their future efforts related to creating this novel instrument of European re-
search policy will be steadfastly supported by the Ministry.
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The Polish government wants to increase the Polish participation in the EU
Framework Programme. It proposes to make a number of simplifications
with respect to application procedures and reductions in project size, in
order to build an effective public-private partnership in the R&D area and
involve more research institutions. However, we presume that the
discrepancy between the Polish and the Commission’s views is of a non-
financial nature. Even though the Polish government has confirmed its
strong support for basic research in the new European research policy,
basic research is not even mentioned in the NDP. Priority has instead been
given to commercialised research since,52 according to the document, only
close cooperation between research institutions and industry can give
optimal results. Certain research fields, such as information technology,
must therefore be given precedence.
This line of reasoning seems to us to be incorrect. Research in general and
basic research in particular is subject to a high risk of failure: since we
cannot programme the outcome, the correct strategy would be to diversify
risk by supporting all basic research areas and with the financial tools
provided by the ECP and the European R&D Policy, rather than just a few
fields chosen for some bureaucratic reason. We are convinced that
supporting basic research is a key factor in building future competitiveness
based on R&D. However, the considerable differences between the views
of the Polish authorities on the one hand and the Commission’s priorities
concerning the EU’s support for research and development on the other,
implies that it will be very hard to reach a consensus. 
4.5.6 Macroeconomic and institutional reforms: reducing
central budget deficit and decentralising public finances
As pointed out by Barry, the Irish success in attracting export-oriented FDI
was a combined result of both infrastructure and education investments,
financed through Structural Funds channels and a favourable macro-
economic environment, above all a low corporation tax, fiscal consolida-
tion and flexible labour market conditions (Barry 2003). In order to
increase the effectiveness of Structural Funds investments, Ireland has
introduced a set of evaluation procedures that has helped change the way
the administration approaches public expenditure – from a bureaucratic
perspective to a more rigorous economic evaluation.
The Polish government is focusing on macroeconomic reforms and sees
budget restructuring as a major challenge. The budget deficit has structural
and permanent imbalance on the expenditure side, above all caused by
social expenditures. The demographic trends – with an ageing population,
low birth rate, high emigration ratio of young people and the highest
52 It maintains also the post-socialist system of state-owned institutions with central budget
financing. The system has proven to be ineffective, but changes are difficult to implement.
unemployment rate in the EU – put the budget under serious pressure. In
order to cope with the accession challenges, such as co-financing and pre-
financing procedures, contribution to the EU budget and to other European
and international organisations and the Maastricht convergence criteria, the
government has postponed the public finance decentralisation process.
However, the Polish government is determined to continue the institutional
reforms, which aim at strengthening the self-governmental level of
administration. The idea to implement 16 regional programs that cor-
respond to 16 administrative units of NUTS 2 size and managed by local
governments within the Structural Policy framework, was the result of a
conviction that cooperation between central government and regional self-
governments would be the most successful form of governing in Poland.
Thus, further decentralisation of the administration, fair division of com-
petencies between central and local government and decentralisation of
public finance, in order to provide local authorities with the necessary
financial tools to conduct their policies, is the task for central and local
authorities.
Poland has proposed to manage, among other operational sectoral pro-
grammes (see Table 4.2), 16 regional programmes within the Structural
Policy framework with the aim of reinforcing regional authorities, as
horizontal programming and management are supposed to favour regional
economic development. The general opinion is that sectoral management
softens budget discipline, since the government is under permanent pres-
sure from sectoral lobbies, political parties and other interest groups that
corrupt public administration representatives. This is especially true for
industries with a state-owned dominance, such as coal mining, railways,
power industry, roads and public health care system. Thus, further in-
stitutional reforms are essential in the process of transforming the Polish
economy.
European Cohesion Policy should reinforce national regional policies on
the principle of subsidiarity. Governmental authorities responsible for
regional development in Poland have been introducing the idea of
decentralization of the administration of the domestic regional policy in
order to increase the effectiveness of the overall scope of regional pro-
grammes financed under the Structural Funds scheme. This has been
confirmed by establishing 16 regional programmes within NDP for 2007-
2013. The authors of this chapter are also convinced that gradual increase
in public spending, managed from the local level and starting from 30% to
50% of Structural Funds spending, would strengthen local governments as
decision makers in the regional policy field.
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5 HUNGARY AND COHESION POLICY
András Inotai and Tamás Szemlér
5.1 Introduction
The Structural and Cohesion Policy has for decades been one of the most
important fields in the European integration process. This policy area has
always been influenced by major changes, especially by enlargements of
the European Community/European Union. New members have always
meant new challenges in one way or another and Structural Policy was
supposed to meet these challenges. This is also true – even more than at
any time before – for the enlargement in 2004, when ten new members,
among them eight Central and Eastern European countries joined the
European Union. 
New members have their own specificities and, consequently, new needs
vis-à-vis Cohesion Policy. The present paper aims at describing and
explaining the needs of one of them, Hungary. The paper is structured into
seven main sections.
In section 5.2 we summarise the Hungarian experiences with the pre-
accession funds. In section 5.3 we discuss the most important past and
present problems and challenges related to Cohesion Policy in Hungary.
These problems are discussed in more detail in the following sections:
section 5.4 is devoted to the question of additionality, section 5.5 describes
the challenges to Hungarian regional policy, while section 5.6 deals with
the possibility of involvement of the private sector actors into structural
development projects. In section 5.7 we present arguments for a new
budget line covering trans-border infrastructure and environment in the
new Member States. Finally, in section 5.8, we conclude and summarise
the most important Hungarian interests related to the European Cohesion
Policy.
5.2 Experiences and background of the
use of pre-accession funds
In this section, we briefly summarise the experiences of Hungary with pre-
accession EU support – SAPARD, PHARE and ISPA – and we also try to
provide background information in order to help the reader to better
understand the situation in the given field in Hungary. The order in which
we present the experiences with the pre-accession funds does not cor-
respond to the chronological order – PHARE being the first among them –
but enables us to get step by step closer to the very heart of the topic of
this paper, namely the European Structural and Cohesion Policy.
5.2.1 SAPARD and Hungarian agriculture
The main controversial issue in connection with the pre-accession funds
was related to SAPARD, where the establishment and the accreditation of
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the national agency suffered a long delay. Unfortunately, internal political
debates overshadowed the establishment of the National SAPARD Agency
and this slowed down the process of preparation. As a result, in the first
two years of SAPARD, Hungary was able to access zero per cent of its
potential share (€38 million a year in 1999 prices), while in the third year,
after essential steps had been taken by the new government, the share of
absorbed transfers grew to 40 per cent.
However, the improvement did not result in a rapid catching up in using
funds available to the country. The institutional system, although finally in
principle corresponding to the requirements of the Commission, was not
able to deal with support claims of farmers in the second half of 2004. The
slowness of the process resulted in manifestations of agricultural producers,
partly also backed by some political parties and movements. In brief, in the
early spring of 2005 it seems that the institutions and the communication
devoted to facilitate the use of EU transfers in the field of agriculture are
still unsatisfactory. This has, of course, long-term explanations as well.
While Polish agriculture, despite expectations to the contrary, seems to have
benefited from membership in the CAP, Hungarian agriculture had to face a
serious crisis, not so much on the production level as on the political level.
Beyond the political and institutional problems the fragmented ownership
structure can also be made responsible for the evolving situation. More than
200,000 applications for financial support have been submitted in Hungary
(in several cases inadequately filled-out and sometimes even in duplicates),
which had to be evaluated by an institution that was clearly understaffed for
the task. In contrast, there were only 18,000 applications in the Czech
Republic (with a similar population size) and 12,000 in Slovakia, which is
mainly due to the fact that the ownership structure of agriculture did not
undergo the ideology-driven and past-oriented transformation experienced
in Hungary.
The problems surrounding SAPARD (and in the first year of membership)
are rooted in the general structural problems of the Hungarian agriculture.
The performance level of the related institutions is just the tip of the
iceberg. EU funds (also available for rural development) can be helpful in
the rapid and future-oriented restructuring process. The key barrier,
however, remains the irresponsible behaviour of some domestic political
actors and the outdated and partly consciously contaminated mentality on
the part of the farmers, most of them with no chance of attaining com-
petitiveness.
5.2.2 PHARE: from multi-objective aid to preparation
for membership
At its start, PHARE support was focusing on providing the financial
framework for Hungary’s solvency, due to the high level of external
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indebtedness at the moment of systemic change. Later, in the first half of
the 1990s, it was aimed at offering technical support in the privatisation
process, with the establishment of market-economy institutions and legal
background and the training of public administration. The amount of
money channelled into the real restructuring and regenerating the growth
process, if any at all, was minimal. All PHARE resources were planned on
an annual base, which deprived this instrument the possibility of becoming
a meaningful factor of sustainable transformation. Moreover, additional
international financial resources (e.g., World Bank credits) were not
allowed to be combined with PHARE money.
The situation changed substantially in the second half of the 1990s, mainly
by means of a prolonging of the planning period and by facilitating the
support to multi-annual projects. Also, as a result of internal restructuring
of the PHARE resources, more money became available for key economic
development objectives (e.g., infrastructure). The change in the PHARE
strategy since 1998 – concentrating on issues directly related to EU-
accession – has substantially improved effectiveness and also the rate of
use of PHARE funding in Hungary. The use of PHARE support in
Hungary from 1998 is shown in Table 5.1.
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5.2.3 ISPA: preparing for the Cohesion Fund
In the case of ISPA, Hungary was able to cover its envelope entirely with
projects (the average yearly amount of potential EU support was €88
million in 1999 prices): environment projects concentrated on water and
waste water management, water supply and waste management, while in
the field of transport infrastructure, the development of main international
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railway lines and the enhancement of the load-bearing capacity of main
roads have been financed. 
One negative experience in Hungary with ISPA was the EU’s reluctance to
co-finance major highway projects, preferring railway modernisation
instead. This approach was based on Western European experience but not
on the reality in NMS. One can only speculate about the background to
this position (environmental lobbies, fear of competition from NMS, etc.).
To tell the full truth, the 1998-2002 Hungarian government aggravated the
problem by denying public procurement for highway construction accord-
ing to EU competition rules.
This experience was an important step in the learning process in the phase
of preparation for membership. It made clear that EU regulations had to be
respected, and that there were no alternative “individual solutions”. For
most of Hungarian ISPA projects – which, with accession, have been trans-
formed into Cohesion Fund projects – no institutional problems arose. The
total value of Cohesion Fund projects – including new projects – for the
period 2004-2006 is roughly €1 billion.
The story of the use of ISPA in Hungary is a clear proof of two issues: 
1. EU support can be highly successful if it really concentrates on key
economic development priorities of Hungary;
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2. in such a case, the absorption capacity of the country is very high.
Therefore, when estimating the “absorption capacity” of a country (or
region), the nature of the project may have crucial importance, let alone
the bureaucratic hurdles on the EU side, which should also be examined,
for the “absorption capacity”. The EU’s “absorption” capacity – or adjust-
ment capacity, i.e., the definition of key areas in the NMS to be supported
and the bureaucratic procedures – definitely have a (negative) impact on
the absorption capacity in the NMS.
5.3 Past and present problems and challenges 
Structural and Cohesion Policy – and especially the financial instruments
available for the new members for it – was one of the most debated issues
during the accession negotiations. After accession, challenges related to the
use of available support came to the foreground.
5.3.1Debates during the accession negotiations
During the accession negotiations, the most important debates concerning
Cohesion Policy in the period 2004-2006 were of a financial nature and
were therefore dealt with as part of the final financial package.
53 The modernisation of transport and environmental infrastructure is clearly an important part
of these priorities. We will return to a specific aspect of it – the need for developing trans-
border infrastructure in the new Member States – in section 5.7.
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Like many other new Member States, Hungary was very much interested
in the possibility of elaborating Operational Programmes on the national
level instead of regional operational programmes, due to missing traditions
and administrative capacity at NUTS 2 level. This approach was approved
until 2006, not least because the Commission would have had capacity
problems if it had had to work with dozens of new and inexperienced
regions. An additional motive for the Commission to agree with the
national approach until 2006 was that it really wanted to have a quick
success with the absorption of the available resources in the first and really
critical years of membership (also due to the low level of resources, the
bureaucratic procedures, etc.). 
In light of the debate on the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective as well as
concerning the problems related to the NUTS 2 level in Hungary (see
point 5.5.2 for details), it is especially interesting to see whether this
situation will change after 2006. Until now, most Operational Programmes
were regional and, in fact, the National Development Plan was also in
many cases called National Regional Development Plan. Such an approach
– an approach focusing on the regions – was expected to apply also for the
new Member States after 2006. But in the recent debates on the future
Cohesion Policy the question often asked is whether it would be better to
focus on the national level rather than continuing with the present
practice.54
Potential effects on efficiency of the policy are under heavy discussion.
From an administrative point of view, the interests mentioned on the EU
side for the period 2004-2006 will probably persist; with the prospect of
further countries joining the EU, these arguments will become, in fact,
even stronger. For the new Member States, this approach can have different
effects. Hungary is surely one of the members in which an expressed
focusing on the regional level is hardly conceivable in the present circum-
stances. It means that for Hungary, the relatively centralised structure of
Operational Programmes would be – from a purely administrative point of
view – a better solution, regarding the present (under)development of the
sub-national entities. This, of course, does not mean that it is the best
conceivable solution. With a well elaborated regional policy, with clear
responsibilities on the different levels as well as with a reinforcement of
the potential (finances, human resources) of the regions, the specific
problems of the regions could probably be tackled more efficiently.
Similarly to other new Member States, Hungary was interested in a higher
share of the Cohesion Fund within Structural Policy transfers. One reason
is the already mentioned weakness on the regional level, another one is the
54 The suggestion was also present in the first proposal from the European Commission for
the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective (COM 2004).
relative overall underdevelopment level of the country, making country-
level infrastructure development measures necessary, and the third reason
is the more favourable co-financing regulation of the Cohesion Fund. We
can also note that ISPA provided a good model for the use of Cohesion
Fund support and the experiences with ISPA (mentioned under section
5.2.3.) can make it easier to use than Structural Funds transfers.
5.3.2 Challenges after accession
The restructuring of the national budget will allow Hungary to fulfil co-
financing and additionality requirements until the end of 2006. With
probably much larger amounts of transfers, the task will be more difficult –
but not unfeasible – from 2007. We should seriously consider the additional
pressure on the Hungarian budget due to enhanced EU resource flows.
Seemingly paradoxically, it will be the presence (and availability) of the EU
resources that will force the Hungarian budget to be fundamentally re-
structured in the first period of the new budgetary framework.55
For the next financial period, the following issues must be tackled in this
respect:
1. continued restructuring of the budget in order to meet co-financing
and additionality criteria;
2. strengthening human, administrative and financial capacity of NUTS
2 regions;
3. involving the private sector into development projects more
intensively, as well as strengthening cooperation with municipalities.
We discuss these three issues in the subsequent sections (sections 5.4, 5.5
and 5.6) of the chapter.
5.4 The need for restructuring the budget
Restructuring the budget is an important task to be done in order to be
able to absorb potential EU structural and cohesion support.56 In this re-
spect, however, the present situation is characterised by poor circumstances
for a substantial reform, influencing short and medium term prospects.
5.4.1 Lacking solid background for reform
One of the key challenges not only of absorbing EU resources efficiently,
but also of a successful Hungarian membership in the enlarged integration
process, comes from the situation and structure of the budget. There is
widespread professional consensus concerning the need of fundamental
reforms, both on the revenue and the expenditure side of the budget.
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55 A comparison can be made with respect to the experience of Portugal in 1992-1993.
56 It is important to note here that restructuring the budget is necessary for other reasons as
well. The regulations of the Cohesion Policy (notably additionality) can play the positive
role of a catalyst in this respect.
Unfortunately, the years of sustainable and high growth following 1997
were not utilised as a way to start this process. Just the opposite, the
previous 1998-2002 government did not start any major reform (in turn,
even the rules of the game of the previously initiated pension reform were
changed). The current government became hostage of its (partly populist)
promises, which could hardly have had a positive impact on budgetary
reforms. However, they may have increased the pressure on urgent reforms.
Still, there are substantial barriers or question marks concerning the timing
and viability of such reforms:
1. within one year, Hungary will have parliamentary elections, a rather
unfavourable external condition for starting key reforms at this
particular moment (even if they were urgent);
2. there is no well-elaborated reform package (benefits and costs, the
distribution of both elements in time and across business and social
sectors) in the government’s pocket;
3. as a fundamental precondition of sustainable long-term reforms, the
mutual confidence and cooperation between the fiscal and the
monetary authorities is missing (the interest rate policy of the National
Bank of Hungary is partly responsible for the level of budget deficit,
since a large part of budgetary expenditures covers interest payment);
4. there has not been an honest dialogue with the population, how
reforms would affect the society, and why reforms are necessary and,
at the end of the day, a positive-sum game;
5. resistance in a large part of the society, mainly generated by
demagogy and populism, and in the interest of narrow-minded party
politics, is evident (see the story of the partial privatisation of the
absolutely outdated, run-down and capital-poor health sector); and,
last but not least;
6. the critical (and in this case, relevant) mass of consensus between
government and opposition is farther away than at any time in the past.
5.4.2 Short and medium term prospects
Short term budgetary corrections are of no help or may even backfire.
Generally those expenditure items will fall victim of the “corrections”
where no organized social protests are expected, where the lobbying
activity is low and where there is a lack of “demonstration effects” from
represented interest (i.e., no strikes, no occupation of roads, etc.). As a
result, the only reserves of the country for a sustainable and future-
oriented growth, i.e., expenses in human resource development, have
regularly been curtailed (education, research and development and partly
also health care). The Hungarian budget, as that of other major Central
European countries, faces a threefold and “overlapping” challenge:
1. to restructure the budget for its internal unsustainability and reduce
the current GDP-related budget deficit from above five per cent to
three per cent in a few years;
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2. to keep on (or start) financing future-oriented factors of sustainable
competitiveness, including the catching-up process to more developed
EU Member States;
3. to cope with the criteria of EMU membership and the introduction of
the Euro still in this decade (in 2010, according to the current official
Hungarian position).
Most probably, major budgetary reforms need a clear sequencing, since not
all areas can be addressed at the same time and with the same level of
intensity, such as education, health, regional institutions and tax policy, to
mention but a few of the most important fields. Moreover, some “holy
cows” should be revisited, including the 30 per cent national contribution
for direct payments to the farmers. This figure is not carved in stone, it
could be even lower if economic conditions allowed. In fact, it could be
lower, looking at the requirements of competitiveness of the Hungarian
agriculture, but the issue is an eminently political one.
In this situation, a loosening of the co-financing restrictions could, of
course, be advantageous for Hungary (although as stated under section
5.3.1, the task is feasible according to present regulations as well). How-
ever, it would not mean “non-conditionality”. An interesting alternative
would be to enhance macroeconomic stability requirements while loosen-
ing co-financing regulations. The roots to this idea were present in the
original objective of the Cohesion Fund; and this approach could be
broadened to all Structural Policy instruments.57 The possibility to shift
financial resources between the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund
enlarges the room for manoeuvre in this respect.
Such an approach would exercise external pressure on Hungary in order to
meet the Maastricht criteria, especially those concerning public deficit and
debt ratios measured as a percentage of GDP. Such a pressure is in the
long-term interest of the country, even if the steps to be taken in the short
run in some cases can be painful. However, the resulting loosening of co-
financing requirements could ease this situation, help the use of Structural
and Cohesion Funds transfers as well as meeting the Maastricht criteria (a
lower rate of co-financing means less burden on the national budget).
5.5 Regional policy challenges and problems
of the regional classification
In this section we present the main features of territorial inequalities and
regional development in Hungary. Heritage can provide help in under-
standing actual problems with regional classification in general and one of
the most debated concrete issues – the future of Central Hungary – in
57 Weise (2005) tackles the possibility of using macroeconomic stability criteria as an
additional requirement for providing structural and cohesion support for the recipients.
particular (for more details on Hungarian regional policy; see Horváth-Illés
1997; and Horváth 1999).
5.5.1 Regional policy challenges
In order to understand the regional development in Hungary after 1990, it
is necessary to know the situation before the beginning of transformation.
The territorial changes in the country during the 20th century have in-
fluenced the regional development considerably: these changes (after the
First World War, then reconfirmed after the Second World War) meant the
end of their organic links for several territories near the new borders of
Hungary. As a result, these territories have become peripheral, and a centre
– periphery problem has emerged: due to its population and its importance
as an economic centre, Budapest has become the only outstanding centre
of the country.
Emerging regions, as the result of a decade-long sustainable development
following 1867, became separated from Hungary (Bratislava, Kosice, Cluj,
Subotica, Timisoara, Brasov, even Zagreb), and, as a result, bottom-up
regional development and “regionalisation” came to a halt, or was even
reversed. The new borders were drawn without taking into account the
physical infrastructure, consciously planned and developed for the needs of
a large empire (major railways and road connections happened to belong to
the neighbouring countries). Key centres of human resource building
(universities, technical schools) were separated from Hungary (university
of Kolozsvár (Cluj) mainly had to be relocated to Szeged, geological and
mining high schools of Slovakia to Miskolc, etc.). Finally, the rationale of
division of labour in a rapidly growing and catching-up “market economy”
was not only questioned but destroyed. Autarchic, inward-looking develop-
ment with high economic, social and political costs had to be the con-
sequence. It is the EU membership that offers a new opportunity to link
together what belongs together (in the words of Willy Brandt, “es wächst
zusammen, was zusammengehört”). Moreover, EU membership is expected
to reduce the one-sided (heavy-weight) development of the “centre” and
mitigate the contradictions between the “centre and the periphery”.
Evidently, a reasonable and future-oriented solution to the agricultural pro-
blems is a precondition.
During the time of the centrally planned economy, the economic policy
(concentrating on industrialisation, especially on heavy industry), could not
find solutions to the long-run regional problems. Regional development
based on centralised direct methods and often for reasons of a political
nature, not leaving space for local initiatives, proved to be unsuccessful in
the long-run, as was clearly shown by the economic problems already
before the beginning of the transformation process. This kind of
development policy was not able to cope with the double challenge of
fighting overall underdevelopment and regional inequalities.
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Regional economic inequalities remained (and in some cases have become
even more accentuated) in the 1990s. For the beginning of the 2000s, in
terms of GDP/head, the data characterising the most developed region
(Central Hungary) was more than the double of that of the least developed
regions (Northern Hungary and Northern Great Plain).58 The centre-
periphery problem has been aggravated in the first years of market
economy: the poorer and also infrastructurally underdeveloped territories
were not able to compete with the economic possibilities offered by Buda-
pest.
Foreign direct investment, playing a key role in the economic modernisation
of Hungary, looking for the best investment possibilities, also contributed to
the increase in regional inequalities. Beyond the centre-periphery problem,
East-West differences have become stronger. Especially territories lying
along the Vienna-Budapest axis or near the Austrian border have ex-
perienced a rapid development, partly due to the interest of foreign capital.
Among other factors – relatively well developed or rapidly developing
infrastructure, availability of qualified and cheap labour force – the
neighbourhood of the EU market was an important motivation.
Under market economy circumstances new problems that were unknown in
the previous decades of centrally planned economy have surged as well.
The most important one is unemployment, where – according to difference
in regional development – regional inequalities are considerable. Most of
the territories severely hit by unemployment are in Northern Hungary and
in the Northern Great Plain region. The problem is aggravated there by the
fact that the activity rate of the population is much lower than the already
very low national average. Labour market inequalities are reflected in the
regional differences in wages as well.
According to official figures, Hungary has the lowest level of registered
unemployment among all new member countries. Its figure of slightly over
seven per cent is much better than the EU average and is in the range
of the old EU countries with the best performance in this context. At
the same time, Hungary indicates the lowest level of economic activity of
the working age population, according to OECD figures. There are about 1
million persons in the age group between 18 and 65 that have practically
“disappeared” from the labour market in the first decade of transformation.
The question of how these people can be integrated into the official labour
market is a crucial economic and social policy issue. In principle, there are
three major groups to be addressed:
1. those who have returned to household activities;
2. those who decided to benefit from – in Hungarian terms – generous
early retirement schemes (including “invalids”);
58 See chapter 3 and Appendix A for empirical data and analysis.
3. those who became “entrepreneurs” (one-person businesses), having no
other choice to have a job – whether their activity is/was sustainable
or not.
The appropriate labour market policy has to be diversified, since these
groups have different motivation to stay in or give up their current
position. There is, however, no doubt, that at least the partial reintegration
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of this “idle” workforce is a basic condition of increasing the Hungarian
absorption capacity both of EU resources and of Hungarian instruments.
Beyond persisting or even increasing regional inequalities, (relative)
overall underdevelopment has also remained a major problem, especially in
light of the prospects of EU accession. National and regional development
policy (as in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe) has to deal
with both problems.
The changes since the beginning of the 1990s pushed regional policy to the
foreground in Hungary. This is reflected by several changes presented in
Table 5.2. These changes – especially after 1996, with the adoption of the
Law on Regional Development and Land-use Planning (XXI/1996) – meant
important steps in the direction of being compatible with EU requirements.
Despite the considerable development acknowledged by the EU itself, in a
number of aspects – way of financing, scales of direct financing, dominant
element of the implementation, dominant favoured sectors – the degree of
EU-compatibility remained low. Beyond this, some practical questions, in
particular concerning the (re-)definition of the borders, competencies and
resources of the NUTS 2 units, are to be solved as well. 
5.5.2 The problem of NUTS 2 regions
The definition of regions in Hungary has caused different problems on
different levels. The 20 NUTS 3 regions correspond to the counties (+ the
capital); this definition has a long tradition in the country. The definition of
the 7 NUTS 2 regions – having no historical traditions – has been a much
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??????????????????
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more difficult task. NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 regions are presented in Figure
5.1. The distribution of competencies is a difficult task on both levels.
NUTS 2 regions were first defined in 1998 by the National Territorial
Development Concept. The regions created were the so-called territorial-
statistical regions, as the first objective of their creation was to produce
EU-compatible statistics at NUTS 2 level. This is the main reason why the
regions consist of 3 (in the case of Central Hungary, 2) counties (NUTS 3
units), and why region borders coincide with county borders: statistics can
be obtained relatively easily by aggregating county statistics. It also means
that reflections on the internal cohesion of the regions to be created did
not have an important role in their formulation (the case is just the
opposite in Poland: there the objective was to set up organic regions, but,
as a result of the boundaries of the 16 NUTS 2 units, statistics are hard to
produce backwards). There were debates concerning Northern Hungary
and the Northern Great Plain, but for today, the only big debate is on
Central Hungary (we discuss the issue in section 5.5.3).
The introduction of a new intermediary level of public administration – the
NUTS 2 regions – is “suspicious” both from the point of view of the
central public administration, which is the strongest actor in territorial
development and the counties, which fear to lose even the competencies
they have now. No wonder that until now the NUTS 2 regions have
remained pure territorial-statistical units. Although some administrative
bodies have been set up at the new regional level, their competencies and
the financial instruments available for them remain very limited. For the
next Financial Perspective, it is crucial to change this situation – it is even
more important than the question of the borders of Central Hungary,
mentioned above.
The 7 NUTS 2 regions have a common feature that they all have external
borders. Not taking into account Central Hungary, these borders are
relatively long. However, as the NUTS 2 regions created in 1998 are not a
result of a traditional regionalisation process, the effects of the borders can
be very different in different counties within a given NUTS 2 region. Of
course, it is not irrelevant what kind of external borders the regions have.
Before 1 May 2004, only Western Transdanubia had a common border
with the EU. With the accession of Hungary, the situation changed: the
Hungarian-Austrian, the Hungarian-Slovene and the Hungarian-Slovak
borders have become internal EU borders. This will probably boost the
economy of the bordering Hungarian regions; the effects will probably be
different at different borders, but also according to counties within a given
NUTS 2 region. The Northern Great Plain and the Southern Great Plain
regions will remain – until the EU-accession of Romania – without
internal EU-borders (with the exception of a 3km-long fluvial border
section of the Northern Great Plain region with Slovakia); this can con-
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tribute to accentuating even more the already existing regional differ-
ences.59
The fact that all Hungarian regions border neighbouring countries, should
call attention to the high priority of cross-border cooperation, i.e., how
national development plans related to the given region can, from the very
beginning, be combined with similar national development plans to be
elaborated for the given regions in the neighbouring countries. In this con-
text, it is extremely important to look at the development level of neigh-
bouring (cross-border) regions, since it substantially influences the growth
capacity of the whole area and defines the best way of allocating res-
ources. At first glance, three different patterns can be outlined:
1. developed regions on both side of the border (development level can
be similar or different, but still “developed” as compared to other
regions of the given country);
2. bordering of developed and less-developed region;
3. underdeveloped regions on both sides of the border.
These patterns can be complemented by the growth factor (high- or low-
growth developed or underdeveloped regions). As a result, an interesting
matrix can be created for further consideration of the potential implica-
tions for regional development, cross-border cooperation and “best practice
instruments”.
5.5.3 The dilemma of Central Hungary
In the case of Central Hungary, the debate’s main reason is that Budapest
“distorts” the indicators of this region. In 2003, GDP per capita in Central
Hungary was about 90 per cent of the EU average. The capital itself was
far over this level, while the county Pest – being part of Central Hungary –
was still well under the 75% threshold that, without Budapest, would make
it eligible for support under Objective 1 of the Structural Funds after 2006.
Leaving Central Hungary as it is could lead to the loss of a considerable
amount of Structural Funds transfers for the county Pest after 2006. There
are some possible solutions to this problem; the most probable one is to
make Budapest – or Budapest with its agglomeration – a NUTS 2 region,
and to add the county Pest to an already existing NUTS 2 region (probably
to Northern Hungary). However, the question has for long been the subject
of political debates and it makes the solution even more difficult. For the
future of Central Hungary, three basic scenarios can be imagined.
59 In this case, relatively underdeveloped Hungarian regions will cooperate with relatively
well-developed (but in absolute terms even less developed) Romanian regions. In such
cases, the importance of EU support is more crucial than in general, and the tasks of the
regions are more difficult as well: first of all, absorption capacity has to be developed  in
these regions in order to give them a chance to realise the multiplier effects of development
programmes.
Scenario 1: Central Hungary, including Budapest, loses its position as an
Objective 1 region after 2006 (due both to growth and statistical effects).
As a consequence, big intra-regional differences remain, the under-
developed environment of Budapest also hinders the development of the
capital and disparities remain or become even stronger, not only between
Budapest and Central Hungary, but between rural Central Hungary and
other Hungarian regions that will keep utilising EU resources. In this
scenario, three positive solutions are conceivable:
a) long phasing-out period for the whole region after 2007;
b) creating a special category (there is interest in such an option in some
old member countries, facing similar problems);
c) use a mixed structure of regional fund plus R&D, human resource,
etc. baskets.
Scenario 2: taking out Budapest from Central Hungary, making it a NUTS
2 region of its own. In this case, Budapest does not benefit from Objective
1, but the remainder of the present Central Hungary will benefit from it
for a long period (provided EU rules remain the same). The solutions to
the consequences of such a situation could be the following:
a) rapid development of the regions around Budapest, with indirect but
important multiplier effects for the capital;
b) decreasing intraregional cleavages;
c) new sources for the development of Budapest (see Prague);
d) Budapest may have a lower growth path in the first years (it has to be
sold politically);
e) stronger reliance on additional money for Budapest (EIB loans to
urban transportation and housing rehabilitation);
f) designing Cohesion Fund money to involve Budapest (environment,
partly physical infrastructure).
Scenario 3: taking out Budapest, and bring the rest of Central Hungary
into another Hungarian region. It is theoretically possible, but the
economic rationale for such a solution would be hard to explain.
According to the latest Commission survey, two of the four regions in the
enlarged EU with the highest growth prospects are located in Hungary
(Central Hungary and Central Transdanubia). It means that what matters is
not only the current level of income per head, but also the growth potential
of the selected regions.
5.6 Involving potential participants:
the private sector and the municipalities
The basic principles of EU structural policies – concentration of financial
resources, programming, partnership, additionality and efficiency – have to
be applied in the whole process of national regional policy-making. A key
issue is to get the most potential actors to become involved.
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It is very important to emphasise that while most of the rules of the game
are centrally decided – on EU or on Member State level – local initiative is
crucial from the point of view of the successful use of the possibilities
provided by EU transfers. The attitude of local governments can be de-
cisive in this respect. Local governments as well as NGOs can encourage
local initiatives by collecting, disseminating and explaining information on
these possibilities. In order to have up-to-date information, they should
strengthen their contacts with regional and central authorities. They should
continuously follow actual announcements and tenders and disseminate
information about them to the potentially interested local partners (for
more details, see Szemlér 2001).
The grade of involvement of the private sector in development projects is
generally hard to predict (Szemlér 2004 provides some empirical evidence
from the former GDR). In Hungary, as in many other countries, public-
private partnership (PPP) has become a very fashionable notion. However,
there are also debates about the possible extra costs of such solutions:
opponents say that, in the long run, investments may be more costly for the
state (and thus for the citizens) this way. On the other hand, it has to be seen
that private sources must play a key role in assuring the necessary own con-
tribution to the (partly) EU-funded development programmes; if this contri-
bution is not assured, part of the potential EU financing may be lost – costs
and benefits of the PPP construction must also be regarded in this respect.
The Hungarian government is conscious of this and supports PPP in a
number of fields, where investment requires a high amount of financial
resources. A special field where PPPs can play an important role is the
accelerated construction of physical infrastructure. In order to be able to
realise the potential gains from its favourable geographical location,
Hungary needs a modern and well-functioning transport network, and rapid
modernisation and development is inconceivable without the involvement of
private capital.
5.7 The need for a new budget line: trans-border
infrastructure and environment in the NMS
Infrastructure development is a key issue in Hungary, with special
emphasis on transport infrastructure. Given its specific geographical
situation – at the crossroads between East and West, and also North and
South – Hungary needs a highly developed infrastructure in order to be
able to realise the potential gains from its location. These gains, of course,
could be felt in the whole enlarged EU.
It is also important, especially from the last argument of the previous
paragraph, that infrastructure development in the new Member States
should be coordinated: from the EU point of view, gains can be realised if
actions do not end at national borders. Hungary is therefore interested in an
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overall Central and Eastern European transport infrastructure development
priority of structural operations. The region desperately needs not only the
extension of West-East routes, but the creation of genuine “arteries” for
itself, both in North-South and Southwest-Northeast directions.
Beyond a number of other “special” features, the EU’s enlargement to the
East (and the Southeast) has two strategic implications rooted in the geo-
graphic conditions of Europe.
1. The most recent (and coming) enlargement did not result in an EU
reaching its geographic boundaries to the East (all previous enlarge-
ments, with the exception of Austria and Denmark, widened the
Union’s map up to the clear geographic frontiers of the continent).
Moreover, we really do not know where the Eastern border of the EU
has to be drawn: geographic, political and cultural considerations may
imply different frontiers.
2. All North-East and Central European new members (eight together)
have common continental borders.
The above two conditions, with substantial and still not recognized
relevance for the future of Europe, urgently need a revisiting of the basic
principles of the EU budget. Thus, the budget should immediately create a
new item, called “financing of trans-border infrastructure and environ-
mental projects in Central-East-South-East Europe” (for further details on
this idea, see Inotai 2004a). Such an approach would have a number of
advantages:
1. it would be a clear political message to not-yet-member countries
that they are not forgotten, just the opposite, that they may actually
participate in some of the projects;
2. it would avoid inefficient use of EU transfers for national prestige
projects that have little to do with the priority of trans-border infra-
structure development;
3. it would, within a very short period, exert a positive growth-enhancing
impact on business, both domestic, regional and all-European, since
just the Hungarian case demonstrates that there is a close correlation
between the geographic concentration and spread of business activities
and the development of physical infrastructure (mainly highways);
4. perhaps most importantly for the EU budget, this approach seems to
offer the only instrument that could prevent narrow-minded and
selfish “bargaining” in the negotiation process of the 2007-2013
budget. Any meaningful reorientation of the resource flow from old to
new beneficiaries needs a separate objective, for its nature and
contents, mainly available for new members; and, finally,
5. such an approach would serve the interest of most net contributing
countries, since they are, due to their geographic position or economic
orientation, interested in better business conditions in the new Mem-
ber States (Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, as well as
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Finland and Denmark).
It has to be emphasised that the inclusion of a new objective would not
necessarily imply a bigger budget and, therefore, more financial contribu-
tion by the current net contributors:
1. the money for the new objective should come partly from the national
entitlements available for the new Member States;
2. it would be helpful in breaking the deadlock and resistance of the old
beneficiaries, and making possible major regrouping of financial re-
sources (this is one of the main arguments of those who do not seem
ready to pay more than one per cent);
3. it would  ensure higher efficiency and quicker return, not least for
private business;
4. the net contributors would be the main beneficiaries in getting orders
for designing, construction, technology deliveries related to the im-
plementation of physical infrastructure and environmental projects.
There are two more aspects for further consideration:
1. by implementing the above mentioned concept, an important shift
could be produced between Structural and Cohesion Funds that would
alleviate the co-financing pressure on the budget of the NMS. This
trans-border infrastructure objective would fall into the category of
Cohesion Fund;
2. the money available under this heading of the EU budget would not
form part of the four per cent capping of EU resources available for
the NMS.
5.8 Hungarian interests – some summary remarks
EU membership brings with it a number of tasks, both on the side of the
new Member States and of the EU. Of course, the Hungarian domestic
tasks have to be addressed adequately. In this context, it is vitally im-
portant to develop a comprehensive Hungarian EU strategy that would
clearly identify our basic strategic development pattern.60 They may not
fully harmonise with the Commission’s priorities, but could offer a good
basis for further discussions on the basic objectives of the expected
resource transfer. Most probably, the EU would not be able to develop any
special programme for Hungary (or for any other NMS), but the EU-
created packages could be somewhat softened and special Hungarian
priorities (either concerning areas to be financed, or, not less importantly,
just the sequencing of the projects) built into the EU-packages. We should
also focus more on the success stories (e.g., FDI inflow, exceeding by far
the earlier estimations of absorption capacity) in order to prove that the
60 The issue is at the centre of earlier and current research at the Institute for World
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Similar conclusions have been drawn by
Inotai (2004b) and Inotai and Szemlér (2004).
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absorption capacity of Hungary is higher than believed.61
5.8.1 Steps to be taken by the EU
The EU could improve the conditions of having access to the resources
and, not less importantly, to enhance the efficiency and speed of using
such resources, in many ways:
1. by dispensing with the four per cent ceiling on annual transfers; as has
been shown earlier, the absorption capacity is influenced not only by
domestic but by external factors as well. Hungary, together with some
other countries in the region, e.g., the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
demonstrated that it had a high absorption capacity once it started to
host foreign direct investment. FDI inflows have reached more than
four per cent of GDP in selected years of the nineties. Including
reinvested earnings, in itself a clear sign of confidence and sufficient
absorption capacity in a “maturing transformation economy”, FDI
contribution, even today, is likely to be around four per cent of GDP.
Moreover, it produces 50 per cent of the Hungarian GDP, controls
about 75 per cent of total exports, plays a key role in technological
advancement and ensures several hundreds of thousands of jobs;
2. by keeping the four per cent ceiling but, at the same time, reducing
the ceiling for more developed net beneficiaries (some of them did
not use more than one to two per cent of GNI in a year), such a step
could enhance the manoeuvring room of the overall budget and at the
same time facilitate redistribution of resources. Moreover, it would
take into account the “equal treatment” principle, since four per cent
for Spain and four per cent for Poland would in the aggregate be
completely different figures, which could hardly be explained on the
basis of development levels;
3. by changing the rules of co-financing, i.e., reducing its share in the
Structural Funds and/or regrouping part of the Structural Funds-
financed projects into the Cohesion Fund;
4. by concentrating, as a common work between EU and Hungarian
experts, on such projects that promise not only efficient and quick
return, but generate multiplier effects across the economy. In this
context, a study of previous experience would be very useful, since
Hungary and most other NMS can hardly be compared with other net
beneficiaries. The presence or lack of multiplier effects depends on
factors such as population density, FDI, economic transformation and
competitiveness, educational level of the society, the state of physical
infrastructure, telecommunications, cooperation within regional and
central authorities, etc. Efficient absorption capacity can be interpreted
61 A very clear sign of the absorption capacity is that most firms with FDI coming into the
country reinvested their profits in Hungary. This means a high level of confidence of the
investors in the Hungarian economy, and this is the point where long-term investments
differ from the presence of “footloose” capital.
in two different ways. First, the efficient absorption of the resources
available within the framework of one single project. Second, and more
importantly, in the multiplier (spill over) impact of the project. We
would strongly prefer the second scenario, whenever possible;
5. by defining the new objectives in a way that would not exclude any
NMS that is automatically benefiting from the regional fund (cohesion
objective), from other programmes (e.g., research and development,
innovative capacity-building, etc.). The access to other financial re-
sources involved into other objectives is also a must in order to reach
the Lisbon goals. Some of the NMS are better off in this context than
some of the OMS. Therefore, it would be not only unjust but
detrimental to the future development of Europe if they remained de-
prived of such sources. Access of NMS to EU resources aimed at
achieving the Lisbon goals is important for additional reasons as well:
equal footing in an enlarged community and ensuring the rapid
generation of multiplier effects in the economy;
6. by stressing the importance of cross-country projects (mainly physical
infrastructure and environment), so that the priority of this effort is
adequately reflected in the new 2007-2013 Financial Perspective.
5.8.2 Steps to be taken by Hungary
For a successful integration, of course, there is much to do on the Hungarian
side as well. The most important issues can be summarised in the following:
1. Domestic absorption capacity needs:
a) constant improvement in the public administration (on govern-
mental, regional and local levels alike);
b) speeding up the process of application, evaluation and payment;
c) strengthening the monitoring and controlling functions;
d) making the whole process more transparent and freeing public
servants from the widespread fear in getting into unjustified and
artificially created scandals and being accused of maltreatment or
misuse of money.
2. Most importantly, a new political culture is needed, based on coopera-
tion as opposed to conflicts, on transparency and not “assumptions”
and scandal mentality, on the stability of institutions and public
servants working in them, instead of firing professionals in each new
electoral period.
3. There have already been identified interesting local and regional
initiatives that would not have been possible a decade ago. In fact,
money, or even the hope for money, is a very important integrative
factor. Let us hope that a large part of the society is able, ready and
willing to learn and, sooner or later, discover its own interests (en-
lightened self-interest behaviour). Western Hungarian counties that a
decade ago did everything to establish unique (closed) contacts with
neighbouring Austrian regions and used most of their energy to
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prevent the other county from doing anything, have learnt that they
could achieve much more if they developed a common position. Also,
there are encouraging examples of local initiatives in small regions
(e.g., local water treatment projects, human resource building, etc.).
Here, the main bottleneck is the rather limited co-financing capacity
of the municipalities.
4. An additional budgetary constraint may emerge once it turns out that
successful projects will need additional (although provisional) financ-
ing. Namely, at the beginning of the implementation of the project
some money will be made available from EU sources. The second slice
of financing is expected to come from national co-financing. Later,
another part of EU money may become available. However, the total
amount of EU contribution will be disbursed after finalising the
project, and sometimes with a substantial time gap (1 to 2 years, which
is needed for final controlling of the financial items, etc.). However,
the project leader and the participants (subcontractors) can hardly be
asked to wait for their money for such a long period. Most potential
participants in Hungary are and will remain undercapitalised, they do
not dispose of huge financial resources in order to pre-finance their
services or activities. As the number and financial volume of
successful projects tends to increase, which represents a positive
development, more and more money may be needed to overcome the
liquidity gap. It should be investigated to what extent the disbursement
rules of the EU funds can be changed in order to shorten the
transitional period and mitigate the liquidity pressure (and, ceteris
paribus, the budgetary constraints) in the NMS.
5. Communication policies have to be substantially improved and an
active dialogue has to be established, not only between those who
have already applied for or those who belong to the potential
applicants for EU resources, but in the society as such. Not only the
potential amount of money (following 2007) has to be publicised
(which, in itself, is a high-risk undertaking; see the next paragraph),
but the conditions of having access to the resources and the obligation
the applicant is assuming when signing the project. Wrongly or
deficiently filled-out application documents, loose accounting, “in-
novative bookkeeping” and incorrect bills, all of them widely spread
and in part deeply rooted in past practices, have to be abandoned. If
the local, regional or central government and/or EU authorities
identify such cases, it should not be taken as a good chance to blame
the government or the EU and defend “poor Hungarian/Slovak/Czech,
etc. (so-called) entrepreneurs”.
6. Finally, the current Hungarian strategy towards EU funds has to be
fundamentally revised, since, quite frankly, Hungary does not have a
strategy. Integration strategy has been largely replaced by concentrat-
ing on the highest possible absorption of potential EU funds (above
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€20 billion for the next seven-year budgetary period). This, however,
means that objectives and instruments have been confused. EU
transfers are a vital factor of successful membership and sustainable
modernisation. However, at the end of the day, they are instruments
and not objectives in themselves. A one-sided concentration on money
may backfire for two reasons. First, if the money is not available or,
for different reasons, becomes available only with a delay, potential
beneficiaries will turn against the administration and, more likely,
against the government. Second, such an approach may foster the
image of Hungary in the old member countries in general, and in the
net contributing countries in particular, as Hungary being in it only for
the money (which, of course, is far from the truth!). Consequently, a
comprehensive integration strategy is badly needed, because,
a) Hungary’s successful membership in the EU needs the definition of
interests, the seeking for strategic or tactical alliances in the enlarged
community and the implementation or protection of basic interests;
b) the EU consists of much more than just a budget – more importantly,
several high-priority and high-intensity areas are not covered by the
objectives of the budget as defined by the Commission (justice and
home affairs, common foreign and security policy, where fundamental
Hungarian interests are at stake);
c) Hungary has to define its longer-term place and role both in the
rapidly changing global environment and within the enlarged/
enlarging EU – only by using this as a fundament can the country’s
room for manoeuvre be determined (most probably along different
scenarios) and the main objectives that the country would like to
achieve with the financial support of the EU be defined;
d) it is not ruled out that these objectives will largely coincide with the
basic objectives formulated by the Commission and with those that
will become the pillars of the coming EU budget – however, dif-
ferences in priorities may not be a priori excluded, either concerning
the areas, the instruments, the timeframe or the sequencing of
different policy goals and means;
e) automatic acceptance of the EU-defined goals is a consequence of the
lack of a national strategy, and may generate serious consequences
both for Hungary, the EU and for the image of the EU in a Member
State. Even assuming the (not unlikely) fact that, at the end of the
day, Hungary (and other countries) has to subscribe to the priorities of
the Commission and could hardly change them (the trans-border
infrastructure objective could and should be an exception), the
negotiations on the modalities of EU transfers after 2007 and the
composition of the Second National Development Plan should (have)
start(ed) from a different approach. At least some special high-priority
interests of Hungary could (have) be(en) included into the package at
an early stage of preparing the final document.
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6 THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND COHESION POLICY
Radomir Spok (ed.), Pavel Karásek, Tomásˇ Pubrle and
Zuzana Kasáková
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the European Cohesion Policy with a view to
adapting some of its aspects so that they become more in line with the
particular needs of the Czech Republic. We claim that the role of the
European Union, in creating the right conditions for economic growth,
should not be underestimated.
The challenges the Czech Republic is faced with ranges from structural
unemployment to an unsatisfactory state of transport infrastructure. Many
of the problems visible today can, to a great extent, be said to be the
legacy of the former Communist regime. The major income redistribution
that this regime undertook, together with a centrally planned relocation of
industries, led on the one hand to narrower regional disparities in the
Czech Republic than in the former EU15, but, on the other hand, laid the
foundations for the structural problems we still see today in some parts of
the country.
The Czech Republic has benefited, on many levels, from being an EU
Member State, both from having access to the internal market and from
the ECP. At the same time, it has also benefited from the pre-accession
assistance. Above all, the pre-accession programmes made it possible to
invest in areas which otherwise would have been neglected or at least
received less attention, they have improved the institutional and admi-
nistrative quality and they have also made possible the utilisation of the
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund once the Czech Republic joined
the EU.
In this chapter we argue that a successful ECP should primarily focus on
the enhancement of a good entrepreneurial environment and the promotion
of economic growth based on innovation, R&D and new technologies. This
economic growth, furthermore, should be anchored in the development of
human resources.
The chapter is divided as follows: in the next section we examine the pre-
accession instruments, PHARE and ISPA, with respect to their respective
strengths and weaknesses. In section 6.3 we look briefly at controversies in
the membership negotiations. Section 6.4 looks at various aspects of the
Commission’s proposal for a new Cohesion Policy, which is followed by a
discussion on Czech priorities for the period 2007-2013. Before conclud-
ing the chapter we provide the reader, in section 6.6, with the expert’s
views on how European regional policy should be conducted in the future
and which priorities should prevail. 
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6.2 The Czech Republic and the
pre-accession instruments
This section will attempt to assess the impact of the two pre-accession
funds PHARE and ISPA – leaving out the third major instrument,
SAPARD – on the Czech Republic. However, in order to evaluate PHARE
and ISPA, we must first establish the goals of the programmes or, rather,
what the Czech Republic wanted to achieve with these programmes.
Besides the political effort to use as much of financial support as possible,
the main objective was to invest in sectors and regions that would other-
wise have been left out of the main objectives of the Czech government,
such as border regions and certain large infrastructure projects. Another
important and basic aim of the Czech Republic with the pre-accession
funds was of course to prepare for the future accession to the EU.
Hence we shall focus on how the aims and priorities of PHARE and ISPA
were fulfilled; how successfully they were implemented through different
types of projects; and how important these programmes were for the
transformation of the Czech Republic in its endeavour to join the European
Union.62
6.2.1 PHARE
The Czech Republic joined PHARE as early as 1990 when still part of
Czechoslovakia (Pravda 2002). After the dissolution of the federation, both
the Czech Republic and Slovakia became, without delay, participants of the
PHARE programme. 
Administration of PHARE
The adoption of the Accession Partnership in 1998 led to a more
decentralised administration of PHARE, which emphasised the demand for
enhancement and formalisation of Czech institutions. A position of
National Aid Coordinator was established, with responsibility for the
coordination of preparation, implementation and monitoring of all EU aid
programmes. This post was assigned to the deputy of Minister of Finance
– the Centre for Foreign Assistance was set up to administrate his agenda.
In addition, another deputy Minister of Finance was designated National
Authorizing Officer, responsible for the management of all financial
allocations coming from the EU and after 2000 also all financial resources
intended for co-funding of the EU’s aid programmes. The National Fund
was created at the Ministry of Finance as an administrative instrument of
the National Authorizing Officer (CFA not dated b).
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62 The sources used in this chapter are mainly official documents of the Czech government or
governmental web sites and the European Commission’s Regular Reports on Czech
Republic’s Progress towards Accession. Other publications and journal articles were also
consulted.
Moreover, specialised implementation agencies were established – mostly
within Czech ministries – in order to administrate projects in particular
areas.
• The Central Financing and Contracting Unit (Ministry of Finance)
implements institution-building projects. 
• The National Educational Fund (Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs) is responsible for human resource projects. 
• The Centre for Regional Development (Ministry of Local Develop-
ment) administrates investment projects in the area of economic and
social cohesion and cross-border cooperation. 
• CzechInvest (Ministry of Industry and Trade) manages projects in the
field of business development including business infrastructure. 
• The Civil Society Development Foundation is responsible for the
grants supporting NGO activity (MLD 2004a).
The European Commission described the implementation of PHARE as
“generally satisfactory” in its 2000 Regular Report. However, it also
criticised the functioning of the National Fund, in particular that it had
been slow in handling requests and distributing the funds (COM 2000, p.
12). Although the implementation of PHARE had improved in time for the
next report, the Commission recommended in the years that followed that
the Czech Republic improve the capacity of public administration by provi-
ding “adequate human resources and efficient and effective organisational
structures for all relevant bodies” (COM 2001, p. 12).
Even though the improvement of public institutions became a permanent
and important priority of the PHARE programmes after 1997 (CFA 2001;
and CFA 2003), project implementation was still not optimal. The Acces-
sion Partnerships had meant that the implementation of PHARE became
decentralised, but all projects still had to undergo ex-ante monitoring by
the European Commission or by the Delegation of European Commission
in the Czech Republic. In order to accelerate the process of approving pro-
jects, the European Commission decided to introduce the so called Ex-
tended Decentralisation Implementation System, which – according to the
Commission’s 2001 Report – should have been fully operational in 2002
(COM 2001).
However, the Czech Republic was unable to secure satisfactory admi-
nistrative bodies even by the time of its accession to the EU and thus the
Commission refused to grant its accreditation. Therefore, the flow of
financial resources from PHARE was suspended in August 2004, but
restored only four months later in December 2004 when the shortcomings
had been dealt with (EurActiv 2004a; Euractiv 2004b).
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Types of programmes
The PHARE programme consists of several types of programmes. The
most important in terms of financial allocations is the National Pro-
gramme. Then there is the Cross-border Cooperation Programme, which is
the counterpart of EU’s Community initiative Interreg. The administration
of these programmes is decentralized. In this chapter we do not deal with
Multi-country Programmes which are proposed directly by the Commis-
sion for all countries participating in PHARE.
National Programmes
During the first phase of PHARE, the aim of the support under the
National Programmes was to promote certain sectors in their transforma-
tion to market economy. When the multi-annual indicative plans were in-
troduced in 1994, each candidate country became responsible for deter-
mining its own long term priorities. The areas prioritised in the Czech
Republic were really very broad including public administration, agri-
culture, civil society and democratisation, education, infrastructure, en-
vironment and nuclear safety, private sector, social affairs, employment and
healthcare. The adoption of the Accession Partnership in 1998 meant that
almost a third of the allocations under the National Programmes were
assigned to institution building projects and the remainder to investment
projects (CFA not dated a). In 2002, the National Programme was even
divided into two parts, where the first part was entirely devoted to institu-
tion building (CFA not dated c).
The institution building projects were focused on six priority areas: finance,
justice, home affairs, agriculture, environment, and economic and social
cohesion (CFA 2003). The priority status of institution building was also
stressed by the introduction of a new project type, twinning, which supple-
mented existing projects such as consulting, training and studies. Under the
twinning projects, different bodies of public administration in the Czech
Republic accepted long- or short-term advisors from the EU15 Member
States in order to benefit from their knowledge, experiences and contacts,
thus improving the preparedness for the accession to the EU (CFA 2001).
Between 1998 and 2001 more than 60 twinning projects were carried out
in the Czech Republic, in co-operation with EU Member States. There
were problems reported with respect to communication between the
visiting consultants and hosting institutions. This was partly caused by lack
of helpfulness on the Czech side and partly by the fact that the quality of
the consultants was not always satisfactory (CFA 2002). The twinning
projects were applied in a number of areas, such as legal business environ-
ment, pension reform, public procurement, integrated pollution prevention
and control, sanitary and phyto-sanitary63 administration, healthcare and
63 EU and national standards to protect health, of humans, plants, and animals.
work safety and the combating of organised crime (COM 2001; and COM
2002).
The aim of the investment section of the National Programmes was
primarily to foster economic and social cohesion, which included projects
in the area of support for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), em-
ployment policy, protection of human rights and minorities, human re-
sources development and business infrastructure (CFA 2002). 
As for the overall distribution of the resources of the PHARE National
Programmes among particular sectors in the Czech Republic during 1993-
2001, the largest share was allocated to transport (€71 million), followed
by regional development (€54.4 million), employment, human resources,
social policy, and education (€47.6 million), and technical assistance,
public administration reform, standards, statistics, legislation, industrial
property, and telecommunications (€38.8 million). Significant resources
were also aimed at support of business, export and foreign direct invest-
ment, agriculture, finance and many other areas (CFA 2002).
Cross-border Cooperation
The second significant component of PHARE was the Cross-border
Cooperation programme. This programme was launched in 1994 and
represented about 50 per cent of the PHARE resources in the period 1995-
1999. 
When the Cross-border Cooperation was launched, it only concerned the
Czech-German border, which in 1994 was the only Czech border with an
EU Member State. When Austria joined the EU in 1995, the CBC
programme was extended to the Czech-Austrian border. In 1999 the Cross-
border Cooperation programme was introduced also on the borders be-
tween the Candidate Countries. The Czech Republic has thus cooperated
with Poland under this programme since 1999. There was also a one-off
cooperation with Slovakia in the same year (MLD 2004b). However, the
Czech Republic also cooperated with Poland and Slovakia under two
trilateral cross-border cooperation programmes (Czech Republic-Germany-
Poland and Czech Republic-Austria-Slovakia) in 1995 and 1996 (CFA
2001).
The primary aim of the CBC PHARE programme was to support the
economic development of the regions disadvantaged by their border
position. This was to be achieved by supporting competitiveness of Czech
businesses, improving infrastructure, dealing with common problems such
as environmental degradation and fostering cooperation between residents
in neighbouring regions (MLD 2004b; and CFA 2001).
The process of decentralising the CBC programme started in 1996, which
further enhanced cooperation and contacts between people and institutions
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in the border regions. The CBC PHARE programme converged towards the
Community Initiative INTERREG after 2000 with respect to its rules,
methods and administrative procedures, in order to prepare the candidate
countries for INTERREG participation after accession (MLD 2004b; and
MLD 2005).
The CBC originally supported a large number of smaller projects, but
subsequently changed with the introduction of ISPA in 2000 to favour
instead a small number of large infrastructure projects. At the same time,
grant schemes were also introduced, first tested in the two pilot NUTS 2
regions Moravskoslezsko and Severozápad. The most successful fund was
the Small Projects Fund, which was launched in 1996 and supported small
non-investment projects64 based on cooperation between municipalities,
schools, and NGOs in the area of culture, education and tourism (Horácˇek
2002; and MLD 2004b).
Although the tangible outcomes of the CBC PHARE infrastructure projects
could be seen in the form of roads, sewage systems or sewerage plants,
these projects sometimes failed to demonstrate a direct cross-border impact.
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64 Amounts allocated ranged between €1,000 and €50,000.
This fact was also criticised in the 2000 assessment reports by the Associa-
tion of European Border Regions (AEBR 2000a; and AEBR 2000b). The
problem was solved in the following years, especially by the means of the
grant scheme of the Small Projects Funds, which focused on a people-to-
people approach. Nearly half of these funds were as early as 1995-1999
allocated to cross-border cultural exchanges (AEBR 2000a; and AEBR
2000b). However, it is still questionable whether the aim of overcoming
cultural differences and rooted prejudices was achieved, since support for
EU Membership in the 2003 referendum was below average in nearly 85
per cent of Czech districts bordering Germany and Austria (CSO 2003).
One can only guess what support of EU in these regions would be achieved
without any visible PHARE projects and their outcomes. 
6.2.2 ISPA
Since ISPA supports large infrastructure projects with a budget exceeding
€5 million, particularly thorough and elaborate preparation is required.
Although there were special programmes under PHARE for the prepara-
tion of ISPA projects, the Czech Republic was unable to obtain even the
average allocation from the possible range in the years 2000 and 2001
(COM 2002).65 This changed quite dramatically in 2002, however, when
the Czech Republic’s allocation equalled €80.5 million, which was nearly
90 per cent of the maximum achievable allocation (MLD 2004c).
We have already mentioned that the process of project documentation
approval was rather lengthy, which subsequently put pressure on project
implementation. This was in no small part due to the approval procedures
of the Delegation of European Commission, but there were also serious
shortcomings on the Czech side. The most important factor was the
inability to guarantee sufficient co-funding of the projects. The EU con-
tribution should ideally be 75 per cent of total eligible costs, but the
typical EU contribution was not so high and there were also substantial
ineligible costs. Thus, the average EU contribution amounted to 50-60 per
cent of the overall costs, requiring sizeable resources to be provided by the
Czech side (CFA 2002; CFA 2003; and MLD 2004c).
The above mentioned obstacles occurred much more often in the area of
environmental projects. This led to a slight imbalance between the alloca-
tions for the transport and environmental project. In the end, 55 per cent of
the ISPA allocations were used under the transport branch and the re-
mainder under the environmental branch (EU Information Centre and DEC
2003). Since the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, all ISPA
projects were transformed to the Cohesion Fund (MT not dated).
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65 The Czech Republic could obtain between €57.2 and €83.2 million; see (MLD 2004c).
131
The projects in the area of transport all aimed at improving the connection
between the Czech Republic and its EU neighbours through the Trans-
European Networks (TEN), in total of €260 million.
Under the environmental part of ISPA, there were three main target areas:
securing quantity and quality of water, air quality and climate protection,
and waste treatment. Altogether, 14 projects were supported in the Czech
Republic (ME not dated; and MLD 2004c).
6.2.3 Conclusions
Under the PHARE programme, more than €1 billion was allocated to the
Czech Republic prior to its accession to the EU. The total ISPA allocation
in 2000-2003 exceeded €500 million (CFA not dated b; and COM 2004a).
The various branches in the Czech Republic were indeed successful in
contracting and implementing these resources. In both the PHARE and
ISPA programmes, more than 95 per cent were, or are expected to be, con-
tracted. The reason for not contracting the entire allocation was that the
least expensive offer has to be chosen during the selective procedure.
Although some projects were cancelled and the contribution had to be
reimbursed, more than 95 per cent of the contracted resources were already
paid out (DEC 2001; and CFA 2002).
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Thus, we can conclude that the Czech Republic took full advantage of the
assistance offered by the European Union. We can also claim that the pre-
accession funds inspired and supported investment in sectors and regions
that would otherwise have been omitted, or at least much more modestly
addressed. In this regard, we can for example mention the success of the
CBC PHARE programme (regardless of the various shortcomings
mentioned above) or the amounts invested in transport and environmental
infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the pre-accession funds contributed partially to the success of
Czech accession to the EU. In other words, this particular aim of both
PHARE and ISPA was fulfilled. Both administrative bodies and different
final beneficiaries have improved their knowledge and skills in how to
prepare, implement and evaluate the individual projects or administrate the
programmes. These facts imply that the Czech Republic is now better
prepared for participation in both the Structural Funds and the Cohesion
Fund. However, there are still some imperfections, as the suspension of the
PHARE fund in 2004 suggests. This particular situation shows that
ongoing reforms and constant endeavour is needed if the Czech Republic
is to be as successful within the EU Regional policy framework.
6.3 EU regional policy in the negotiation process
The negotiations on the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU were
officially initiated in March 1998. One of 31 negotiated chapters consisted
of EU regional policy and structural instruments coordination. From the
very beginning, the Czech government declared its preparedness to fully
adopt and implement the whole acquis in the field of EU Structural and
Cohesion Policy. The Czech government did not expect any serious
obstacles in this field during the negotiations and was convinced that the
respective laws and rules would come in effect in time for the date of
Czech accession to the EU. Thus, the Czech government did not request
any transition periods in this chapter (Position document of Czech
Republic to the Chapter 21).
With regard to the pre-accession instruments in previous years, the Czech
Republic had created the administration system in accordance with EU
regulations. Although both the pace and the quality of these administration
and monitoring structures were often criticised by the Commission, the
public administration in the end managed to guarantee that the entire
process of preparation and implementation system would be granted ac-
creditation.
During the negotiations the Czech Republic faced a specific problem
which called for immediate handling. Due to the strong tradition of state
centralism in the country, a reform of regional self-governance was post-
poned several times in the 1990s,66 which significantly influenced the
preparation of public administration on the territorial level. Since regional
authorities (including elected assemblies and regional councils) started
working only in the beginning of 2001, not being fully involved in the pre-
accession instruments, they could not gain sufficient administrative
experience as regards EU programmes and projects. Perhaps this is the
reason for the initial mistrust on the part of the Commission towards
regional operational programmes in the Czech Republic.
Based on the National Development Plan, six sectoral and seven regional
operational programmes were proposed by the Czech government under
objective 1 (excluding Prague). The Commission was however reluctant to
“inflate” the programming documents, which led to a substantial reduction
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66 Constitutional law on the creation of territorial self-governance was approved at the end of
1997 and came into effect on 1 January 2000. The first elections for regional assemblies
took place in November 2000.
in operational programmes – in the end one joint regional operational
programme and four sectoral operational programmes were approved. In
light of weaker administration capacity at regional authorities, a more
centralised (national) control over the Cohesion Policy can be seen as a
better conception.67 The government can thus easily enforce national
priorities; management is less complicated and cost savings can also
constitute a significant factor for this approach. However, representatives
of individual regions should be involved as much as possible in constitut-
ing the content of Cohesion Policy, including the setting of priorities and
measures in the Czech Republic. 
In order to conclude this part it is important to note that no serious
controversial issues appeared during the negotiation process. However,
there were several opinion clashes between the Czech government and the
Commission regarding the preparation of the programming documents.
6.4 Czech stance towards new regulation drafts
on regional policy
Generally speaking, the Czech government considers the proposed
structure of Structural Policy objectives – Convergence, Competitiveness
and Territorial cooperation – as sufficient and holds the view that these
objectives cover all needed areas of the least developed regions and states
in compliance with Lisbon objectives. However, there are a number of
aspects in the Commission’s proposal that representatives of the Czech
Republic should strive to modify. In this chapter we will discuss the most
important topics, which are either emphasised by the Czech government or
should not be neglected in our opinion.
It is essential to ensure sufficient flexibility of regional interventions in
order to respond adequately to the needs of regions or states. It would be
beneficial to bring activities supported within the Competitiveness objective
into the Convergence objective. With regard to the Cohesion Fund, it is
desirable to allow for a flexible use of resources for projects in both the
supported areas of transport and environment.
The proposed reorganisation of the rural development policy – from the
ECP to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – is regarded as a signi-
ficant step that will substantially influence the future rural development.
The priority is to prevent possible overlaps or the existence of gaps in
covering problematic areas.
According to the Czech government, lifelong education should be ex-
plicitly set as one of the priorities supported by the European Social Fund
for both the Convergence and Competitiveness objectives. It also wants to
create a more precise definition of horizontal themes necessary for the
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67 We return to this particular question in section 6.5.1.
programming documents. To name but one example, a reference to the
information society is today missing. 
The Czech government favours the emphasis on the urban dimension of
the ECP. It is certainly in line with the current political debate on the
deterioration of large prefabricated blocks of flats located especially on the
city suburbs. The threat of lower living standards for inhabitants in these
quarters, which could easily cause social-pathological phenomena (higher
criminality, drugs distribution etc.), explains this pro-urban stance. In this
context the government intends to increase the role of the cities and to
clarify their involvement into the implementation and preparation of
individual operational programmes.
6.4.1 Proposed costs for EU Structural and Cohesion Policy
As noted in the first chapter, the Commission has proposed a total of
€336.1 billion to finance the ECP in the years 2007-2013. Regarding the
ongoing negotiations, the figures in the Commission’s proposal should not
be considered as definite. It would be probably better to connect the total
budget to indicative calculations for each Member State. The Commis-
sion’s proposal should be regarded as a good base for further negotiations,
but the Czech government considers the proposed share of resources for
regions and countries lagging behind as not being optimal and, on the
contrary, the allocations for phasing-out regions as very generous. We do
indeed agree with this position.
6.4.2 Mono-fund v. Cross-financing
According to the Commission’s proposal, each operational programme
should be financed by a single Fund (a so-called mono-fund system). The
only exception to this rule would be operational programmes financing en-
vironment and transport together where the Cohesion Fund and the ERDF
may be used simultaneously. This simplification is welcome, since it can
significantly reduce bureaucracy and save costs. However, the mono-fund
approach seems in many respects to complicate rather than to simplify
matters.
According to the proposal, the flexibility for cross-financing would have a
ceiling of five per cent as a general rule, implying that each fund in each
operational programme could fund up to five per cent of its budget actions
that usually fall under the scope of the other fund. The Czech government
has expressed an intention to raise this ceiling by several per cent in order
to secure synergy between the ESF and the ERDF. For example, human
resources development requires both infrastructure investments and
training.
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6.4.3 Eligibility rules on VAT 
Under the current provisions on eligible costs, non-reimbursable VAT is
eligible for financing from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. In
the draft for new regulations this is to be changed, since VAT would no
longer be eligible for financing from the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund in
all cases, regardless of whether it is reimbursable or not (although the
provisions on eligibility of VAT for financing from the ESF would remain
unchanged). Since some of the final recipients, especially municipalities, do
not have to be VAT payers (i.e., they are not entitled to get VAT re-funded)
this rule threatens to negatively influence the absorption capacity of those
beneficiaries. The Czech government should therefore try to maintain the
current rules on eligibility of VAT for the next programming period.
6.4.4 Operational Programmes
Another debatable question concerns the creation of a special operational
programme to be used as a national reserve. The Commission has proposed
that each Member State should create a national contingency reserve,
amounting to one per cent of the annual contribution from the Structural
Funds for the Convergence objective and three per cent for the Com-
petitiveness objective, in order to cover costs from unexpected crises. The
proposed special Operational Programme should partly help to respond to
such crises. On the other hand, unexpected crises logically imply un-
expected risks, which can hardly be fully covered by a specific Operational
Programme.
The draft for regulation also lacks the definition of a precise period for the
fulfilment of the Commission’s obligations concerning the procedure for
the submitting, approving and revising of programming documents. It is
unclear why the Commission should have the right to adjust operational
programmes on its own initiative. In compliance with the principle of
subsidiarity we are convinced that the Commission should only have the
power to express non-binding recommendations for the Member States.
6.4.5 Maximum level of co-funding
If the Commission’s proposal was to be adopted, it would mean that some
islands, mountain areas and sparsely populated areas would be faced with
a higher rate of Community co-funding, such as the outermost regions as
well as regions that no longer have external EU borders (compared with
the situation on 30 April 2004). There is a possibility to increase this level
up to 85 per cent compared with a maximum 80 per cent for cohesion
countries. Moreover, the latter level is expected to be used only in excep-
tional and duly justified cases. We are convinced that such differences
neglect the specificities of the new Member States. In regard to the lower
level of economic development, higher convergence gap and the less
developed infrastructure, the Czech government should require the same
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level (i.e., 85 per cent) of financing for convergence regions in cohesion
countries as for remote regions.
It is quite strange that the Commission’s draft requires co-funding to be
related to the total eligible costs and not just to public costs. Such an
approach would exclude the opportunity to involve private resources in
financing and thus reduce the strain on public budgets.
6.5 Priorities of the Czech government in 2007 - 2013
On 1 March 2005 the Czech government approved the priorities of the
Economic and Social Cohesion Policy for the 2007-2013 period (Govern-
ment resolution no 245 on progress in preparation of the Czech Republic
for EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund in budget period 2007-2013).
The priorities are as follows:
• enterprising;
• human resources and tertiary schools (including universities);
• innovations and knowledge-based economy;
• infrastructure (including environmental infrastructure);
• regional disparities reduction (horizontal theme).
The Ministry for Regional Development in the Czech Republic has been
given the task of updating the current National Development Plan (NDP)
by 30 September 2005 and to prepare the National Strategic Reference
Framework for the 2007-2013 period by 30 November 2005.
According to a survey organised by this Ministry, the needs of individual
ministries expressed in costs, potentially funded from the Structural Funds,
exceed €6.7 billion per year. These figures (and the absorption capacity
arising there from) seem to be overestimated.68 Bearing in mind the capp-
ing principle of four per cent, a maximum estimation of transfers corres-
ponds to €4.2 billion per year. This amount significantly exceeds the cur-
rent transfers from the Structural Funds to the Czech Republic (€2.3 bil-
lion in the 2004-2006 period). Moreover, if we add national co-funding
(approximately 25 per cent of total funding), we conclude our estimations
at €5.4 billion per year, which represents more than six times the volume
of the financial resources in 2005.
There are some problems which negatively influence the absorption
capacity in the Czech Republic. First, problems are apparent on the side of
the final beneficiaries. In particular, the smaller municipalities may face
obstacles, both on administrative and financial levels. Smaller municip-
alities do not have enough experience to meet all the requirements set by
the respective regulations and rules and, at the same time, they are often
not so financially strong to pre-finance and co-finance the projects. On the
68 Many ministries included in these figures all investments and development projects that
they wanted to implement regardless of the main rules of EU Structural Policy. 
other hand, exclusion of smaller communes and the limitations of final
beneficiaries could lead to a lower overall absorption capacity.
Second, the Czech government has to clear away duplicities with respect to
national development priorities. Thus far, the National Development Plan
has been perceived as a tool through which additional funds can flow from
the EU budget to the Czech Republic. Apart from the NDP, there are still
many other national funds supporting many areas and identifying many
other priorities than those defined in NDP. Such duplicity and overlapping
of funds has to be dealt with properly.69 The approximately €1.34 billion
per year which would probably be needed for co-funding represents around
five per cent of the state budget. Regarding the current general government
deficit70 and the necessity of complying with Maastricht fiscal criteria, the
Czech Republic cannot afford on the one hand to further deepen budget
deficits and on the other use in an inefficient way the resources available
from the Structural Funds; that would simply not be politically sustainable.
The Czech government will have to realise that the NDP and the National
Strategic Reference Framework should be based on long-term goals com-
bined with clearly defined priorities and strategies. In compliance with the
principle of additionality, a national development policy has to walk hand
in hand with the rules of the ECP. Interventions carried out in the frame-
work of this policy will be financed both from public budgets and the
Structural Funds.
Last but not least, in preparing the new operational programmes the Czech
government should focus on defining crucial priorities. As regards the
current budget period, the Czech Republic has been criticised by the Com-
mission for having too many priorities and measures in the individual
operational programmes. Such an approach naturally leads to a conflict
with the principle of concentration. The impact of individual projects, as
well as the overall outcome of the operational programmes, will not be as
strong if too many priorities are built into the policy formulation. The
Czech government should therefore avoid this approach and define fewer
priorities and measures. A less voluminous approach would better in-
fluence the situation in particular areas.
The above mentioned priorities arise from the Economic Growth Strategy,
which is one of the most important strategic documents and it is currently71
being prepared and developed by an expert team led by the Czech deputy
Prime Minister Martin Jahn. This document seems to be the first attempt
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69 This topic is further developed in the next section.
70 The general government deficit consists of the central government deficit, which forms the
most significant part of the overall deficit, the local government deficit and non-budgetary
funds and state agencies’ balances.
71 April 2005
in the Czech Republic to formulate a coherent and clear mid- and long-
term strategy for economic growth. Each of the five chapters (human
resources, research and development, infrastructure, financial sources,
institutional environment; see Table 6.3) is further divided into several
objectives, which will be measured and monitored in detail.
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This ambitious document is expected to fight at least two crucial battles.
First, it has to be approved by the Czech government, which could be
paralysed by the conflicts inside the coalition government. A second and
probably more dramatic battle will take place after the general elections in
the summer of 2006. The civil democrats (ODS), currently the strongest
opposition party, are predicted to win. Despite the fact that the Economic
Growth Strategy is a well elaborated document according to independent
analysts, there is doubt whether the ODS – which have scored political
points mainly by criticising the coalition government – will be courageous
enough to adopt a document prepared by their political opponents. Another
question which deserves to be raised is whether a new government will
have enough time to modify the programming documents, especially the
operational programmes that are to be prepared for the next budget period.
We are convinced that it will not.
6.5.1 How to set priorities
The question of how to optimally use the resources available through the
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund has been discussed in the Czech
Republic since 1998. The Czech administration has been preparing for the
Structural Funds primarily through PHARE, which enabled responsible
officers to administer and monitor individual PHARE programmes.
The first draft of the National Development Plan – a complex and far-
reaching strategic document – was prepared in 1999. The Czech govern-
ment had to tackle the problem of a high number of priorities identified
first in the NDP and then in operational programmes. As noted, the Czech
Republic has been criticised for not being able to limit the number of
prioritised problems to be solved through the ECP and was consequently
forced to reduce the number of operational programmes. The changes were
incorporated into the final version of the NDP only in February 2003 and
the delay significantly reduced the time frame in which the concerned
actors could prepare for and develop priorities and measures as set out by
the NDP.
In the current programming period, EU subsidies are distributed through
five Operational Programmes for the Objective 1 (Industry and Enterprise,
Human Resources Development, Infrastructure, Rural Development and
Multi-Functional Agriculture and the Joint Regional Operational Program-
mes); two Single Programming Documents for Objective 2 and Objective 3
and the Community Initiatives Equal and Interreg. Projects under the
Cohesion Fund for the areas of transport and the environment are prepared
on the NUTS 1 level. 
However, the number of priorities has remained high and in order use
effectively the financial resources available through the EU funds, more
emphasis should be placed on the principle of concentration. The
supported priorities should be further reduced and be more specific since
this approach can help to set up clear strategies and targets. The focus
should be put on long-term concepts and targets, especially on human
resources development, research, enterprise and infrastructure.
As we have already indicated, one of the potential problems is the over-
lapping of priorities. The government should clearly divide the priorities
into those that are to be supported under the ECP and those that are to be
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covered only by national sources. The explicit definition of such priorities
could prevent the government from using national finances on programmes
similar to those co-financed by Structural Funds resources. It should thus
concentrate on areas which cannot be supported from EU sources but
which are important from the national perspective.
6.5.2 How to assure co-financing
The problem of setting ECP priorities is closely related to the economic
situation of the country. In order to receive funding, the government must
ensure co-financing from national sources (state budget, state funds, and
regional or municipalities’ budgets). Naturally, it would be a great advant-
age if the Czech government was able to ensure sufficient national finances
for co-financing and thus use as much financial resources from the EU
budget as possible.
For the years 2004-2006, the Czech Republic allocation from the Structural
Funds and the Cohesion Fund is about €2.8 billion. For the next program-
ming period it is estimated that the Czech Republic could get about €26.4
billion from the Structural Funds and it therefore has to provide co-financ-
ing from national public resources in the area of€8.9 billion. Additionally,
almost €13.4 billion is allocated from the Cohesion Fund and thus about
€2.3 billion would be required for co-funding. In comparison with the
current (reduced) programming period, the amount of financial transfers
will thus grow substantially. This in turn implies much stricter require-
ments in order to assure co-funding from national public sources.
Czech public finances are characterised by a growing general government
deficit and a relatively low but rapidly increasing public debt. The state
budget is afflicted by permanent deficits driven mainly by high mandatory
expenditures. Mandatory expenditures (e.g., social transfers, debt service,
state contributions to the health insurance system, etc.) represent 55 per
cent of overall public expenditures. Together with quasi-mandatory ex-
penditures (i.e., the army and public administration salaries) it represents
about 81.4 per cent of total expenditure.
A public finance reform was implemented in 2003 in order to improve the
fiscal position of the Czech Republic. The main task of the reform was to
ensure a gradual reduction in the budgetary deficit and a slowdown of the
growth of public debt. The government has committed itself to a general
government deficit that will not exceed four per cent of GDP by 2006 and a
year later it should not be higher than 3.5 per cent of GDP. In comparison
with the level of general government deficit in 2004, this represents an
annual reduction of 0.7 percentage points. The government (late 2004)
plans to cut expenditure by €6.7 billion (CZK 200 billion) during the 2005-
2007 period and to raise an additional €2.3 billion (CZK 70 billion) in tax
revenue. 
Within the framework of the public finance reform the question of public
private partnership (PPP) has been vigorously debated. The adoption and
development of the PPP principle could significantly contribute to the
required level of co-funding. The government approved this approach in
January 2004 and the first pilot projects have already been started.
However, no legislation has been adopted so far in this area.
In the current programming period co-funding is possible also from private
sources. However, this condition is not included into the Commission’s
proposal for the next programming period. This could cause problems for
the government to guarantee sufficient financial sources for the co-funding
requirement. Additionally, it would be convenient to maintain this feature
in light of the importance to enhance public private partnership. Therefore,
the Czech government needs to push the idea of involving private sources
in order to make it part of the new ECP.
The Czech government should also focus on mistake-free administration of
individual operational programmes. It has recently come under strong
criticism due to changing rules and conditions during the preparatory
phase of projects, such that the applicants were sometimes unable to adapt
to modified rules in time. The unsatisfactory state of the knowledge and
lack of experience of civil servants in several cases complicated the
process of preparing individual projects.
In order to receive money from the Structural Funds it is also important to
be able to develop quality projects. Despite the use of financial sources
within the PHARE programme, the applicants in many cases had poor or
no experience of how to prepare projects and fill out application forms.
It seems that both civil servants responsible for the Structural Funds and
potential applicants have gone through a learning process. Experience,
skills and knowledge gained from the current programming period could
fundamentally contribute to a more efficient use of the funds.
6.6 Expert view on the situation in the Czech Republic
The challenges faced by the Czech Republic, ranging from structural
unemployment, unsatisfactory state of transport infrastructure and environ-
ment, to low mobility of the labour force, to mention but a few, to a great
extent can still be attributed to the legacy of the centrally planned economy
under the former Communist regime. In the hope of narrowing regional
disparities and securing balanced regional development, the Communist
regime chose to engage in major income redistribution and centrally planed
relocation of industries, resulting in, for example, strong concentration of
mining and heavy engineering industries in certain regions (especially in
North-West and Moravia-Silesia).
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Even though the redistribution efforts led to narrower regional disparities
in the Czech Republic than in the former EU15,72 the approach laid strong
and undeniable foundations for the structural problems we see today in
some parts of the country. The past era stands as an important example of
what Tsoukalis calls “the risk of government failure” (Tsoukalis 1997).
Despite major progress in the Czech Republic during the past fifteen years
of putting right the wrongs of the past regime, the legacy of the former
system still mirrors itself in the country’s structural problems.
From a macroeconomic point of view, economic growth in the Czech
Republic is higher than in the former EU15. However, in comparison with
the other CEECMS, the Czech Republic rates as average, if not below
average (see Graph 6.1). As a relatively small, open and trade-dependent
economy, the Czech Republic and its future growth perspectives are to a
large extent dependent on the performance of the European economy,
especially that of Germany.73
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72 As measured in terms of unemployment and GDP per capita levels.
73 We return to this issue below.
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We would like to begin our discussion of the issues that are important for
sustained future economic growth by listing some of the most urgent
challenges the Czech Republic is faced with. Even though the following
list does not give an exhaustive picture (see the National Development
Plan) it should however provide the reader with an elementary view of the
current situation of the country.
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6.6.1 Public finances
The most critical question with respect to Czech economic policy is the
question of public finances. As noted, the general government deficit has
been rising in recent years and public debt has increased rapidly. Rising
deficits and high mandatory spending result in a situation where there is
little room for “productive public spending”. Especially worrying in this
regard are the possible consequences of this situation, should the issue
receive less attention than it rightly deserves. The above consequences
would certainly include a major decrease in, or complete halt to, invest-
ment policies as well as potential destabilisation of the macroeconomic
environment.
6.6.2 Labour market and regional disparities
The unemployment rate in the Czech Republic reached 9.65 per cent
in February 2005 (CSO). Despite the fact that the employment rate is
relatively high and the unemployment rate is close to the EU average, the
Czech labour market displays a number of structural shortcomings. First,
there are marked regional disparities with respect to unemployment. The
unemployment rate in structurally weak regions is more than four times
higher than in Prague and in some areas exceeds 20 per cent. This is
particularly the case in the northern regions, where structural unemploy-
ment has become a chronic problem with many negative consequences, not
only for the unemployed but also for the welfare system. Second, the share
of long-term unemployed can be regarded as high, reaching 37 per cent of
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the total number of unemployed in 2002. The increase in the number of
long-term unemployed is a major negative phenomenon. Third, youth
unemployment (people under 25 years old) is very high. In 2002, the
average share of people under 25 registered as unemployed was almost 17
per cent of the total number of unemployed. Here, too, there were sub-
stantial regional disparities. The structural shortcomings in the Czech
labour market mirror a low occupational flexibility and a low geographical
mobility of the labour force.
It is interesting to consider the composition of the unemployed, particularly
with respect to their educational background. Graph 6.2 (data form CSO
2004) clearly shows that job seekers without “arbiture”74 make up nearly
half of the total number of unemployed, regardless of their age. The above
only underlines the importance of higher and university education and the
need to engage in active education policies.
6.6.3 Employment composition
In comparison with the former EU15 the employment in the secondary
sector remains relatively high in relation to the tertiary sector.75 We should
be able to expect that the continuing structural changes in the secondary
sector (where a large proportion is still made up of industry) may release
more workers, creating additional pressure on the tertiary sector. It can be
argued that the absorption capacity of this sector is almost exhausted, due
to its level of saturation. 
6.6.4 Secondary and tertiary sectors
The most acute challenges of the secondary and tertiary sectors are
arguably the relatively low value added of the production in the secondary
sector; the relatively low export ability of SMEs; insufficient investment
resources; and insufficient development and transfer of new technologies,
as well as a lower level of productivity than needed.
6.6.5 Transport infrastructure, technical infrastructure
and environment
The qualitative characteristics of the transport infrastructure network do
not correspond to the conditions of the former EU15. This has a negative
effect on the environment, the development of entrepreneurial activities
and on the mobility of the labour force, especially in regions with
structural problems. Some parts of the transport infrastructure embodied in
the TENs can be regarded as unsatisfactory from the point of view of both
current requirements and future needs. The quality and quantity of the
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74 Or what is known as the A levels in the UK.
75 The secondary sector represents the part of the economy that is devoted to the processing of
basic materials extracted by the primary sector and the tertiary sector represents the part of
the economy that is devoted to service activities.
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technical infrastructure is also being tested to its limits in many parts of
the country. The above, together with an unsuitable waste industry, the
high energy demands of industry and households in general, a past en-
vironmental legacy as well as the low ratio of renewable energy resources,
presents a great challenge to the environmental situation of the country.
6.6.6In the “middle” of the debate
Without prejudice to the fact that this paper focuses on the future of
European Cohesion policy from the point of view of the new Member
States, what must not be disregarded is the fact that the Czech Republic
and its future growth perspectives are closely tied to the performance of
the European economy as such. This does not necessarily imply that what
is good for Europe is a priori good for the Czech Republic, but it does
imply that the economic developments in Europe will have a strong impact
on the Czech economy. A general view that takes this into account must be
put forth before we can adequately discuss the future Cohesion Policy.
In particular, we would like reiterate the conclusions of the Sapir report,
which stated that “the EU system has failed to deliver a satisfactory growth
performance” (Sapir et al. 2003, p. I). The report points out that “growth
must become Europe’s number one priority” (Sapir et al. 2003, p. I) and
that growth is pivotal in achieving the economic, social and environmental
objectives of the enlarged Union and crucial in helping to fulfil the Union’s
political objectives. To a great extent the same can be said about the Czech
Republic. The most important documents in this regard, the National De-
velopment Plan and the CSF, seem to recognise this fact. The National
Development Plan states that the “long term aim of the Czech Republic is
to reach sustainable growth, which will enable continuous convergence
towards the economic level reaching the EU average” (NDP 2003, p. 117).
The global objective of the Czech Republic in this regard is then defined as
“sustainable development based on competitiveness” (NDP 2003, p. 117).
To reach these objectives the Czech Republic has set itself three specific
objectives, namely:
1. creating conditions for a business environment;
2. increasing labour market flexibility;
3. improving the quality of the infrastructure.
These objectives are then developed into the following priority axes:
• increasing the competitiveness of industry and business services;
• development of transport infrastructure;
• human resource development;
• protection and improvement of the environment;
• rural development and multi-functional agriculture;
• development of tourism.
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The rationale behind the strategy for the shortened period 2004-2006, but
no doubt also for the longer term, is to “develop a range of key interven-
tions in a limited number of core areas which will support the streng-
thening of the competitiveness of the Czech economy by creating the con-
ditions for higher productivity growth while addressing structural problems
in the labour market” (CSF not dated, p. 6).
If the above is the goal of the Czech Republic, it is important to note its
position in the so-called post-Berlin debate, that is to say, to the debate
regarding the reform of the European Structural and Cohesion Policy. First
of all the Czech government fully supports the policy’s goals embodied in
the Treaty and wants to see a continuation of the Cohesion Policy in the
future. In this sense it can be argued that the Czech government leans to-
wards the values of social market economy as defined by the Commission
in 1996,76 that is to say, towards the objective of creating a system of Euro-
pean liberal democracy capable of regulating markets, redistributing re-
sources and shaping partnership among public and private actors in the
European arena (Hooghe and Marks 2001). One could argue that this view
is to a certain extent coloured by the fact that the Czech government has
been dominated by the Social Democratic Party since 1998. However, were
the system entirely left to the mechanisms and logic of the market forces,
there is arguably a grain of truth to the argument that it would take too
long to secure a socially desirable equilibrium.
The Czech position in the post-Berlin debate closely corresponds to the
goals and objectives of the country’s National Development Plan. What is
interesting to note is that the Czech Republic does not take a clear stand in
the ECP debate. Arguably, the Czech Republic, while agreeing with the
need of retention of the Cohesion Policy on the one hand, seems to support
certain attributes of what has been called a re-nationalisation of the Cohe-
sion Policy. It will become clear that the Czech government does not pro-
test in principle to a certain level of open method of co-ordination (OMC),
also titled a “framework for devolved regional policy” by the UK (Rawlins
2003), or what Austria titles the “light governance approach” (Austria
2003). The Czech position should be divided into three parts.
1. The philosophy of the policy (or the underlying principles). As stated
previously, the general view is strongly leaning towards solidarity and,
which will become clear later, also arguably towards the New Growth
Theory. Particularly the need for retention of the principle of con-
centration, or, so to speak, a philosophy of “positive discrimination”
(concentrating funds into the least developed regions), is frequently
signposted.
76 This model “seeks to combine a system of economic organisation based on market forces,
freedom of opportunity and enterprise with a commitment to values of internal solidarity
and mutual support which ensures open access for all members of society to services of
general benefit and protection” (COM 1996, p. 13).
2. The objectives of the policy. On the level of objectives of the
Cohesion policy an intrinsic link is made to the Lisbon Strategy. The
need to support the innovation processes in the economy is strongly
emphasised, including support for the implementation of information
technology, thus enhancing competitiveness. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that the Cohesion Policy should primarily take into account
the goals of sustainable territorial development, adaptation of human
resources to labour market conditions and infrastructure development.
Obviously, a strong link to the Czech National Development Plan can
be detected here. Moreover, it is arguably fundamental that the Cohe-
sion Policy instruments regarding employment and social integration
should be developed on the basis of the national action plans and not
the other way around. This represents a clear move towards the notion
of proportionality.77
3. The delivery principles. Here too we can see a move towards pro-
portionality. First of all, a definition and clarification of the role, rela-
tions and powers between the European Union, Member States and
individual regions are believed to be key issues. It can be also argued
that the need for a certain level of OMC is proposed in many ways,
shapes and forms, as the need for decentralisation in the enlarged
Union is viewed as acute. It is further suggested that different levels
of co-funding should be used and that more developed Member States
should be capable of providing more national resources for their
underdeveloped regions than poorer Member States.78 In addition,
more emphasis on OMC is implied with respect to the use of
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund in the Member States receiv-
ing assistance from both, as it is suggested that the ration between the
above instruments should be decided on the basis of the priorities of
the given Member State. Joining a long cue of countries, the Czech
Republic has made it clear that a simplification of the regulation of
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund is desirable. In this
regard the Czech Republic does not shy away from suggesting direc-
tions. For example, it has pointed at the need to simplify administra-
tion and implementation procedures, reduce the number of program-
147
77 As defined in the draft of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe. Title III,
Article 9(4) states that “under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of the
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Constitution”.
78 This view arguably correlates with that of Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark
and the UK. Nevertheless, the proposals supported by the above Member States would with
some certainty mean a decrease in funds for the ECP, which is clear from the UK position
(the UK government stresses the necessity of a fair budgetary deal for the UK taxpayer; see
UK, 2003b) and Sweden (who views the 0.45% threshold of the EU GDP on the Structural
Funds budget as unacceptably high; see Sweden, 2003, p. 1). Interestingly, the Czech gover-
nment has stated that the volume of EU funds for the Cohesion Policy should be sufficient to
allow for the goals of the new ECP to be fulfilled, but does not provide any further details.
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ming documents, and the need to find a solution to the demanding
financial management, or to at least provide a clearer definition for
recognising costs. Finally, the Czech Republic proposes to create a
single fund in the future.
6.6.7 Sustainable development based on competitiveness
As noted, the problem of the public finances in the Czech Republic is the
most critical issue as regards its economic policy. The current situation
may have far-reaching consequences and the reform of public finances
should be the number one priority; not only for the government, but for the
whole political spectrum. The imminent question to ponder is whether the
European Cohesion Policy can play a valuable role and provide added
value in this regard.
Clearly, the large government deficits and public debt must be stabilised.
Furthermore, cuts may also have to be made in mandatory expenditures.
The current situation seems to “strangle” what the National Development
Plan calls a “productive public spending” (NDP 2003). On the other hand,
the result of a reform that has not been meticulously planned may be
equally disheartening. A cut in the national budget could endanger the
application of the National Development Plan and put into question the
Czech ability to co-finance assistance from the Structural Funds and the
Cohesion Fund. It can therefore be argued that in the long term, public
finances can be improved through five intrinsically linked directions (or
priorities). Furthermore, it can be argued that, although it may not be
apparent, the ECP has a fundamental role to play.
Let us therefore return for a moment to the Sapir report. The argument put
forward by Sapir, stating that economic growth should be viewed as the
means of achieving the economic, social and environmental objectives and
should be understood as an underlying principle of the Czech Republic’s
economic and structural priorities. Furthermore, it is clear from the Czech
position regarding the post-Berlin debate that the country hopes to choose
an approach that does not promote “growth at any cost”. Rather, it should
promote sustainable growth based on competitiveness (NDP 2003),
conscious of the fact that market failures do exist and should be (to a
certain extent) addressed. While by no means denying the global and
specific objectives of the National Development Plan, Figure 6.1 attempts
to “renegotiate” the priorities and objectives into a form that could be seen
to be intrinsically linked to the short as well as the medium term needs of
the Czech Republic. Notwithstanding applicability and logic, it can be
argued that some parts of the NDP have been designed to fit with the
Cohesion policy’s objectives and could be approached, at least from the
Czech point of view, through different ways and means. What springs to
mind is, for example, priority axes 5 and 6, titled Multi-functional
Agriculture and Development of Tourism.
The public sector
What seems to be fundamental as regards the situation with the public
finances, bearing in mind the need to secure “productive public spending”,
is the need to reform the public sector. Institutional failure undoubtedly
contributes to the weakening of positive motivation of economically active
entities. The competitiveness of an economy – and, indeed, the quality of
the development of the whole society – is conditioned on the quality of its
institutions, which helps to create the basic framework for the activities of
the different spheres of society.79 Institution building, institution capacity
and institution learning have played and continue to play a crucial role in
the risk of government failure (Tsoukalis 1997). If it is argued that, on the
basis of the quality of institutions, “the prospects for effective use of
Structural Funds in the (then) accession countries are limited” (Ederveen,
de Groot and Nahuis 2002, p. 17), then this line of reasoning implies that
the quality of institutions in the new Member States (including the Czech
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79 This view is supported by inter alia Sapir et al. (2003); Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis
(2002); and Bailey and De Propris (2000).
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Republic) is far from satisfactory. This problem has been recognised by the
Commission (COM 2002). According to the proposal for the future ECP,
the Commission wants the “adaptation of public administration to change
through administrative and capacity building” (COM 2004b, p. XXVIII).
This still seems to be an important place for the Cohesion Policy.
The policy can help in what can be paraphrased as the “adaptive efficiency”
of the public institutions (North 1990; and Cortright 2001). From a practical
point of view, the primary focus should lean towards personnel and process
audits of the public sector. Furthermore, IT and language proficiency must
not be forgotten. Arguably, more use of information technology, e-govern-
ment and the creation of “one contact points” are also fundamental. In addi-
tion, continued institution learning80 based on the exchange of experience
and OMC should not be underestimated. Even though it is a long term goal,
increased effectiveness of public institutions is arguably a pillar pre-
requisite for a well functioning society and economy, as these institutions
can be said to “draw the rules of the game”. The above contribution should
– in the sense of the Sapir report’s proposals – be conducted on the basis of
an increased conditionality approach, through the “output logic” (goals
reached) rather that “input logic” (money spent). Finally, it should be
underlined that what is generally needed is a more proactive approach from
the public sector towards those who have the potential to become the
beneficiaries of the Structural Funds. What we mean by this is that one
should attempt to go beyond information campaigns and follow them up
with what could be called a qualitative, rather than quantitative, approach. It
is thus important to engage in a dialogue prior to the application stage.
Innovation, R&D, technology and human resources development
The need to support innovation, R&D, technology and the need for a
continued development of human resources do not only stem from the
premises of the New Growth Theory, which claims that knowledge and
innovation, as well as investment in human capital, drive economic growth
and that an economy that “rewards” innovators will grow faster. Similarly,
the need not only stems from the goals of the Lisbon strategy. Arguably,
the underlying need is also more basic, but equally valuable. The Czech
Republic does not possess many natural resources. The only way for the
country to secure growth is through a continuing reorientation towards a
knowledge based economy while trying to increase the value added of its
output. This can only be secured through focusing on the above objectives.
In this regard a much stronger connection must be established between the
private sector and educational institutions. Thus, education could take on a
more practical and project oriented form and structure. The content of
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80 On all levels: state, region and municipality.
education, especially in industry orientated schools and universities, should
focus on broadening the practical skills of its students, ranging from pro-
ject management, teamwork and communication skills to the implementa-
tion of solutions in industrial environment and the involvement in real
problem solving. The opening of departments in education institutions
from other EU Member States should be actively supported.
It is important to note that there may be a possible risk related to innova-
tion, R&D and technology, which is the so-called “cumulative gravitation
mechanism”. The cumulative gravitation mechanism results in regional
growth clusters, which Hitiris, on the basis of Myrdal (1957), titles “poles
of development”, causing “intra-country polarisation” (Hitris 2003, p.
222). In other words, already developed regions continue to grow at the
expense of relatively backward regions, which are experiencing cumulative
economic decline and become further handicapped. The implication of this
line of reasoning is that funds should be directed to regions that need to
undergo structural change. In practical terms, investments should foster or
attempt to lay the foundations for the creation of new growth poles and
their potential spread effects, rather than be directed towards the current
growth poles (e.g., Prague), potentially magnifying what Myrdal (1957)
called “backwash effects”. This indicates in turn a need for further en-
forcement of innovation centres through venture funds and PPP. The plan
by the Czech Ministry of Industry to establish a special venture capital
fund therefore seems particularly promising (Bautzova and Hrstkova 2005).
It goes without saying that the promotion of innovation centres in the
structurally weakest regions must be accompanied by with investments in
human capital and infrastructure. Projects based on the OMC approach,
aiming at knowledge and experience exchange by creating the so called
“flexible education system” (NDP 2003, p. 123) should be increasingly
encouraged. An attempt at promoting the mentioned “output logic” should
be strongly emphasised. Some of the indicators of success could, for
example, be the following:
• Output value added
• Increase of export output (composition of export output)
• The ration of high-tech sector employment
• The number of unemployed per one job offer  
Infrastructure and environment
Both transport and technical infrastructure play a pillar role for the future
development of the country; for many different and intrinsically linked
reasons. Not only will the quality of the infrastructure help to intensify
economic activities, it will also help to promote greater mobility of the
labour force (especially in a relatively small country as the Czech
Republic). At the same time the quality of infrastructure has an immense
impact on the environment. For example, the unsatisfactory state of the
Czech transport infrastructure, in every sense of the word, shows that there
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is a clear link to the state of the environment. This link has been further
accentuated after the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, as the
transit transport has risen by 50 per cent between May 2004 and May 2005.
The TENs cannot be the only priority with respect to transport infra-
structure in the future. The creation of a quality transport infrastructure to
and within structurally weak regions must also be regarded as an
immensely important priority. Furthermore, trans-border infrastructure in
and between the border regions must be supported. As regards the
technical infrastructure, waste policy and energy consumption are arguably
the key elements. For example, Structural Funds in conjunction with
private capital might successfully cooperate to revitalise ageing housing
stocks, which has proved to be unsatisfactory with respect to energy
consumption. This approach could secure energy savings of as much as ten
per cent of total household consumption. Once again, the need for “output
logic” and increased conditionality is apparent. It can be argued that the
“output logic” approach can secure the value added of the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund.
Entrepreneurial environment
The support of an entrepreneurial environment and of SMEs must be
viewed as essential. The development and expansion of SMEs have a great
impact on the overall stability and performance of the economy. Further-
more, SMEs poses a great level of adaptability regarding market demands,
and has proven to be an important engine in the creation of new employ-
ment opportunities. In this regard the emphasis must be put on the enhance-
ment of a good entrepreneurial environment, an environment where legisla-
tion and the concerned public administration motivates rather than de-
motivates entrepreneurship, that is to say, an environment where the playing
field is levelled and just. To this end the Structural Funds can, in the future,
play an immensely important role. As Figure 1 suggests, the enhancement
of a good entrepreneurial environment, as well as the support of SMEs,
should be a key priority, but only as a part of intrinsically linked and
mutually supportive activities and priorities., such as connection between
education, research and business activities, investment into transport and
technical infrastructure, support of lifelong learning, to mention but a few.
6.7 Conclusions
It is important to note and underline that the Czech Republic undoubtedly
has benefited from its year-long membership in the European Union – and
on many levels. With relatively strong growth and exports, low inflation
and low interest rates, the country has the potential to sustain its promising
growth path. In addition, the general course set by the National Develop-
ment Plan, which seeks to “develop a range of key interventions in a
limited number of core areas which will support the strengthening of the
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competitiveness of the Czech economy by creating the conditions for
higher productivity growth while addressing structural problems in the
labour market” (CSF not dated, p. 55), also seems to be the right course to
take. Nevertheless, major challenges lay ahead. The problem of how one
should create the conditions for higher productivity is the most funda-
mental challenge of all and there is no simple solution to this problem. 
European regional policy has an immense role to play in helping to create
the right conditions for economic growth. As noted, the support of an
entrepreneurial environment and of SMEs is essential. In this regard the
emphasis must be put on the enhancement of a good entrepreneurial en-
vironment, an environment where legislation and the concerned public
administration motivates rather than de-motivates entrepreneurship; an
environment where the playing field is levelled and just. But this must not
be the sole focus of the policy. If economic growth is to be sustained,
especially in the Czech Republic, it has to be based on innovation, R&D
and new technologies. First and foremost, it must be an economic growth
that is anchored in the development of human resources. To this end, what
is arguably needed is more “output logic” in the whole policy rationale and
more OMC approach with regards to the priority setting.
From a broader point of view, it is certain that EU regional policy has its
place in today’s Europe. The post-Berlin debate made it clear that some of
the fundamental issues, namely those centring on the philosophy, scale and
spread of the policy, may be a source of severe tensions when the future
ECP is up for its final deliberation in the Council. After nearly half a
century of European integration the respective Member States’ govern-
ments seem to be deeply entrenched in positions that can only be titled
juste retour. Thus, the time has come when we ought to reflect on the past
and begin to debate the underlying and fundamental question of the
European integration: Is the European Union a Union of Member States or
a Union of peoples? Such a debate would in turn undoubtedly reflect on
the future European regional policy. 
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7 SLOVAKIA AND COHESION POLICY
Karol Frank, Veronika Hvozdíková and Vladimír Kvetan
7.1 Introduction
Regional development in the European Union is constantly changing and it
is a process that poses a number of challenges to the new Member States.
Most of them have undergone an economic transition that has represented
a tremendous challenge, unparalleled in their modern history. European
integration and the Cohesion Policy combined are therefore seen as a pos-
sibility to accelerate and successfully catch up with the market economies
of the EU15.
Slovakia began its transition process in 1991 as a part of the Czech and
Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR). The new federal government, formed
after the collapse of the Communist regime, started to prepare for a legis-
lative, economic and administrative reform in the beginning of 1990
(Morvay 2005). By the end of 1990, the economic reform was presented to
the public. The main tasks of this reform were fast and massive privatisa-
tion; price liberalisation and liberalisation of foreign economic relation-
ships; macroeconomic balance; and the establishment of a social security
system. The reform also carried with it a restrictive monetary and fiscal
policy regime; a mechanism of internal convertibility of the currency;
exclusion of the circulation of foreign currencies in the economy; and a
depreciation of the Czechoslovak Koruna of more than 80 per cent. Further-
more, the basic goals of Structural Policy were also specified.
With the formation of Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993,81 the process of
building the necessary institutional framework for an independent state
took off. However, lack of experience, insufficient human capital, various
structural problems, controversies as regards the transition method, in-
adequate administrative capacities, a low level of law enforcement and
other problems seriously hampered this process.
During 1994-1998 Slovakia underwent the so called “Own way of transi-
tion” as a reaction to the federal transition strategy, which it opposed. In
1995 Slovakia applied for EU membership. Although becoming a part of
the European integration was one of the most important priorities of the
government, the actual outcome was quite the opposite. At the Luxemburg
Summit in December 1997, the European Council decided not to open
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81 The unsolvable situation as to the competencies between national and federal levels was one
of the crucial factors that led to the split. Another important reason was the different
impacts of the transition process on the social situation on the national level. Conversion of
heavy military industry, deep structural problems of the Slovak industry and the so-called
“radical” way of transition had a severe impact on the economical and social situation in
entire regions. The necessity of a deeper social consideration thus became an important
topic.
accession negotiations with Slovakia. The main arguments provided in
Luxemburg were the instability of constitutional institutions and the
democratic deficit.
After the 1998 parliamentary election a new government with a different
policy orientation (as compared to the 1994-1998 government) brought
with it a change in the Slovakia-EU relations. Slovakia was persistent in its
efforts to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, which eventually paid off as it led
to an invitation to open accession negotiations in December 1999 in
Helsinki. 
After 1999 Slovakia underwent a substantial shift in economic policy and
political development and has since implemented substantial economic
reforms, including reforms of the tax, pension, healthcare, welfare and
social security systems. Although the reforms have created the necessary
conditions for overall macroeconomic stability, substantial regional
disparities still exist in Slovakia.82
Our contribution strives to present a Slovak perspective to the discussion
about the future ECP and present our vision of this policy on the premise
that it should form a forceful regional policy in the EU in general and in
Slovakia in particular.
7.2 The experience of Slovakia with
pre-accession support
The pre-accession instruments have played an important role in the integra-
tion process. The availability of pre-accession assistance for economic
development (PHARE), for environment and transport (ISPA) and for
agricultural and rural development (SAPARD) has paved the way for the
substantial increase in funding that has taken place since accession in 2004.
7.2.1 PHARE
At the present time, four PHARE Implementing Agencies are in opera-
tion.83 The PHARE support was based of Financial Memorandums 1998-
2002. The pivotal fields for the use of PHARE support have been the pre-
accession activities and infrastructure building. The key objective of the
PHARE support has been to enact and strengthen transparency in the
process of gaining and using the resources to avoid dispersion of funds.
Significant progress in the fields of programming, coordination and im-
proving administrative capabilities has been achieved in recent years.
159
82 See chapter 3 for empirical data.
83 The Central Financing and Contracting Unit (CFCU), the Slovak Post-Privatization Fund,
the National Agency for Development of SMEs (NADSME) and the Regional Development
Support Agency and the Civil Society Development Fund (CSDF).
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The Central Financing and Contracting Unit (CFCU) has proven to be
effective in handling the financial administration of PHARE’s “Institution
building” projects. CFCU was the main consumer of the PHARE funds in
the years 1999-2003 (nearly 75 per cent of PHARE resources). 
The Regional Development Support Agency (RDA) was responsible
mostly for implementing Cross-Border Cooperation programmes, building
the infrastructure for Roma communities and also for most of the
economic and social cohesion projects. The main problem of Implementa-
tion Agency (IA) RDA had mainly to do with a relatively low rate of con-
tracting. Enormous efforts have been made to strengthen the administrative
capacity within the Agency, but progress is still needed in management
capabilities and in project implementation in order to pave the way for an
optimal utilisation of future cohesion assistance.
The largest infrastructure projects were related to highway network
development (Bratislava-bypass Mierová), while the most tangible project
based on Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) was the construction of the
bridge over the Danube River (connecting ?túrovo in Slovakia with
Ostrihom in Hungary). The PHARE community programmes were mostly
oriented towards research (the 5th Framework Programme), education and
culture. Only a small share was used to supporting SMEs. One of the
weaknesses in the utilisation of the funds was timing, because a lot of
sources were only tapped at a very late stage in the process, which was
mainly due to problems in public procurement.
7.2.2 ISPA
There were substantial difficulties as regards ISPA environment projects in
Slovakia. It took two years to start the environmental projects, mostly be-
cause of a lack of suitable projects. In 2002 the number of projects in
force allowed Slovakia to obtain more than its average allocation. The
programming improvements have also been matched by a steady improve-
ment in implementation. 
Almost all funding of environment projects has been channelled to heavy
investments in the water sector. The active involvement of regions’ and
municipalities’ water companies was crucial for the technical and environ-
mental preparation of the 18 ISPA drinking water and waste water projects.
Only one non water sector project was launched in 2003, namely an air
pollution project.
The transport sector was performing well right from the start, mainly
because of the good preparation of infrastructure projects in the years
1996-1998. During these years, substantial infrastructure construction took
place, financed by government expenditures. In 1998 the government
changed and so did the attitude towards government investments in
transport infrastructure. The necessity to reduce the budget deficit led to a
decrease in the number of government investment projects. After the
introduction of ISPA, however, “old projects” could be used to obtain
“new” resources.
The most important impact of the ISPA programmes as regards the rail
sector was the renovation of a substantial part of the important interna-
tional TINA/TEN corridor V.a between Bratislava and ?ilina. Concerning
roads, the financing of the city motorway between Vienna and the
Riverport Bridge (bypass in Bratislava) closed an important strategic gap,
at the same time linking the TINA/TEN corridors V.a (Venice-Trieste/
Koper-Ljubjana-Uzgorod-Lvov) and VI. (Gdansk-Grudziadz/Warsaw-Kato-
wice-Zilina).
The administrative staff has increased in the implementation agencies
established in the relevant ministries. While the increase was higher than
the Commission’s recommendations, the low salaries made it difficult to
recruit staff with adequate knowledge, experience and background and the
substantial turnover has continued to pose a threat to efficient programming
and sound implementation. In particular, young staff have often left the
Ministries for the private sector shortly after gaining sufficient experience.
7.2.3 SAPARD
Slovakia obtained accreditation in only five objectives on 15 April 2002
based on the SAPARD programme on 15 April 2000.84
The most significant problems with respect to the implementation of pro-
jects concerned the poor accessibility to free resources, difficult conditions
for basic industry and unfortunate climatic changes (floods in 2002, freez-
ing spring and dry summer in 2003). Insufficient compensation for these
climatic changes affected the number of proposed projects mostly in the
objective No. 1 Investments to agriculture enterprises.
7.2.4 Main achievements of the pre-accession support
The pre-accession assistance for economic development (PHARE), en-
vironmental and transport (ISPA), and agricultural and rural development
(SAPARD) has paved the way for the increase in funding from the
Structural Funds in 2004-2006, essentially in the same sectors. Some of
the positive achievements to date – bearing in mind that programmes are
still being implemented and results are still coming in – are the improve-
ments as to the administrative capacity and the increase in experience that
the pre-accession instruments brought with them. They will be vital in-
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84 No. 1 – Investments in agriculture enterprises, No. 2 – Improvement in manufacturing and
marketability of agriculture and fish products, No. 4a – Diversification activities in rural
area and non-infrastructure investment, No. 5 – Forestry, No. 7 – Land adjustments.
Accreditation for the remainder of the objectives (3, 4b, 6, 8, 9) was obtained on 14 August
2003.
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gredients in the utilisation of the Structural Funds and they will hopefully
help Slovak institutions overcome the obstacles that we describe later in
the text. 
Regarding the absorption capacity, Slovakia has so far been able to draw
approximately 95 per cent of the resources available through the PHARE
and SAPARD programmes and 120 per cent of the resources available
through ISPA.85 The case of ISPA proved that it was possible through
special effort to draw support at the end of the programming period,
despite contracting problems. However, the overdrawing of ISPA support
owed more to huge transportation infrastructure projects than to a radical
qualitative change in managing and contracting.
That having been said, there has been no evaluation of the pre-accession
instruments by either government officials or independent researchers in
Slovakia86 and it is therefore not possible to state with any certainty their
real economic impact on overall economic development.87
7.3 Cohesion Policy in the accession negotiations
Slovakia started accession negotiations in March 2000, two years later than
the other Visegrad Countries. The delay was mainly due to political
reasons and it meant that Slovakia was placed in a disadvantageous
position in the negotiation process from the very beginning. The main
problems related to negotiations were mostly of an internal nature. When
negotiations were opened, Slovakia had not elaborated a coherent regional
policy strategy that could have served as a basis for the negotiations. Also,
the preparation and drafting of the National Development Plan was both
inadequate and delayed.
In addition to these complications, there were also other internal problems.
Above all, uncertainty about the territorial and administrative division of
Slovakia; negotiators with poor experience who did not have all the
relevant information; struggles over competence between regional bodies,
central government and municipalities; and the obligation to press the
schedule in the negotiation process, produced an outcome that was not
optimal. In many cases Slovakia accepted statements and proposals from
the Commission and, from our point view, applied a quite passive approach
during the negotiations that concerned Slovakian economic priorities.
Examples of specific restrictions that discriminated the efforts and require-
85 The figures reported here are estimates made at the end of 2004 by the Ministry of
Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic.
86 The ex-post evaluation of PHARE projects in 1997 and 1998 (which was published in
2001) focused on 16 selected projects. The overall economic impact of PHARE support was
not evaluated.
87 Evaluation of the NDP for 2004-2006 and the ex ante evaluation of the National Strategic
Reference framework for 2007-2013 is currently in progress in Slovakia.
ments of Slovak applicants were certain restrictions in agricultural and
rural development, where the food sector was excluded from EU funding
(eligible applicants for the Sectoral Operational Programme Agriculture
and rural development were only agrarian-processing subjects in accord-
ance with the rules of the ECP). Some very important industries in Slovak
regions were also excluded from support (such as mining and the steel
industry).88
The Ministry of Environment had from the very beginning serious
problems exploiting the ISPA financial limit for environmental projects. As
late as 2000, none of the environmental projects submitted to Brussels had
been accepted, six of them because they lacked the necessary documenta-
tion (such as the lack of a financial plan). The Ministry of Environment
was unable to provide in time the basic information on ISPA criteria to the
municipalities in time. Moreover, there has been no tradition of large
environment infrastructure projects in Slovakia. In the year 2000 Slovakia
lost ISPA environmental support worth of €4 million, money that was in-
stead transferred to Slovenia. 
The described problems are mainly explained by the nature of ISPA, as its
priorities are centred on projects in large agglomerations. For instance, in
the field of water sewage purification, the recommended costs for ISPA
projects are a maximum of €500 per capita. However, since environmental
liabilities in Slovakia are the greatest in the field of canalization and
sewage plants building – especially in small settlements and villages – pro-
jects have often exceeded the maximum recommended per capita cost.89
Even though the Slovak delegation has asked for a more flexible approach
on several occasions due to the specific conditions of the country, the rules
of ISPA have remained the same for all participating countries. The low-
water mark for ISPA projects in Slovakia was reached in 2001, when only
one environmental project was accepted and Slovakia lost approximately
€20 million worth of ISPA resources as a consequence. After 2002 the
situation has changed. Despite the initial problems, however, the situation
changed in the following years and Slovakia has since been able to utilise
the ISPA resources to approximately 120 per cent, as measured over the
entire pre-accession period.
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88 The National Development Plan of the SR (NDP SR) for the period 2004-2006 introduces
four programming documents, one Operational Programme (OP Basic Infrastructure) and
three Sectoral Operational Programmes (SOP Industry and Services, SOP Human Resources
and SOP Agriculture and Rural Development) for Objective 1. As regards Objectives 2 and
3, NDP SR determines one Single Programming Document (SPD) for each of them.
89 The high per capita cost in ISPA projects were in most cases caused by the low urbanisation
level in Slovakia. There are only two agglomerations in Slovakia (Bratislava and Kosˇice), in
specific cases other regions had to form so-called “microregions” in order to be eligible for
ISPA support.
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As regards the positive features of the negotiation process, the opening of
negotiation chapter 21, “Regional policy and coordination of structural
instruments”, at the end of March 2000 had a very positive effect on the
adoption of legislation related to the implementation of EU regional policy
in Slovakia. At the end of 2001 the Act on the Regional Development
Support, the Act on Financial Control and Internal Audit, the Act on the
State Statistics and the Act on the State Treasury, were adopted. At the
same time, the National Monitoring Committee was established and in
January 2002 the ex ante evaluation of the SR National Development Plan
by independent experts was completed and submitted to DG Regio and
DG Enlargement. The legislative steps for the implementation of European
regional policy invoked by the accession negotiations served as a base for
the accession process. Negotiations on chapter 21 were preliminarily
closed in July 2002, which meant that Slovakia fulfilled the basic
legislative conditions of the ECP.
7.4 Selected problems, barriers and
obstacles related to Cohesion Policy in Slovakia
This section is thematically divided into two contiguous parts. The first
part describes the situation with respect to regional policy, public ad-
ministration and management of the regions at the time when pre-acces-
sion support was launched. The second part outlines some concrete pro-
visions of the ECP that have created considerable obstacles in EU-funding
in Slovakia, with a special emphasis on the problems in lagging regions.
7.4.1 Background – Regional division of Slovakia 
A special situation regarding EU pre-accession support was caused by an
ongoing regional reform, which brought about a complete change in the
regional structure in Slovakia. Three Slovakian regions (Western, Central
and Eastern Slovakia) were revoked and the country was instead divided
according to a new territorial architecture. The result was a new self-
government structure,90 where the newly formed municipalities required
new regional offices, new administrative capacities and new management.
However, due to a lack of management experience in the regions in the
regional self-governing bodies, along with a weak partnership between
these bodies, the new agenda has continued to be a source of substantial
delays and problems with respect to EU funding.
7.4.2 Decentralization of public administration
Administrative capacities with the appropriate competence at the local and
regional levels are essential to correctly prepare for support from the
90 Since 2002 Slovakia is territorially divided into 8 upper-tier territorial units, so-called VÚC.
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. Furthermore, they need to be suf-
ficiently equipped so that they are able to prepare and implement develop-
ment projects in partnership with national bodies. Like the other CEECMS,
Slovakia has been characterized by a high level of centralisation and, as a
consequence, there has been a total absence of any regional structures from
the very beginning of its existence as an autonomous country. The basic
principles of an integrated regional policy were defined in 1991 (as part of
the federal transition strategy), but the first Integrated plan of regional
development – which was necessary to enable the country to apply for pre-
accession support – was adopted by Parliament only in 1999. The National
plan of regional development required for programming of post-accession
support was adopted in 2001, the very year when the decentralisation of the
public administration was initiated. However, the municipalities obtained
competencies for regional planning only in 200291 and they still did not
have enough time for building up efficient administrative capacities for
implementing the Principle of Partnership (Vojteková 2004).
In addition to insufficient experience with programming and planning at
the regional and local levels, there were also delays when the methodology
of regional planning for municipalities were prepared and released. This
did not exactly strengthen the partnership between national and local levels
in creating a strategy of regional development. The methodology handbook
for elaborating the Plan of regional economic and social development was
prepared by the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction and
adopted only in 2004. 
7.4.3 Fiscal decentralisation
The concept of Decentralisation and Modernisation of Public Administra-
tion that introduced the principles of fiscal decentralization in Slovakia,
Conception of Decentralization and Modernization of Public Administra-
tion, was prepared within the framework of the process of the above
mentioned regional reform in Slovakia. The document (Conception) det-
ermined two phases of fiscal decentralisation92 and outlined the new
legislation on budgetary principles for regional governance.93 However, the
launch of the fiscal decentralisation, primarily planned for 2004, has been
delayed one year.
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91 The process of competences transfer from the national level to the new self-governing
territorial units was planned for the period 2002-2004.
92 During the transition period 2002-2003 the activities of VÚCs and municipalities had to be
financed by grants from the State Budget.
93 The list of taxes in the competence of regional governance bodies, the structure and
principles of sources redistribution, principles of financial management, budgetary process
of municipalities, etc.
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Although the new legislation was adopted in 2001,94 regional self-
governing bodies still dispose of limited possibilities for putting their com-
petence into practice. As mentioned, moreover, the fiscal decentralisation
has been initiated only in 2005. Since the financial tasks are still rather
centralised, serious questions have arisen after the launch of the fiscal
decentralization process, especially regarding the cooperation between
regional (VÚC) and local self-governing bodies (municipalities). The
experience of the municipalities in the Trenín region (VÚC Trenín)
serves as a good example. In accordance with the decentralisation process,
the responsibility for preparing the Economic and social development
plan95 falls on the municipalities on the local level, but the financial re-
sources are allocated to the regional lever (VÚC). Unfortunately, the VÚCs
do not perform this duty in a satisfactory way. The financial coordination
between local and regional levels is thus rather deficient.
The delay in implementing the decentralisation reform caused problems as
regards the preparation of regional structures (mostly at the municipality
level) for the process of EU Funds exploitation in the period of 2004-2006.
Without fiscal decentralisation and the completion of the public ad-
ministration reform, formation of public resources on the local and re-
gional level necessary for supporting the socio-economic development of
regions is impossible. Thus, an initiator and coordinator of endogenous
development of the regions is absent (Ben et al. 2004).
7.4.4 Delays in preparation of strategic documents
In addition to the above mentioned caveats, the insufficient administrative
capacity – such as problems in inter-ministerial coordination, long-lasting
lags in legislative adaptation and other problems – delayed the preparation,
coordination and adoption of the necessary strategic Cohesion Policy do-
cumentation. As noted previously, the first national plan for regional
development for pre-accession support was adopted in 1999, for post-
accession funding in 2001, but the actual National Development Plan only
in March 2003. Individual ministries were late in preparing the grant
schemes for smaller projects and compared to neighbouring countries they
were approximately a year behind schedule. Consequently, the delayed
process of documentation and legislative preparation hindered accreditation
of the implementing agencies. However, the lag observed during the pre-
94 A portion of the competencies regarding regional development has been moved from the
national level to the competence of VÚCs, such as preparing regional development plans
and programmes; participating in the preparation of the National Development Plan;
approving and implementing the Cross-border Cooperation programmes; monitoring the
socio-economic development of the regions; ensuring that the financial resources for over-
coming regional disparities are adequate; coordinating the activities of municipalities, etc.
95 This document represents an important strategy for exploiting future EU funds and also
serves as a base for elaborating the development plan on the national level.
accession period was adjusted at the final phase of preparation for the
Structural Funds. After the Commission had adopted the basic documents
required for initiating Structural Funds exploiting in December 2003,
Slovakia launched the first call for a Local Infrastructure priority (Opera-
tional program Basic Infrastructure) on 19 January 2004 (it was a second
call from all acceding countries).
7.4.5 Obscurity and complexity of strategic documentation
The National Development Plan that was adopted in 2003 was designed in
too complicated a way and even though it was reduced from an initial 11
operational programmes to 4 in the final concept (Basic infrastructure,
Industry and Services, Agriculture and Human Resources) it remained quite
obscure. Also, the structure of other documents in their final form has often
been unintelligible for the applicants, which has led to formal mistakes in
project preparation. The reduction of elementary documentation types96 and
the simplification and unification of rules in the next period 2007-2013 will
be very welcome.
7.4.6 Administrative and capacity building
The huge administrative and human capacity problem was observed in
both the state authorities and in the regional and local public bodies and
agencies, as well as on the side of the applicants. It is indeed hard to build
an appropriate administrative capacity when the experience of such
processes is lacking and finances to motivate already trained personnel are
absent. A noticeable fluctuation of ministerial human resources can there-
fore be observed in Slovakia. Also, poor coordination between ministries at
the beginning of the process caused additional administrative confusion. 
The administrative requirements in project preparation represent great
obstacles for potential applicants. In general terms, one might conclude
that; the smaller the project, the greater the abundance of administration.
In other words, the cost-benefit ratio will be excessively high in smaller
projects, since administrative costs will not be matched by the benefits
drawn from the projects, especially when compared with larger projects.
Administration thus represents a substantial barrier for small entrepreneurs.
The question is whether the principle of proportionality in the new ECP
will help solve this problem. The idea of proportionality with regard to
audit controls and administrative requirements is definitely a positive
feature in the Commission’s proposal, but the principle is extended only to
a limited number of programmes and administrative requirements. In our
opinion, the proportionality should to be extended to a larger number of
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96 Regional, Sectoral Operational Programmes for Objective 1, Single Programming
Documents for Objective 2 transformed into Operational Programme for each Objective; 
no programme complement.
168
programmes and projects. One example concerns management costs in
accepted projects, which could either be reimbursable or, possibly,
included into eligible costs. Also, the reform of the evaluation process –
whereby in the first stage of the evaluation process no complete project
proposal will be required – may be very helpful with respect to Slovak
conditions. 
7.4.7 Experiences with programming and regional planning
The lack of necessary experience to successfully prepare and implement
projects, along with almost no previous experience of regional planning
(due to the Slovakian history of being a centralised economy), resulted in a
situation where Slovak applicants were not only ill-informed, but where
some of them did not even understand the principle of EU funding. Some
of the projects at the beginning of the pre-accession period were prepared
with the sole aim of gaining financial support; there was neither any
estimation as to the real impact of the project on the region, nor were there
considerations of whether the projects had even the slightest chance of
becoming profitable.
7.4.8 System of project evaluation
The evaluation process was demanding, not only in terms of exhausting the
administrative capacities, but also because of the inexpert composition in
the evaluation committees. The lack of specialists slowed down the evalua-
tion process. At the present time, the decentralisation of the evaluation pro-
cess is underway in some sectors, which could further complicate matters.
Since the regional self-governing bodies try to solve the problem by invit-
ing external evaluators – when participation in the project assessment pro-
cess is not compensated – the inexpert composition of the regional com-
mittees together with the unwillingness of external evaluators could
weaken whole process.
7.4.9 The co-financing criterion
Co-financing implies serious pressure on the state budget. For example, in
this year alone, €373.8 million will have to be drummed up for financing
Slovakia’s EU membership, while an additional €249.2 million is required
to cover the “matching funding”. The lion’s share of the resources is spent
on public sector projects. Most of these projects are co-financed according
to a 75:25 intervention rate, only seven projects are financed according to
a 80:20 intervention rate and projects oriented toward SMEs are carried
out with an intervention rate of 65:35 of eligible costs.97 This represents a
way to give preference to large public projects. Applicants from the private
97 Note that the 80:20 model refers to projects supported by resources from the Cohesion
Fund, whereas the state budget has to cover for a quarter of the costs in projects financed
by the resources of the European Regional Development Fund.
sector (especially SMEs) do not enjoy this privilege and in most cases their
demand for resources from the state budget is refused.
The financial weakness of many applicants (especially in lagging regions)
along with – on occasions – the distrust of banks, low profitability, and the
fact that contributions from EU funds only comes in the form of
reimbursements for already paid invoices and bills, the principle of co-
financing per se represents a tremendous obstacle, especially for SMEs
and sole proprietors.98 In the updated evaluation of the Convergence
programme of Slovakia in February 2005, the Commission warned Slo-
vakia that it would probably not be able to deplete the whole amount of the
Structural Funds resources allocated for the period 2004-2006 and for that
reason will ease the pressure on the state budget. However, from the year
2007 and onwards the situation may change and the pressure on the state
budget may therefore increase.
7.4.10 Privileged position of large public projects
There are several reasons why in the Slovakian context large public pro-
jects and industrial parks are in a better position. The Slovak government
decided early on to support such projects, mostly because of the social and
economic impact in the respective regions. Being one of the criteria for
measuring the success of a project, the impact can be much more predict-
able and visible, as regards the benefit of the sector or target group, in
such projects. A second reason has to do with the fact that administration
is much more efficient in large scale projects. Moreover, it is easer for the
public finance administrators to assign financial resources to large
industrial parks and thus satisfy the responsibility taken for the develop-
ment of rural regions. The question is whether this strategy has been the
right one. 
The government’s strategy of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and
concentrating them into new industrial zones has also been evident in areas
which did not involve EU funding. The formation of large industrial
clusters can for example be seen in the automobile industry in south-
western Slovakia (Volkswagen, PSA Peugeot, Citroen and their suppliers)
with the future cross-connection to north-western Hungary (Audi and
Ford); in the consumer electronics industry in the Presˇov region in the
eastern Slovakia (Embraco, Whirpool, Alcatel and their suppliers); and in
the prepared silicate zone in the south of central Slovakia. The role of the
government and regional self-governance bodies has been to identify
potential clusters and to support them actively, e.g. by the strengthening of
investment impulses through sub-suppliers programmes, by supporting
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98 There is a possibility of advanced payments, but only in special cases. The financing of
most projects is based on the reimbursement principle.
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R&D, by supporting cooperation between universities and industrial sector
and by developing the local infrastructures. Such activities can be co-
financed by EU resources, which may give rise to an acceleration of the
mentioned processes (Sikula et al. 2003). To name but a few examples of
large public projects and industrial parks that have been co-financed by
EU resources, there is the Industrial park Spiská Nová ves and Humenné;
the Highway by-pass Mierová-Viedenská cesta in Bratislava; the Industrial
Park Snina; the Industrial park iar nad Hronom and the business in-
cubators in Banská Bystrica and Martin. 
A fourth reason for preferring large scale projects is the so-called liquidity
rule. The small economic entities in Slovakia had grown accustomed to the
support of fading-out or “dying” industrial sectors and businesses. With
EU funding the situation has changed. The Slovak entrepreneurs meet a
support that is directed toward profitable businesses. The applicants have
to prove that they have stable and sufficient financial resources to ensure
the continuity of their activities throughout the project and, if necessary, to
take part in financing. They also have to show that they have fulfilled the
obligations of social security contributions and taxes. However, taking into
consideration indebtedness and undercapitalization of many businesses and
municipalities, this particular rule represents a serious obstacle for many
applicants from the poorer regions, since they simply cannot fulfil the
liquidity criterion.
7.4.11 Ineligible costs
Another barrier for smaller businesses is the rule of ineligible costs.
Among the most disputed are the cases of VAT and administration/
management costs. If the applicants are able to ensure financial resources
for co-financing (co-financing by 50 per cent is not an exemption) they
may be not able to cover, additionally, VAT by themselves. The administra-
tion costs for the preparation of a project represent a special problem in
the Slovakian context. Most entities are not able to prepare successful
projects and they are furthermore dependent on paid support from private
consulting companies. The costs involved in preparing projects are seen as
excessively high and so is the requirement for administrative capacity. This
fact discourages not only small businesses but also many cities and
villages from undertaking the necessary steps for using the EU funds.
They are aware, first, that every single project cannot be accepted and,
second, that it is not possible to receive reimbursements for excessively
high management costs (since they are ineligible costs). This usually turns
off potential applicants. As noted above, since administration costs are
much the same for the preparation of larger and smaller projects alike,
larger projects, as a consequence, are in a better position. A solution as to
how one could lessen this problem would perhaps be a new evaluation
process structure, where the first evaluation step would be given im-
ˇ
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99 With respect to, for example, the organisational budget, statutes and/or the articles of
association, annual reports and accounts, official registration certificate and the financial
plan. However, the document that has most often been missing is the bank account report,
or some form of statement that proves the ability to co-finance a project.
mediately after a strategy and impact proposal, leaving out the necessity
for elaborating a final version of a project. 
7.4.12 Formal requirements of EU funding process
The submission of proposals has proven to be a problematic process. Many
of the projects were refused because of formal mistakes.99 In addition, other
formal requirements necessary for EU funding may also aggravate the
process. Applicants have to open a special account for the financial flows
from the EU budget and there are in some cases special requirements for a
double-entry accounting. Furthermore, there are also meticulous require-
ments on the project budget.
7.4.13 Actual task – implementation
A new challenge has been caused by the parallel use of the pre-accession
instruments and the Structural Funds. During the period 2004-2005 there
are still many pre-accession projects in the implementation phase and at
the same time the Structural Funds projects are already up and running.
We have seen that the institutional and administrative capacities were de-
ficient during the pre-accession period and this implies that the problem
has been further aggravated. Preparing and implementing two system-
different programmes at the same time is very time consuming and leads
to serious administrative pressure. The duplicity of rules, documents and
programming is confusing for both the involved authorities and im-
plementation bodies and for the applicants. Moreover, an insufficient
evaluation process in the previous period and a poor expert quality, to-
gether with inflexible institutional structures, also complicate the im-
plementation process.
7.5 A Slovak perspective
7.5.1 Priorities of Slovakia in 2007-2013
The preparation for the utilisation of the Structural Funds in Slovakia in
the next Financial Perspective (2007-2013) is already underway. In accord-
ance with the Commission’s proposal for new regulations of the Structural
Funds, the Slovak government is obliged to elaborate a National Strategic
Reference Framework (NSRF). The word on NSRF is currently in pro-
gress. The NSRF represents the integration of the Community priorities,
on the one hand, and the national and regional priorities of Slovakia, on
the other.
The basis for preparing the NSRF and other documents for the next
Financial Perspective will be provided mainly by the mentioned proposals
for regulations of the Structural Funds, by the philosophy of the new ECP
designed in the third cohesion report and by the existing strategic and
conceptual documents of Slovakia. The Ministry of Finance prepared the
strategic docment Competitiveness Strategy of Slovakia until 2010 (Lisbon
strategy for Slovakia). For fulfilling of the basic objective of the Strategy –
increasing competitiveness of the Slovak economy – the strategy defines
four priority development areas with their main objectives. (Slovakia
2004a).
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The second strategic document at the national level – National-Economic
strategy of Slovakia for the period 2005-2015 – was elaborated by the
Ministry of Economy. This document has not yet been adopted by the
government but will represent (together with the previous document) the
base for developing the future strategy in the field of regional and
economic development in Slovakia. Moreover, the document emphasises
that the only way to ensure long-term competitiveness in Slovakia is to
create favourable conditions for development of the so-called knowledge
based economy. The priorities defined in the National-economic strategy
and the Lisbon strategies for Slovakia are compared in Table 7.1.
The structural reforms that have already been implemented in Slovakia
(pension, tax, healthcare and social system reforms) have made Slovakia an
attractive location for FDI. The main advantages are the favourable con-
ditions for industrial production (particularly the automobile industry).
However, Slovakia can count on this advantage only for a short period of
time, since the key to sustaining the present positive economic trends lie in
the ability to increase the sophistication of the production. Hence economic
growth must be based on the ability of Slovak citizens to work with new
information, develop new knowledge and effectively exploit them in real
life. The role of the government in this process is to define the strategic
objective, content, principles and principles for each area and to coordinate
and implement them. 
The third conceptual document that will have a strategic position in
preparing the National Strategic Reference Framework for the 2007-2013
period is Conception of Territorial Development of Slovakia. The document
establishes the main priorities for the present policy of territorial develop-
ment as follows (Slovakia 2001): 
• supporting economic development and strengthening competitiveness
and efficiency;
• supporting a balanced regional development, including rural develop-
ment;
• ensuring equal regional access to infrastructures;
• protecting the environment and the natural and cultural heritage;
• supporting cohesion and integration;
• maintaining sustainable development.
It could be useful to compare the priorities designed for the future
development in Slovakia in the represented three strategic documents with
the main objectives and priorities defined in the present official documents
– especially in the actual National Development Plan for the period (2004-
2006).
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The strategy for 2004-2006 focuses on four development priorities: in-
creasing competitiveness, promoting employment creation, fostering
balanced regional development and agricultural and rural development (see
Table 7.2). It is implemented through four operational programmes
(Slovakia 2003):
• industry and services: supporting the development of industrial
production, creating better conditions for efficient integration of re-
search and development into industrial production, improving energy
efficiency and promoting tourism;
• human resources: increasing labour market flexibility, reducing un-
employment and reducing the risk of social exclusion of the most
vulnerable groups, in particular the Roma community;
• basic infrastructure: fostering balanced regional development by im-
proving transport accessibility, improving the environment and
renovating local infrastructure;
• agriculture and rural development: increasing the efficiency of agri-
cultural and aquacultural production, modernising the processing of
agricultural and fisheries products and improving the quality of life of
the rural population. 
The comparison reveals a noticeable shift towards knowledge economy,
information society, research and innovations and the inclusion of
sustainable development. From our point of view, the strategic documents
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are in full compliance with the needs of the Slovak economy. However, the
implementation of these strategic objectives represents a substantial
challenge. 
The strategies and the identified priorities seek to promote a competitive
and sustainable knowledge based economy by including the objectives of
the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas into the national strategic documents.
The convergence between Slovak and EU strategic priorities becomes more
clear when the above documents are compared with the priorities outlined
in the third cohesion report.
Although the priorities of Slovakia and those of the Cohesion Policy show
noticeable convergence – and we agree with most of them – there are still
some comments given by the Slovak representatives, introduced in the
Draft statement of the Slovak Republic on the Proposal for a Council
regulation laying down general provisions on the EU funds, which will be
presented in the section below. In this statement Slovakia stresses the
importance of the development of the transport infrastructure and the
enhancement of the transport infrastructure system, the support of invest-
ments in the TEN-TINA networks and local infrastructures and invest-
ments in information society development. Slovakia supports the projects
oriented towards reducing long-term unemployment and the integration of
cross-border labour markets. Support of these projects could lead to a
more efficient integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour
market and help reduce the high regional and structural unemployment in
Slovakia, especially in regions that are still affected by structural problems.
On the other hand, the Commission has recommended a reduction of the
strategic priorities to three, at the most four, priorities. The main (and
correct) idea behind this is to concentrate resources on areas that are the
most relevant to the main objective, that is to say, to reduce regional
disparities. As noted, the priorities were reduced from 15 to 4. 
7.5.2 Controversial issues in the proposals on the new
regulations for the EU Funds from a Slovak perspective
The new Cohesion Policy is currently discussed in Slovakia. Draft State-
ment of the Slovak Republic on the Proposal for a Council Regulation
Laying Down general provisions on the EU funds, Slovakia (2004b), con-
stitutes a negotiation framework and provides the priorities of Slovakia
with respect to Cohesion Policy in the years 2007-2013. The most relevant
proposals are summarised below. This document is not yet adopted, but it
provides a complex view on the most controversial issues of the Com-
mission’s proposal from a Slovak perspective.
Considering the fact that there is a low probability of the four per cent
absorption cap being abolished, Slovakia supports a more flexible approach
towards the limit on structural operations and proposes to use up-to-date
macroeconomic data separately for each Member State (mainly exchange
rates and GDP growth data).
According to the draft statement, a more flexible approach should be based
on:
• The exemption of specific expenditures from the four per cent cap,
for example territorial cooperation and financial allocation for rural
development. Some of these expenditures are currently part of the
EAGGF guidance section.
• The use of up-to-date economic growth rates for each new Member
State, instead of an average for the group of ten new members
(EU10), taking into account the exchange rate development in each
Member State.
• A dynamic development of absorption capacities and levels of co-
financing in the respective countries.
Slovakia strongly supports the proposal that changes in operational
programmes be realised retroactively in relation to commitments (at the
end of the n + 1 year) and not on 30 September of year n. The main idea
behind this proposal is simple. In some cases, it is difficult to predict the
future development as regards the implementation of operational program-
mes with respect to the n + 2 rule. This modification would allow more
effective and flexible utilisation of the Structural Funds and it would have
a positive impact on the Slovak absorption capacity.
The responsibilities of the Commission and the Member States should be
precisely specified – in terms of time schedule – when adopting the
operational programmes. The current situation leads to a prolongation of
the time the Commission needs when adopting individual operational
programmes (according to a recent Slovak experience made in 2003-2004).
The Commission’s proposal fails to take into account the precise time
schedule for adoption after the operational programme has been submitted
to the Commission. There are several precisely defined schedules for the
EU Member States, but the responsibilities of the Commission are only
vaguely specified.100
According to the Commission’s proposal, furthermore, expenditures would
be eligible for reimbursement from the Funds if already incurred by the
beneficiary for an operation carried out between 1 January 2007 and 31
December 2015. Operations that are co-financed do not have to be com-
pleted before the starting date for eligibility. Slovakia strongly disagrees
with the proposed deadline for eligible expenditures. The complexity of the
long-term planning needed to realise Cohesion Fund infrastructure projects
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100 The Commission shall adopt each operational programme as soon as possible after its
formal submission by the Member State; see COM (2004).
may prove to be unsuitable for Slovakia. The application of the n + 2 rule
should be excluded from the rules of the Cohesion Fund, as applied in the
present Financial Perspective, in order to improve the absorption capacity
of Slovakia. Higher contributions from the Cohesion Fund at constant
national budgetary constraints could result in severe and unfortunate
pressure on Slovakia’s absorption capacity.
One of the most criticised principles of the new Cohesion Policy is the
“one programme – one fund principle” (mono-fund approach). It seems
rather impractical that individual programmes would only be given support
from one fund, which is especially true for the regional operational
programmes. An application of this rule would lead to a doubling of the
regional programmes and in turn imply more administrative pressure in
Slovakia. Hence we are unable to see in what way this proposal constitutes
a simplification. The rule has its advantages only at the level of sectoral
operational programmes. In case this proposal is not accepted, the Slovak
stance will be to seek an increase of the upper limit for cross-funding in
the ERDF and the European Social Fund (ESF).
There is also controversy regarding the establishment of a National
Contingency Reserve (NCR). This new proposal does not show any sign of
flexibility or simplification. The intention of the Commission to cover for
unforeseen local or sectoral crises linked to economic and social
restructuring, or to consequences of trade opening, is tied to the creation of
an additional special operational programme with a one per cent allocation
for the Objective 1 and 3 per cent for Objective 2. These allocations are
part of the four per cent capping calculation. However, if no crises occur,
there is a high probability that the reserve remains unexploited. Con-
sequently, the country in question will lose the financial resources of this
contingency reserve. The question of how one creates and links a special
operational programme to an unexpected event is quite unclear and it will
in our opinion only lead to more red tape. 
The proposal to include action in order to strengthen the administrative
efficiency in the Member States that are eligible for support under the
Convergence objective represents an element of discrimination. The need
to increase the administrative efficiency should logically result from a
consideration of the administrative conditions of each Member State
separately, not from the criterion of economic development.
Operational programmes related to territorial cooperation should be
created on the NUTS 3 level. For Slovakia, there are four operational
programmes to be designed with the participation of the NUTS 3 regions:
1. Kosˇicky´ kraj, Banskobystricky´ kraj, Nitriansky kraj, Trnavsky´ kraj a
Bratislavsky´ kraj for operational programme Slovakia-Hungary,
2. Presˇovsky´ kraj, Zilinsky´ kraj for operational programme Slovakia-
Poland,
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3. Zilinsky´ kraj, Treniansky kraj, Trnavsky´ kraj for operational program-
me Slovakia-Czech republic,
4. Bratislavsky´, Trnavsky´ kraj for operational programme Slovakia-Austria.
Trans-national support, network support and information exchange will be
part of the regional operational programmes and of the Operational pro-
gramme under European territorial cooperation. The respective program-
mes of economic and social development on the regional level will be in
accordance with the three levels of programming. It is also necessary to
solve the problem of urban areas within the scope of National strategic
reference framework, or in future regional operational programmes.
7.5.3 Position on the new European Cohesion Policy
Concerning the question of the criteria for qualifying for Structural Funds
support under the Objective 1, we propose to keep the present limit of
75% GDP per capita in PPS in NUTS 2 regions. This should help lagging
regions converge toward the average EU GDP per capita level. Increasing
the limit will lead to supporting regions that may not need it and it will
also imply a decrease as to the amount that can be allocated to the least
developed regions. A lowering of the limit, on the other hand, will restrict
the use the funds in regions that already have made efforts to prepare
themselves for Structural Funds support. Furthermore, it should also be
taken into account that only Member States with a PPS GDP per capita
lower than 100 per cent of EU25 PPS GDP per capita can acquire the
support. This mechanism will decrease the redistribution (recirculation) of
funds between more developed countries. Consequently, Member States’
contributions to regional policy will not rise.
7.5.4 The Cohesion Fund
The completion of the transport infrastructure is a key priority in the
Slovak regions. As noted in an official document (Slovakia 2004c, p.14).
The quality of Slovakia’s basic infrastructure varies across the country. Regions
to the east are poorly served compared to the more developed centres of
economic activity closer to the capital, Bratislava, in the extreme west of the
country. The geographic position of the country in Europe confirms the import-
ance of its transport infrastructure in the Europe-wide transport network. The
main cross border routes, both road and rail, have been designated as TENs
routes, all of which are a priority for upgrading. In the road transport sector an
ambitious motorway network has been designed for the TENs routes, with
approximately 50% already completed, supported in the pre-accession phase by
ISPA. However alongside the high priority of completing the TENs routes,
particularly the “Northern corridor” D route; there is a need to upgrade certain
other primary routes of national importance to expressway standard to ensure
efficient intra-regional access, and in particular to facilitate regional develop-
ment, especially through growth pole linkage. The challenge therefore is to
complete the motorway network on the TENs routes with support from the
Cohesion Fund and continue upgrading to expressway standard the other key
routes. The topography of the country with its mountainous terrain in the centre
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of the country means the completion of the whole network will require heavy
investment.
Due to a substantial need for investment in the transport infrastructure, the
rate of intervention from the Cohesion Fund has had to be decreased (e.g.,
in railroad project from 85 per cent to 75 per cent) because of the lack of
resources for other potential projects. If the 50:50 rule could be modified,
more resources would be available for the transport projects that are
needed in Slovakia.
We assume that the effects of the Cohesion Fund will remain the same
after the accession of new countries. The Cohesion Fund should hereafter
offer financial support to projects in the field of environment and to the
Trans-European networks of transport and technical infrastructure. From
our point of view, it could be favourable to keep the 50:50 proportion, but
we also propose to allow for more flexibility so that the 50:50 rule is
allowed to change in legitimate and substantiated cases. The possibility of
a nonparallel draw could, for example, be tied to a division in the road and
the railroad transport infrastructures respectively.
We also hold the position that the present conditions for a country’s
eligibility for Cohesion Fund support (a GDP per capita lower than 90% of
the EU average) and the existence of programmes leading to economic
convergence should remain. The definition signifies a real example of
solidarity between developed and lagging Member States. At the same time
there is no unnecessary mutual redistribution of resources between
developed countries at present. Despite initial doubts that Slovakia would
not be able to use all the resources available through the ISPA instrument,
those resources were overdrawn and as a result became part of the
Cohesion Fund resources for the period 2004-2006, in order to cover for
ISPA obligations. Slovakia has already contracted 91 per cent of the
amount that remained in the Cohesion Fund (€408 million) in the 9
projects that were adopted by the Commission at the end of 2004 (Slovakia
2005). Out of these 9 projects, 7 of them are environmental projects (water
sector) and two are transport infrastructure projects (1 railroad transporta-
tion project and 1 expressway project converted from an ISPA project to a
Cohesion Fund project). The numerical imbalance was caused by the high
costs and long-term character of the transport projects. If the principle of
50:50 between transport and environmental projects is preserved, a smaller
number of transport projects will be accepted.
We propose to keep the present allocation of general structural operation
resources for the new Member States also in the period 2007-2013. This
means the share of resources offered, i.e., a third from the Cohesion Fund
and two thirds from the Structural Funds, should be preserved.
7.5.5 Management
The process of implementing projects supported by the resources from the
Structural Funds needs more flexibility and less administration. While the
controlling and anticorruption mechanisms should remain in place, the
process should be significantly decentralized with adequate connection of
top-down and bottom-up approaches. It should be also more focused on
the activation of internal regional resources. The crucial role in this
process is the improvement of human capital on the respective levels of
public administration with the support from the ESF and the involvement
of citizens in greater participation on the economic development of their
respective regions. A key question is the transparent demarcation of com-
petencies on particular levels of regional policy structures, as well as
interactions of these levels (supranational, national, regional and the
municipality levels).101
7.5.6 Financial Perspective
Since the European regional policy constitutes approximately one third of
the total EU budget, the decision on the 2007-2010 Financial Perspective
has to be perceived in a wider sense and in relation to the financial
resources of other Community policies. EU regional policy is the tool for
convergence between the economies of EU’s Member States. On the other
hand, the principle of additionality may have a negative impact on public
finances and may indirectly influence the new Member States’ path
towards joining the euro. EMU membership will thus be threatened, or at
least delayed, due to the fact that the general government deficit according
to the Convergence Criteria should not exceed three per cent of a country’s
GDP.
At the same time we may assume that under current political development
in the EU, it would seem unrealistic to increase the share of Structural
Policy on overall EU Budget and therefore it is necessary to keep and fully
use the given limit (0,41 % GNI of EU27). The enlargement of the Union
meant that EU GDP increased in absolute terms, which in turn meant that
the resources available for the ECP also increased.
7.5.7 Cross-border Cooperation and Community Initiatives
Similar to other Member States, Slovakia has had positive experiences from
the Cross-border Cooperation programme. Not only do we therefore support
a continuation of cooperation based on the Community Initiative Pro-
gramme INTERREG, we would also like to see it strengthened financially.
At the same time we would like to point out that an evaluation of the
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101 Clear and transparent demarcation of competences is one of the most important tasks in
Slovakia due to constant legislative changes. It is necessary to stabilize the legislatory
environment in the field of regional governance to achieve a predictable and transparent
framework which will allow more consistent and coherent regional planing.
successfulness of other Community Initiatives, such as EQUAL, LEADER
and URBAN, would be welcome. Actions based on these programmes
could be included into the framework of priority targets supported by the
Structural Funds and contribute to a general simplification.
The enlargement of the Union meant that the eastern external EU borders
were shifted to the boundaries of new Member States and countries of the
Balkans, the Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. These borders represent an
important part of EU surface frontiers and probably also the future
frontiers of the Schengen Area. Under these circumstances it is necessary
to emphasise the need for a coordination of the present cross-border co-
operation tools (PHARE CBC, TACIS, MEDA, CARDS a INTERREG) at
external boundaries and to introduce one common tool (NEIGHBOUR-
HOOD).
7.6 Conclusions 
The new European Cohesion Policy is faced with a tremendous challenge,
which at the same time should be seen as an opportunity: to increase the
support of lagging regions and to assist in the effort of reducing regional
disparities in Slovakia. 
The pre-accession support created the necessary foundations for these
efforts, especially regarding the administrative capacities and, to some
extent, economic development. It is difficult to measure the real effects of
the pre-accession support in Slovakia, since no extensive evaluation has
been made either by national authorities or by independent researchers. 
Slovakia started its accession negotiations on 15 February 2000, which was
two years later than the other Visegrad countries. This put Slovakia in a
difficult position from the very start in the membership negotiations. Slo-
vakia accepted, in many cases, statements and proposals from the Commis-
sion without any substantial objections and the Slovak government officials,
from our point view, adopted a quite passive approach during these negotia-
tions. This, along with other domestic factors, influenced in a substantial
way the shaping of the Slovak negotiation position and resulted in an
outcome in several areas that were not optimal. Negotiation chapter No. 21
on Regional policy was preliminarily closed in July 2002, which meant that
Slovakia fulfilled the basic, mostly legislative, conditions necessary to
conclude the accession negotiations.
Although the legislative preparations for the EU membership and the ques-
tion of Cohesion Policy in Slovakia were successfully completed, practical
problems and obstacles have since emerged. The first obstacle was caused
by the domestic situation with respect to regional policy and the
preparedness for the implementation of the ECP principles, e.g., problems
related to the regional division of Slovakia, decentralisation of public
administration, fiscal decentralisation, delays in the preparation of strategic
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documents, administrative and capacity building and the lack of the
necessary experience to successfully handle project preparation and
implementation. There was also lack of relevant information as to the
principles of EU funding. The second problem was built in the concrete
provisions of the European Cohesion Policy as regards the difficulties in
the less developed regions in Slovakia. 
At present, the necessary preparation for the implementation of Cohesion
Policy during the next Financial Perspective (2007-2013) is already under-
way. We may assume that most of the priorities of the Slovak government,
as formulated in preliminary statements and official strategic documents,
are in accordance with the Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives. We can
conclude that this convergence of priorities is the result of the significant
influence of the European Cohesion Policy on policy making in Slovakia,
but we can also see a positive trend with respect to Slovak priorities, on
the one hand, and the priorities of the ECP, on the other. In our opinion,
this convergence can be seen as a favourable condition to strengthen
regional development in Slovakia. 
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8 LATVIA AND COHESION POLICY
Alf Vanags and Julia Pobyarzina
8.1 Introduction
For Latvia the road to the European Union (and beyond) has been and
continues to be a major learning process. Unlike most other new Member
States and candidate countries Latvia, as a former Soviet republic, had no
experience of operating as a nation state after 1940. This meant that at the
start of the 1990s neither its politicians nor administrators had experience
of operating in the international arena – international relations, including
the EU accession process, was very much a learning-by-doing experience.
Mistakes were made, and disappointments were endured – most notably
when Latvia was excluded from the so-called Luxembourg group, the six
countries initially chosen as the “first-wave” of countries to commence
accession negotiations.
This learning process is very much evident in the experience of Latvia
with both the pre-accession funds, the Structural Funds for the 2004-2006
programming period and also now in the negotiations for the 2007-2013
programming period. This will come out in the discussion below.
As a background to this chapter it is worth noting some basic facts about
Latvia in the EU context:
• Latvia is currently the poorest country in the EU in terms of GDP per
capita.
• In discussions of regional policy the whole of Latvia is a NUTS 2
region – this perspective hides the fact that at NUTS 3 level Latvia
has severe regional disparities, containing some of the poorest regions
of the EU at this level (see Table 8.1).
• At the same time, Latvia has the highest real GDP growth in the
EU25. This was 8.5 per cent in 2004 and cumulatively is up by more
than 60 per cent since 1996.
• Latvia is one of the EU’s smallest countries with a population of 2.35
million (Central Statistical Bureau 2005).
These facts serve to define the heart of Latvia’s problems and also the
constraints it faces in the EU arena.
The remainder of the chapter is ordered as follows: the next section offers
a short overview of Latvia’s experience with pre-accession funds; this is
followed by sections on issues relating to Cohesion Policy in the accession
negotiation process and problems linked to the conditionality built into EU
Structural Policy. There follows a forward looking part of the chapter that
considers what Latvian development and structural policies look like on
the basis of the current system of rules and also of how an unconstrained
scenario might look. The concluding section examines Latvia’s interests in
the outcome of the negotiations on the Commission’s proposals for the
2007-2013 programming period
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8.2 Latvia’s experience with pre-accession support
Latvia like every candidate country has had access to the three pre-
accession funds – PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD, whose aim was to
facilitate the integration of the accession countries into the EU and to
prepare them for future use of the EU Structural Funds. In Latvia the
Ministry of Finance was the main institution responsible for implementing
and administering EU pre-accession funds.
8.2.1 PHARE
In the early years the main aim of PHARE was to support transition to
democracy and to a market economy. However, as of 1998 when it was
clear that relatively early EU enlargement was on the cards the programme
was exclusively reserved for EU accession preparation. As of 2000, most of
the PHARE resources supported an ongoing process of “Institution
building” by which the Latvian public administration and its institutions
were strengthened. The aim was to put Latvia in a position where it could
effectively apply and enforce the acquis. A smaller part of the PHARE
funding was devoted to strengthening “Economic and Social Cohesion” in
Latvia. The economic and social cohesion measures were clearly an attempt
to address Latvia’s specific regional problems in the form of special
measures for Latgale and Zemgale – Latvia’s two poorest regions.
The 2003 PHARE Programme was the last PHARE support for Latvia and
funds were allocated to the following:
• the National Programme;
• Cross-border Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region;
• the Nuclear Safety Programme.
The National Programme continues to address key political issues, such as
the integration of society, civil society and anti-corruption measures. It has
also provided support for the strengthening of the administration with a
view to EU accession. Priorities have included improvement of the
capabilities of the Justice and Home Affairs ministries, especially in the
areas of border management, free movement of goods, company law, agri-
culture, social affairs, employment, public health, energy, customs union
and public finance management as well as in regional policy matters in-
cluding European Regional Development (ERDF) and the European Social
Fund (ESF) type actions concerning economic and social cohesion. Since
the 2003 budget was the last PHARE support for Latvia. there was a need
to ensure continuity of institution building support for issues not covered
by the Structural Funds. Accordingly, a “Transition Facility” has been set
up, which will continue to co-finance institution building actions until the
budget year 2006.
8.2.2 ISPA
ISPA started as of the year 2000 and can be regarded as a forerunner of
the Cohesion Fund. It has financed major environment and transport
infrastructure projects. In Latvia, the priorities for environment infra-
structure development concern the following: drinking water and waste-
water treatment and waste management. The upgrading of the Via Baltica
(Road Corridor I) and of the East-West railway link are transport priorities.
8.2.3 SAPARD
SAPARD was set up in 2000 to assist candidate countries in preparations
for the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy and for
addressing in a sustainable way agricultural and rural sector problems.
Revenue generating investments (mostly projects proposed by enterprises)
require 50% co-financing from the project owner. The agreed goals have
been:
• development of sustainable agriculture;
• integrated rural developments and improvement of the environment. 
Projects financed have included: 
• investment in agricultural holdings;
• improvement of agricultural and fisheries product processing;
• marketing, development and diversification of economic activities
providing alternative income, including tourism;
• improvement of general infrastructure;
• environmentally friendly agricultural methods.
8.2.4 Impact of the pre-accession funds
In general the pre-accession funds have contributed much to the Latvian
economy and have generated many successful projects: a good example is
the pilot regional development plan in Latgale, which created the Latgale
Development Agency, trained more than 200 people and had many spin-
offs in regional development planning throughout the country. The full
quantitative effect of the pre-accession funds on the Latvian economy and
society requires a comprehensive impact analysis which has not yet been
undertaken.102 However, an important goal of the pre-accession funds has
been to prepare Latvia for the use of the Structural Funds and, arguably,
this goal has not been fully achieved. The main problem has been an
overly individual attitude to each project and rather loose terms and dead-
lines for submitting projects. This has negatively affected the discipline of
submitters and as a result there are ISPA projects that may remain un-
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102 The “PHARE country ex-post evaluation and capacity building. Country report – Latvia”
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/phare_evaluation_pdf/latvia_country_report_english.
pdf has a detailed evaluation of 5 projects. However, the valuation is  not a comprehensive
economic and social impact analysis
finished for some time. SAPARD has had the strictest terms and deadlines,
and this has significantly increased the speed with which projects have
been approved and funds disbursed. As a result SAPARD went beyond its
original financial limits and Latvia already has used more than 100 per
cent of the allocated funds.
8.3 Issues relating to Structural Policy
in the accession negotiation process
In Latvia the whole accession negotiation process, including decisions on
the amount of pre-accession funds allocated to Latvia, has appeared as a
rather unilateral decision – prosperous EU member countries simply
decided how much money they could afford (or perhaps more accurately
wished) to contribute to the acceding countries and then implemented these
wishes without any meaningful consultation with the recipient countries.
Latvia was in an especially difficult position to be pro-active – it had been
excluded from the Luxembourg group of first wave accession countries
which meant that it was psychologically and politically important for Latvia
to catch up and join the EU together with the first wave countries.
Accordingly Latvia did not press for increases in the amount of pre-
accession funds. Therefore it got only €1.2 billion instead of the maximum
1.6 billion which it had grounds to receive. Thus, this compliance cost
Latvia €400 million.
In addition, there were disputes about priorities. In the first stages of the
accession process the European Commission already wished to define in
detail how the pre-accession funds should be implemented and
administered. However, Latvian civil servants did not have sufficient
knowledge, or experience to be able to take a strong position on these
issues. Thus, in order to speed up the accession process and generally
comply with the wishes of the Commission, the necessary documents were
signed and the obligations were undertaken. Only when the funds came on
stream, did Latvian civil servants understand that they might not be in a
position to meet all the contracted obligations
A further issue of conflict was the twinning programme which was in-
troduced in the later stages of institution building. Arguably, the European
Commission used the potential new member countries to experiment –
changing conditions and rules for receiving funds. That was a factor
behind the relative failure of the twinning programme. Also, the twinners
saw that the needs and conditions (including the economy) in new member
countries were very different from those in their home countries. Thus, the
twinners found that their experience was not easily and effectively
transferred to Latvia. 
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8.4 Problems with current Cohesion Policy
The negotiation process between the Commission and the Latvian civil
service on the current National Development Plan which then became the
Single Programming Document (SPD) was fraught with difficulties. As
mentioned in the introduction, developing the SPD was a learning process
for Latvia and early versions of the SPD were severely criticised by the
Commission on various grounds such that it was merely a “shopping list”
or that there was insufficient foundation for what the Latvian side was
proposing. A number of disagreements of substance emerged. Sometimes
the Commission was unwilling to take into account the Latvian legal
system, its political preferences and various historical issues. For example,
the Commission tried to promote projects concerning minority and
nationality issues in Latvia. This was not acceptable politically, because
what was proposed was in conflict with the main statutes of the leading
political parties.  This led to active and emotional negotiation between
representatives of Latvia and the Commission. 
Furthermore, some of the economic areas that the EC sought to make
priorities in Latvia were inconsistent with the priorities as perceived by
Latvian civil servants. For example, the Commission wanted to emphasize
tourism and social issues, but home officials took the view that some other
areas were more important and financing them would lead to more
sustainable development.  
The generous time allowed for planning and programming of the priorities
within the pre-accession financing framework was very favourable for
Latvia and contributed to improving decisions on priorities. However, there
were rather strict conditions about the areas, where funds could and could
not be invested. Moreover, these conditions did not always consider the
particular characteristics of the Latvian economy. For example, Latvia had
to work hard to convince the commission that its healthcare system needed
urgent attention. The arguments worked, and as a consequence, Latvia is the
only country in the Baltics to receive support for its healthcare system. This
support has enabled a start to be made on health sector capacity building. 
Here could also be mentioned the problem of “rent-seeking” generated by
the Structural Funds. It is rather clear that support from the Structural
Funds, e.g., the Rural Development Fund or the ERDF, can make business
ventures supported by the funds very profitable – even projects that would
be hardly viable commercially can be very profitable if subsidised. If
evaluation of projects is confined to ensuring that projects satisfy the
technical eligibility requirements then this generates a significant incentive
to commit resources to ensure successful application. This can result in
considerable socially unproductive activity.
Finally, there is a potential “success problem”. In recent years Latvia has
experienced the fastest growth in Europe, with real GDP up by more than
60 per cent since 1996. If this trend continues then Latvia could well reach
the 75 per cent of the EU average per capita threshold in a measurable
number of years and will no longer qualify for support under Cohesion
country rules. The danger is that after the Latvian economy no longer
receives the positive external shocks generated by the Structural Funds,
which can be viewed as a kind of financial doping, it may no longer be
able to maintain the same growth rates. Perhaps Latvia could adopt the
Irish “solution” and divide the country into two regions one of which
remains an Objective 1 region.
8.5 Latvia’s development and Cohesion Policy:
actual vs optimal?
8.5.1 Cohesion Policy under current rules
The National Development Plan for the next programming period is
currently in the process of preparation so we do not yet know how it will
look. However, the expectation is that the priorities for the next period
(2007-2013) will not differ much from those defined for the existing
financial period. After all, the current SPD is for the three year period
2004-2006 and it cannot be expected that Latvia’s structural problems will
have changed radically in that period.
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Figure 8.1 shows the current allocation of all EU Structural Funds among
priorities together with domestic co-financing funds. The biggest share of
financing is devoted to infrastructure which receives 32 per cent of total
available funds. This is followed by entrepreneurship which receives 25 per
cent with human resource development in third place with 21 per cent.
Thus Latvia has adopted a position somewhere between the so-called Greek
model in which support for business and infrastructure is emphasised and
the Irish model where human resource development is given a more
prominent role.
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It is of interest to see how these priorities compare with what the Latvian
public thinks. Although we do not have large scale surveys on this the
Soros Foundation of Latvia conducted an online survey on the Latvian
public policy portal http://www.politika.lv at the beginning of 2005. This
exercise was done in order to inform the working group responsible for
elaboration of the National Development Plan for the next financial period
(2007-2013) (Soros Foundation-Latvia 2005b). Thus the survey can be
seen as redressing the widely criticised lack of consultation with NGOs in
the 2004-2006 exercise.
Figure 8.2 represents the opinion of respondents as to the sectors of the
Latvian economy which should receive additional financing (there was an
assumption that such action might increase the tax burden).
It is clear that the first priority of the public is infrastructure and in
particular, motorway repair, with 91 per cent of respondents stating that the
government should pay more attention to this issue and increase financing.
Here it seems that the policy makers and public are singing in tune.
The second priority is science – 88 per cent of respondents believe that an
increase in investment in science is necessary for successful development
of Latvia. Next comes funding of primary and secondary education with
86 per cent positive responses. Most respondents would also allow in-
creased financing for health and environment protection, as well as for
higher education, public transport and measures to improve the demo-
graphic situation.
There are some interesting divergences between public opinion and official
priorities. For example, in practice support for entrepreneurship receives 25
per cent of available funds, but public opinion views it somewhat neutrally
with half of the respondents opting for increased financing and half being
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of the opinion that entrepreneurship is already financed enough. However,
education and science that is rated highly in the survey actually receives
just five per cent of available Structural Funds
Although a key aim of EU Structural Policy is to promote income con-
vergence, this relates to the EU level, i.e., country level or at least NUTS 2
level. Lower level regional disparities are left to Member States. The
problem for Latvia is that there are particularly severe regional disparities
within the country. These are illustrated in Table 8.1 (Tables 8.2 and 8.3
show the same for Estonia and Lithuania).
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In the current Latvian priorities (2004-2006) the regional dimension was
added as something of an afterthought and there is very little in the SPD
that explicitly addresses regional issues. Rather it has been left to agents
themselves, e.g., municipalities or businesses to make project applications.
This has led to fears that partly because of co-financing requirements and
partly because of inadequate capacity to prepare projects, the less developed
regions would be unable to get a “fair share” of projects. These fears seem
to have been realised. According to the first information on implemented
Structural Fund projects published in March 2005, of 178 accepted projects
Riga and the Riga region (including Jurmala) received 99 projects worth a
total of nearly €24 million, whereas Latgale, Latvia’s poorest region, has
just had 7 projects approved worth €2 million. If such an outcome is
repeated in the future, including for the next programming period, then far
from promoting convergence the Structural Funds may even exacerbate
internal regional disparities.
8.5.2 An unconstrained scenario
What would represent an optimal scenario for 2007-2013 from the point of
view of Latvia? A quick and cheap answer would be unlimited funding
without conditionality. Unlimited funding is of course not feasible though
as will be argued below that the four per cent cap penalises the poorest
countries. However, conditionality is another matter. The main form of
conditionality comes in the shape of various co-financing requirements.
In general the point of Member State co-financing is that by having a
financial stake in the project there are incentives to deliver a good project.
However, there are some problems with co-financing issues in Latvia.
Firstly, the applicants for many ESF and ERDF projects are expected to be
local authorities and in Latvia there are more than 500 local authorities,
many of them rather small – 70% have a population of less then 2000
(Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2005). This means that they have very
limited scope for co-financing. In an ideal scenario there would be in-
centives for local authorities to merge, as has been the wish of the central
government for some time. However, in practice issues such as the
promotion of territorial reform are outside the scope of Structural Policy.
There is also the problem that a small and relatively poor country such as
Latvia cannot afford on its own to implement some large projects, which
do not qualify under EU requirements. For example, a current problem is
market failure in the building sector, where there are no projects for
building public sector housing. A number of factors such as the problem of
what to do with the tenants of denationalised houses together with recent
developments in the real estate market suggest that public housing projects
are rather desirable and socially justifiable.
What can one say in general about an optimal Structural Funds policy for
Latvia? One route is to try to identify regional comparative advantages and
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support sectors that have such advantages. Another is to identify particular
sectors – “high-value added” or “knowledge based” are popular buzzwords.
Such approaches are entirely misconceived. Production according to
regional comparative advantage will emerge quite automatically in a market
economy unless governments intervene to obstruct it. High value added is
an entirely non-operational concept and is there any activity that is in some
sense not knowledge based? In a modern economy value added consists of
wages plus profits and it is of course good to have more profits, higher
wages. High profits are generated by good projects and high wages are
earned by people with marketable skills. What meaning can be attached to a
“high value added sector”? In truth not very much – one needs a
denominator i.e., value added per “something”. One option is value added
per worker, but then the high value added per worker sectors are all
traditional capital intensive sectors such as refining, steel or car making and
not at all the so-called high tech sectors. Indeed Paul Krugman has pointed
out that one sector with the highest value added per worker is the making
of potato chips (crisps) since it is very highly mechanised. 
In general, unless some specific sectoral market failure can be identified
policies that select particular sectors should be avoided. Thus if one
believes that the market is not generating enough “knowledge based”
activity the correct approach is to implement horizontal rather than sectoral
remedies. Here horizontal policies are ones that are available equally to all
sectors of the economy e.g., support for innovation – innovation in a
traditional or “low-tech” industry is potentially just as valuable as
innovation in a so-called “high-tech” industry.
Another approach to defining a good Structural Policy is to consider the
experience of other countries. This is the approach of Alasejeva (2003),
who has looked at the historical examples of Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
The experience of Greece and Portugal shows that it is a mistake to treat
the Structural Funds money as a free lunch. By contrast Ireland was able
to achieve a long term positive effect from the EU Structural Funds by
concentrating on developing human resources. 
European funds have two main effects. First they represent a boost to
economic activity through the demand side and secondly they can improve
productive capacity through supply side effects. Demand side effects occur
automatically with the appearance of EU Structural Funds. Thus
implementing large infrastructure projects, using EU funds, automatically
increases demand for building sector services. But the demand effects are
transitory and they disappear together with Structural Funds. However, if
the infrastructure project is a good one it can be expected to contribute to
increased productive capacity in the future.
However, a subsidy to business has a supply effect while the subsidy is in
place but vanishes when the subsidy is removed. On the other hand
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resources devoted to human resource development i.e. increases in skills
and human capital in general, allow the economy to develop faster also in
the future without additional subsidies. 
The question is how to create the right mix between demand or supply side
effects? Alasejeva reports that for the Irish economy the total impact of the
funds has been the equivalent of between 2.7 per cent and 3.5 per cent of
GDP (Alasejeva 2003). From this overall effect the demand oriented part
constituted 1.9 per cent. That means that the supply effects were almost as
big as the demand effects. Moreover the supply effects persist over future
years.
Ireland has differed from Greece, Portugal and Spain in its priorities for
the use of EU funds. Around a third of all available EU money in Ireland
has been devoted to the development of human resources. In the other
countries less than one fourth of available funds were devoted to this
priority, but more was invested in physical infrastructure.
From Ireland’s experience it can be concluded that the most effective in-
vestments are in those areas that can give highest supply effects. In
Ireland’s case investment in human resources has been a key factor with
higher labour quality at all the levels increasing productivity in all sectors
i.e. in both existing industries and in new ones, including the high-tech
industries that are much sought-after in Latvia.
8.6 A Latvian perspective on the
Commission’s 2007-2013 proposal
8.6.1 Co-financing requirement  
One important issue is precisely that in the new proposal the eligible
private expenditures for projects will be cut in half – this effectively cuts
the implicit subsidy in half. Motivating this decision is presumably the
view that current levels of support for the private sector are more than
generous enough However, the Latvian government view is that private
funds as a source of co-financing play an important role as a guarantor of
the success of structural projects.  Involvement of private financial funds
as a source of co-financing structural projects is regarded as a powerful
instrument to motivate entrepreneurs to contribute more to planning and
monitoring of structural projects because they risk their own money in
addition to money from the Structural Funds. Therefore, the new co-
financing limitation is regarded as unfavourable for the effectiveness of
structural projects.
At the same time the Commission wants 25 per cent of the costs of
structural projects to come from national co-financing (government and
municipalities’ budgets). In a poor country such as Latvia it is difficult to
generate such resources from the public sector. Latvia cannot exceed the
ceiling for government budget deficit to qualify for membership of the
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Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 (ERM2) and generally needs to maintain
satisfactory macroeconomic indicators. Thus, the government faces a
dilemma, on the one hand it wants to and is asked to invest more, but on
the hand it needs to practice fiscal prudence and to maintain economic
stability. As a possible solution of this problem the Commissions suggests
public-private partnership (PPP) as a way to replace government financing.
However, PPP is really a method of substituting government financing by
private. The Commission position has created incomprehension and con-
fusion in the Ministry of Finance of Latvia as to the direction to which to
point. On the one hand the Commission suggests the use of PPP, but on the
other hand Structural and Cohesion Funds are trying to reduce private
initiative. If it is clear that co-financing is not possible then a whole
department in the Ministry of Finance, created to increase and to attract
private co-financing, should be closed and a new information centre should
be created to stimulate PPP. The main official position of Latvia is that it is
necessary to keep private co-financing and to maintain current rules.
8.6.2 The 4 per cent cap 
The main goal of the Structural Funds as proposed by the Commission is
convergence between the member countries and cohesion within the union.
Convergence according to neoclassical growth theory may be defined as a
long-term process of higher growth in countries with low capital to labour
ratios, in other words, countries that have a low GDP per capita level
should increase growth rates to “catch up” with richer countries. Such a
development should lead to an increase in the level of economic cohesion
within the Union. However, the existing method of allocation of Structural
Funds is not fully compatible with GDP per capita levels within the cohe-
sion and convergence framework. 
The current financial period is the first when the so called Berlin Method
and four per cent cap GDP criteria applies to the amount of aid from
Structural Funds that is allocated to recipient countries. This Method states
that the maximum total amount of aid each country can receive from all 4
Structural Funds and the Cohesion fund is four per cent of its GDP. There
was no need to apply such method before the enlargement because the
amounts of money to be reallocated were not so big and the poor countries
were not as poor as Latvia is now. However, now it is obvious that the
demand for Structural Funds significantly exceeds supply and that the
Berlin Method is supposed to solve the problem of allocation of resources.
However, from the Latvian perspective this approach seems to be some-
what unfair. This system fundamentally discriminates against poorer
countries (with lower GDP) relative to richer countries (with higher GDP).
First, the amount of financial assistance per capita Latvia receives seems
low taking into account macroeconomic conditions and the level of
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development of Latvia in comparison with other recipient countries.
Latvia, as one of the poorest countries in the EU (if not even the poorest if
we look at GDP per capita), receives less aid per capita than countries that
are much more wealthy and economically developed.
Figure 8.3 shows the distribution of total structural aid per capita in the
next (2007-2013) financial period103 one can see that Latvia is not last in
the amount of aid available per capita for all member countries, but is
nevertheless behind Greece, Portugal and Spain which are much richer.
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103 The data on total amount of aid per capita in each country for the period 2007-2013 used
in the analysis comes from the latest analysis in the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow,
Scotland, and was provided by the Ministry of Finance of Latvia.
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However, it important to look at the need for aid for each country. For
example, Latvian GDP per capita is only around 43 per cent of the EU
average, but Greece, which is much more developed and prosperous, has
this measure around 83 per cent. However at the same time Greece
receives much more aid than Latvia does. Portugal, Spain, and Italy are
other examples.
A different picture appears when we take into consideration GDP per
capita at PPS for each country (2004 data).104 This is shown in Figure 8.4.
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104 The data on GDP per capita at PPS was provided by SIEPS.
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Latvian GDP at PPS per capita in 2004 was only 43 per cent of the EU
average and actually from Figure 8.4 it is obviously the smallest in the
whole Union. The total aid per one person granted to Latvia exceeds the
EU average by 61 per cent. However, at the same time Portugal, with twice
as big a GDP per capita as Latvia had in 2004, is expected to receive from
the Structural Funds more than twice as much as Latvia or 339 per cent of
the EU average.
Figure 8.4 shows GDP per capita against the amount of aid given. The
differences between old and new Member States are quite substantial.
From the diagram one can notice that GDP capping criteria distributes
Structural Funds in a way that is inconsistent with GDP per capita and,
thus, the need. There is some negative correlation between the variables –
the correlation coefficient is equal to -0.55. However, it is not large
enough to define a strong relationship between the variables. Such alloca-
tion of funds obviously discriminates against the new member countries
and does not provide aid according to need. Countries are substantially
different in their levels of development, for example the standard deviation
in GDP per capita at PPS for all member countries in 2004 constituted 41
per cent of the EU average. Using the GDP capping method with such
initial differences will lead to even larger disparities in the long run. Thus,
it can be argued that this method is inconsistent with the main goal
proposed by the EU, namely convergence. 
Second, there is a difference in the conditions for Latvian contributions
into the EU budget and the aid it receives. Latvia contributes to the EU
budget according to its existing GDP, which grows at a rate of around
eight per cent annually. However, the amount of Structural Funds Latvia
qualifies for in the existing financial period was calculated using the
assumption of only four per cent annual GDP growth for developing
countries (like Latvia) and two per cent of annual GDP growth for de-
veloped countries. Thus it seems that Latvia receives aid that is
inconsistent with its contributions. The Latvian Minister of Foreign affairs
Artis Pabriks has agreed with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania
and Estonia that the Baltic countries receive too little foreign aid and that
aid is not proportional to their contributions to the EU budget. Possible
solutions to this problem may be:
1. That theoretical calculations should be replaced with real economic
indicators to match contributions with aid. The  amount of aid each
country is eligible for in the EC is based on Eurostat official statistics
(latest available are for year 2003) and divides countries into “old”
(with two per cent GDP growth) and “new” (with four per cent GDP
growth). However, real existing indicators for 2004 look much better
than those assumed by the Commission, with a Latvian GDP growth
at a rate around eight per cent annually (instead of four). Thus, our
contributions to the EU budget are calculated according to our
existing GDP (with annual growth around eight per cent), however
our reception of aid from Structural Funds is calculated from
approximated GDP (with assumed annual growth of four per cent);
2. To put emphasis on environment protection and infrastructure projects
that may benefit not only Latvia, but also other countries. Such an
emphasis would make other countries more interested in financing
such programmes and may persuade contributors to exclude
environmental and infrastructure projects from the four per cent of
GDP limitation;
3. To cancel the four per cent of GDP regulation. Latvia is not yet ready
for such a move because of political considerations. Countries which
benefit from the existing system will lose a lot if it is cancelled.
The limitation of financial aid with four per cent of GDP per year is
motivated by the Commission as the maximum amount a country is able to
199
spend and absorb and not harm its economic stability. This is mainly a
political argument. There are no theoretical or empirical findings which
justify such a measure. Furthermore, there is evidence that investment in
richer countries (which can be classified as structural investments) very
often exceeds this limitation. For example the UK, which has always
invested more that four per cent of GDP in the projects that could have
qualified as structural and has not faced any economic problems regarding
these investments and overall stability. 
8.6.3 Cross-financing  
The Commission suggests a mono-fund approach, which states that every
type of programme should be financed from a different fund and that
every type of programme is under the authority of a different ministry. It is
planned that in the future there will be two managing authorities: a
Regional Development Fund, which will deal with infrastructure projects
and a Regional Social Fund, which will deal with soft investments. Cur-
rently the only managing authority for the use of structural aid is the
Ministry of Finance of Latvia, which coordinates both types of projects
and guarantees synergy. There is a plan that in the future the Latvian
Ministry of Welfare should deal with social projects and the Ministry of
Finance with regional and infrastructure projects. However, the Ministry of
Finance of Latvia believes that there is a big share of projects in each
sector that “overlap” with each other. As a result of the proposed division
the necessary synergy achieved by the Ministry of Finance between all
“overlapping” projects will be lost. Coherent projects will be difficult to
manage because there will not be one common institution responsible for
administering and implementing such projects.
The Commission suggests that one should fix a cross-financing level that
will state maximum volumes of cross-financing for each foundation. For
the Regional Development Fund it suggests a five per cent ceiling from the
overall budget to be devoted to social projects, for the Regional Social
Fund the suggested ceiling is ten per cent devoted to infrastructure.
However, the actual level of cross-financing in both types of investment
substantially exceeds these measures. Thus, such a rule creates the risk of
losing this synergy between the two types of projects with corresponding
losses in efficiency.
A possible solution is to accept the mono-fund approach, but the ceilings
for cross-financing for each fund should be increased. Based on the
experience of the Ministry of Finance, the ceiling for cross-financing
should be raised to 20 per cent for each budget. Thus, without rejecting the
mono-fund approach it will be possible to maintain the necessary synergy
and the level of cross-financing.
However, larger and more developed countries where administration of
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Structural Funds is less centralised, in many cases do not understand such
a problem and the necessity for synergy in a small country like Latvia.
Thus, they do not support an increase in the maximum level of cross-
financing. However, their position does not seem to be constructive
because a higher level of cross-financing does not create an obligation to
use its full potential and at the same time it allows it where it is needed.
Currently the Ministry of Finance is engaged in negotiations concerning an
increase in cross-financing levels. Even other countries that are indifferent
on this issue support the Commission in its view in order to speed the
progress of negotiations. 
If the small countries are not be able to achieve an increase in the
maximum ceiling for “overlapping” structural projects, they will be
constrained to use the government budget to maintain the necessary level
of synergy. Such an implication may cause fiscal strain with possible harm
to macroeconomic stability.
8.6.4 The n + 2 rule 
This rule states that the Commission must automatically decommit any
part of a commitment for which it has not received an acceptable payment
application by the end of the second year following the year of commit-
ment. The application of this “n + 2” rule forces Latvia to increase the
speed of Structural Funds’ administration in Latvia. According to estimates
of the Ministry of Finance, if Latvia continues to use funds with the same
speed, then money supposed to be used up to the year 2007 might be
already spent by the end of 2006. Since Latvia will not have any access to
additional financial means before January 2007, this may create a one-year
period of slow down unfavourable to the stability of the Latvian economy.
8.7 Conclusions
For Latvia the new programming period from 2007 to 2013 represents an
opportunity to build and improve on what has been achieved in the current
period. What has to date been achieved includes the demonstration that
Latvia does have the capacity to administer the funds as well as to absorb
them. Judgement on the quality of implemented projects awaits detailed
evaluation.
The most important problem in the current period appears to be that the
priorities of the funds have insufficiently addressed the problem of internal
convergence i.e. regional disparities. Indeed lack of resources and capacity
in disadvantaged regions may mean that the Riga region will receive a
disproportionate share of Structural Funds with the consequence that
regional disparities may actually worsen. This is an issue that urgently
needs to be addressed for 2007-2013.   
201
REFERENCES
Alasejeva, J., 2003, Irijas skola: ka¯ vislaba¯k izmantot ES naudu?,
http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=108926&lang=lv
Brizga, J., 2004, Who will plan development of Latvia`s development in
the next EU budget?, http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=110342&lang=lv
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2005, Latvia. Statistics in brief. 2005,
Publication of Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Riga, (2005:2).
Cigane, L.,  2003, Valstiska¯s redzes pa¯rbaude,
http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=108924&lang=lv
Ministry of Economics Republic of Latvia, 2004, Economic development
of Latvia, State Land Service of the Republic of Latvia.
Ministry of Finance of Latvia, 2003, National Development Plan (Single
Programming Document 2004-2006 project), Ministry of Finance of
Latvia, Riga.
Soros Foundation – Latvia, 2005a, Pirmais gads struktura¯lo fondu
apgu¯ana¯ (First year in administration of Structural Funds), public
discussion materials, http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=110550&lang=lv
Soros Foundation – Latvia, 2005b, public survey’s, Ka¯du naciona¯lo
attı¯stı¯bu atbalstı¯tu ju¯s? results,
http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=110343&lang=lv
Internet sources:
European Structural Funds official website in Latvia, Informative report
about Latvia’s readiness to acquire European Structural Funds,
http://www.esfondi.lv/page.php?id=414
European Structural Funds official website in Latvia, Pre-accession funds
in Latvia (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD and other),
http://www.esfondi.lv/page.php?id=6
European Union Information Centre of Saeima, What Latvia has gained
being European Union member country?,
http://www.eiroinfo.lv/pages/ESIC/content_list.jsp?category_id=110
Phare evaluation: The “PHARE country ex-post evaluation and capacity
building. Country report – Latvia”,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/phare_evaluation_pdf/latvia_country
_report_english.pdf 
202
¯
203
9 FROM POLICY TAKERS TO POLICY MAKERS
Bengt O. Karlsson
9.1 The stage set
The basic goal of this study was to investigate some of the past experience
of pre-accession support and European Structural and Cohesion Policy in
new Member States as well as issues that might have transpired during the
accession negotiations. Further, we wanted to study how the present
system of conditionalities on the ECP would affect the future development
in those States and, lastly, to get some ideas on how a more liberal system,
in which the new Member States had a freer hand in managing available
support funds and in defining priorities would differ from present pro-
posals. On the basis of information from 5 national case studies an attempt
would be made to suggest an outline of a new framework for the ECP
which might in a better way correspond to the needs and objectives of the
Member States. Four specific questions, corresponding to those issues,
were put to the participating research institutes.
The Country Studies, each one of which has been devoted a special
chapter, must be read against the backdrop not only of the actual situation
with respect to income differences between countries and regions but also
of the present system of ECP and the proposed changes that are presently
under negotiation. This section 9.1 reviews briefly some of the more
important aspects which were fully covered in chapters 1 and 2.
We have discussed at great length the present proposal by the European
Commission for a new ECP to be included in the Financial Perspective for
the period 2007-2013 (see chapter 2, section 2.3). Even before the break-
down of the negotiations in June 2005, it was clear that  in addition to the
opposing positions of net payers and net receivers, there is also a lack of
consensus on the proposed structure of the objectives of the Structural and
Cohesion Funds. The Convergence objective is generally endorsed and
several new Member States wish to see a larger share of the funds under
this objective whereas the Competitiveness objective does not have the
same support. The third objective, Territorial cooperation, is, perhaps,
somewhat vague but met with interest. Some countries wish resources to
be allocated to the least developed Member States rather than to the least
developed regions (see chapter 2, section 2.3.2).
That standpoints differ may to some extent reflect the fact that the new
Member States had very little influence over the design of the ECP during
the accession negotiations. Basically the system was already in place. It
had been developed by and for the old Member States and has been
modified to accommodate new Member States at every earlier accession
(Tarschys 2003, chapter 2). What the candidate countries in the Eastern
enlargement round could influence was only some modalities for adjust-
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ment and phasing-in and, to a certain extent, the amount of funds to be
allocated (see chapter 1, section 1.1.1). Accordingly, it is a relevant
question to ask how Structural and Cohesion Policy in the new Member
States has been affected by the conditionality inherent in the system and
what would happen if this conditionality would be relaxed.
Ample empirical evidence of the regional imbalances in the new Member
States is presented in chapter 3. The regional divergence was from the
outset generally larger than in the old Member States, yet it is clear that
regional imbalances have increased considerably105 between 1995 and 2002,
mainly due to the expansion of the capital city regions. When excluding
the capital city regions, the regional differences seem to have remained
basically at the same level as before the start of the integration process in
the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia but have increased in other new
Member States even if not so strongly as when the capital cities are
included. Furthermore, there are big and increasing differences between
regions due to their sectoral structure, educational level and ability to
attract foreign investment. Those differences do not always show up in the
employment records since the agricultural sector, at least in some
countries, serves as a “sponge” that can absorb superfluous labour in sub-
sistence farming. Employment has generally developed more favourably in
so called forward looking industry regions106 but not as strongly as their
GDP. This might reflect the well-observed phenomenon of jobless growth
in the new Member States where rising GDP is mainly due to increases in
productivity rather than employment (see chapter 3, section 4).
It can be argued that the regional differences are somewhat exaggerated:
differences in cost of living are taken into account, but only at the national
level. Further adjustment could be made for taxes, transfers and public
expenditure, maybe also for private capital flows.107 A hypothetical measure
of divergence expressed in terms of equality of consumption might show
considerably smaller regional divergences than we normally assume
(Tarschys 2003a).
In the period under consideration the process of convergence between
countries did take off in an impressive manner (see chapter 3). During the
period 1995-2004 the growth rate of the eastern European new Member
States surpassed that of the old Member States by 1.7 percentage points
annually. In certain countries, notably the Baltics, the growth differential
was even higher. We might say that increased national convergence was
105 Except in Bulgaria and Slovenia.
106 See chapter 3 for a definition of this term – those regions have a large share of various
engineering industries.
107 For a discussion of various measures of human resources development and international
competitiveness where the new Member States generally come out better than when
measured by GNI statistics, however adjusted, see Karlsson (2002), section 9.2.
accompanied by strongly increasing regional differences within countries –
leaving the casual connection aside for the moment. 
We have discussed in chapter 2 the definitions of the concepts con-
vergence, competitiveness and cohesion as well as their possible
overlapping and potential goal conflicts. As has been shown in the Sapir
report, there is very likely a conflict between achieving regional con-
vergence within a country and economic growth.108 We may look at this as
a possible conflict between the objectives of Lisbon and Gothenburg on
the one hand and the convergence goal on the other. The creation of
growth centres or industrial clusters is one of the main engines for
growth.109 As we have seen from chapter 3, the expansion of the capital
city regions in all new Member States may well be an expression of this
fact. The Sapir report states explicitly that “It is obviously possible that,
during the catching-up process, increasing regional disparities within the
poorer countries may also emerge. However, this phenomenon may be
mitigated by national growth and could be eased by national rather than
EU policies (such as social transfer schemes, labour market and wage
policy, etc).” This is also one of the reasons why the Sapir report recom-
mends an ECP that is directed towards countries rather than towards
regions. The Commission recognises this conflict in the Third Report on
Economic and Social Cohesion but wards it off by saying that the trade-off
will depend on “the spatial distribution of economic activity and of settle-
ments”.110
While groping for an optimal design of the ECP for new Member States
we can, then, immediately discern two fields of tension of great con-
sequence: one between the conditionalities of a system originally designed
for EU 15 and the national constraints of the new Member States, the other
between the Lisbon objectives of growth and competitiveness and the
regional divergences within a country. In addition, the deficient capacity to
manage and administer support funds transcends those fields of tension in
the new Member States, albeit to a varying degree. This capacity is some-
times further hampered by remnants of old political structures. 
Against this somewhat troubled background, we will now proceed to sum
up what the national contributions have to say about their past experience
of ECP and their thoughts about the future policy, on the one hand if
present conditionalities prevail, on the other if they were to be given a
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108 For a review of discussions on this issue see Richter (2005), section 1 p.24 ff
109 The concept of industrial clusters is mainly connected with the work of Michael Porter. See
the seminal work in Porter (1990). For an updated bibliography and references to European
conditions; see Kethels (2004).
110 As noted in chapter 2, this observation seems less relevant for the new Member States
where the spatial distribution of economic activity often was decided by the central
planning authority. See, for instance, the Czech Country Study, section 6.6.
freer hand in forming the implementation of the ECP in line with their
own priorities. 
9.2 Summary of national contributions
9.2.1 Experience drawn from the pre-accession support
The refocusing of the PHARE programme and the creation of the ISPA and
SAPARD programmes in 1997/98 made important financial support avail-
able to the candidate countries for preparing for the accession. Whereas
SAPARD aims at rural development, PHARE supports institution building
and cohesion and ISPA large scale environment and infrastructure projects.
Although 2003 was the last programming year for the new Member States,
pre-accession support is still very much a living issue: contracting continues
in 2005 and payments until 2006.111 In the course of the present study, it
seemed reasonable to assume that the experience from the pre-accession
support would throw some light on the possibilities as well as on the dif-
ficulties that the new Member States would face, once included in the ECP.
All Country Studies generally make a favourable assessment of the im-
plementation of the pre-accession programmes, although to a varying
degree and with several modifications. The Latvian Country Study says that
the main goal to prepare for the use of the Structural Funds has not been
fully achieved and the Polish study indicates that the programmes were
inadequate even if the funds in several respects contributed to the economy.
Other Country Studies show a much more positive attitude towards the pre-
accession programmes. It is a common experience that the various pro-
grammes have revealed a large number of institutional, managerial and
administrative shortcomings on the receiving side – shortcomings that,
perhaps, have not yet been fully overcome but which must be addressed in
the nearest future. Several instances of unfinished projects and of funds that
had to be returned are reported. The Slovak Country Study claims that pre-
accession support has increased administrative capacity and experience
which, in the words of the Study, hopefully will help to overcome the
obstacles to the use of ECP funds that still exist. The Czech contribution
goes even further and states that the Czech Republic has taken full
advantage of the pre-assistance support and succeeded to stimulate invest-
ments in sectors or regions that otherwise would have been neglected. The
Czech Country Study also says that the programmes made a contribution to
the success of the accession negotiations but admits that the first aim was
to secure as much financial resources as possible. The strongest reaction
comes from the Polish Country Study which emphasises that the domestic
authorities could not influence content and priorities of the programmes –
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111The Slovak Country Study expresses concern that the simultaneous implementation of
projects financed by preaccession funds and the preparation for the funding through regular
ECP funds might create institutional and administrative difficulties.
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they were consulted rather than playing an active role. All in all this led to a
situation where the main concern became not to lose any of the funds
available from the EU.
The lack of national influence on the pre-accession programmes is also
stressed in the Latvian Country Study and certainly in the Hungarian
contribution. The latter makes a favourable overall assessment but em-
phasises the problems caused by discrepancies between the Commission
and the national authorities: sectoral priorities were seen quite differently
and bureaucratic hurdles made the use of funds difficult. A special feature
in the Hungarian Country Study relates to agriculture and the SAPARD
programme: through fortunate circumstances Hungary had already
succeeded in building up a relatively successful agricultural sector. The
system change meant that well functioning cooperatives were broken up
and the SAPARD programme had to serve, instead, a fragmented sector
with a large number of small landholders. These problems remain for the
future, according to the Country Study.
The Country Studies do not reveal any striking differences between the
three programmes except that one Country Study (Latvia) mentions
SAPARD as the most successful programme, this in contrast to others.
There seems to be satisfaction also with the infrastructural investments
financed under ISPA. The Hungarian Country Study states that the experi-
ence gained from ISPA is a good model for the use of the Cohesion Fund
– probably also with respect to tackling the bureaucratic and other hurdles
from the side of the Commission that the Country Studies elaborates on.
The attitude towards the environmental projects is more ambiguous even if
in Slovakia important improvements in the waste water treatment sector
seem to have been achieved.
There does seem to be a certain inconsistency in the Country Studies (with
the exception of Hungary) between the overall assessment of the pre-
accession support and the identified problems and obstacles. When all is
said and done, the general assessment is positive, except, perhaps, in the
Polish Study but even there available funds seem to have been absorbed.
This must be contrasted with the overwhelming number of problems,
shortcomings and failures that have been identified: particularly the Slovak
Country Study contributes an impressive list. The Polish Study also lists a
number of difficulties but they appear to be different in nature and mainly
concern the mode of implementation (procedures must be simplified, more
emphasis should be placed on SMEs and on the participation of young
people, etc.) With some exception, Country Studies seem to indicate that
most of those problems have not yet been resolved and will remain as
policy obstacles for a considerable period of time. Adequate legislation is
not in place, managerial and administrative capacities are lacking, project
identification and preparation deficient and costly. At least in some
countries, internal political problems and pressure from special interests
make reforms difficult or impossible. All this is compounded by a certain
unease about the proverbial Brussels bureaucracy and a feeling of being in
a weak negotiating position vis-à-vis the Commission.
Obviously the flip side of all this is that crucial bottlenecks have been
identified and even to some extent eliminated and that work on reform and
new structures has started. But it is difficult to get rid of the notion that
the positive assessment of the pre-accession programmes to a large extent
is based on the fact that considerable financial resources thereby have
flown into the country. The uncertainty remains as to whether the pre-
accession support really has been able prepare the new Member States for
a successful participation in the ECP. A first, tentative, conclusion would
be that also in the coming years much resources will have to be
concentrated on continued administrative and legislative reform, coupled
with strong measures for training and education at several levels.112 
9.2.2 Controversial issues in the accession negotiations
In the design of the study it was assumed, as outlined in chapter 1, that the
various national positions and requests in the access negotiations would
provide a good indication of how each country perceived that an optimal
future ECP should be formulated. Accordingly, the cooperating partners
were asked to outline the divergences that might have appeared in the
negotiation process between the national positions and the position of the
Commission.
Country Studies show clearly, however, that the divergent views – and they
existed – arose along quite different lines and did not so much relate to the
very objectives of Structural Policy or to the optimal use of funds. Instead,
purely operational issues were in focus, at least according to the Country
Studies. In two cases, Hungary and Poland, overall financial issues were
particularly contentious. Both countries demanded larger allocations than
those proposed by the Commission. In Poland’s case, concerns about a
slow inflow of funds during the first years of membership led to a request
for a phasing in of the payments to the EU budget – something which was
promptly rejected by the Commission. (Poland, however, gained certain
other financial concessions, largely, it appears, as last-minute compensa-
tions or a way out of a negotiation deadlock.) In all countries, with the
possible exception of Hungary, a weak negotiation position, unfamiliarity
with procedures, a fragile administrative structure and, perhaps, a general
lack of negotiation capacity were perceived as the main obstacles to a
more successful outcome of the process. Several countries, however, seem
to have pressed for a larger share of the Cohesion Fund because of its
simpler procedures of administration. 
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112 For a concurring assessment, albeit with a slightly more positive slant, see Richter (2005),
section 7.
Latvia may have been an exception according to the Country Study, where
sectoral and thematic priorities were at the centre of attention and
sometimes led to “emotional negotiations between representatives of
Latvia and the Commission” in the words of the Study. 
A special – and important – aspect of the shortcomings relates to the
decentralisation of government and public finances. In some cases, a rather
artificial regional structure was imposed on a country which had had no
experience of decentralised decision-making for many decades. Brave
attempts to apply this structure to the required planning process sometimes
led to distrust from the side of the Commission and to unilateral changes
in the planning structure. An example in the same vein, but with different
result, is given by the Hungarian Country Study: national negotiators were
finally allowed to elaborate Operational Programmes at the national rather
than at the regional level which greatly enhanced the absorption capacity.
The Hungarian concern is now whether this will be allowed to continue
over the next planning period.
Again, very little guidance for the design of an optimal ECP for the future
seems to be given by the reports on the negotiation process in the Country
Studies. It can of course be inferred that a strengthening of the administra-
tive and managerial capacity on the receiving side will be an essential
prerequisite for a successful ECP. Likewise, that the use of and access to
the Structural Funds should be as unbureaucratic and easy as possible,
with as few conditions as possible for the receivers. But those are ex-
tremely general conclusions and give little advice on how an ECP should
be designed to best suit the new Member States, given the overall
objectives of that policy. For this we have to turn to the inventory of the
main challenges for the future given in the Country Studies as well as to
their own look at the proposals currently on the negotiation table.
9.3 The starting position 
As this is written, the new Member States have had experience of pre-
accession support at least since 1998. They have successfully concluded
the accession negotiations in which the amount and composition of the
structural support funds for the period 2004-2006 were agreed and they
have started the process of implementation. Together with all other
Member States, they are in the middle of a new negotiation process: this
time to agree on the Financial Perspective for the period 2007-2013 includ-
ing the amounts to be allocated as well as the objectives and goals of the
structural and cohesion support. In this section 9.3 we try to draw some
conclusions from the previous experience of the new Member States, as it
has transpired not only from the preceding section but also from other
parts of the analysis in the Country Studies. Section 9.3.3, in particular,
attempts to formulate the problems that the future ECP would meet if the
difficulties and issues, identified in the Country Studies, would not be
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given sufficient attention in the formulation of the policy for the upcoming
period. Those problems and issues relate both to the ability of the new
Member States themselves to reap the benefits of the ECP and to the
various components of the ECP system.
Even if all Member States share the goal of an increased cohesion within
the EU, the financial interests of the net payers and the net receivers create
natural areas of friction. Whatever the final outcome of the negotiations on
the future finances, it is obvious that financial resources will be limited
and that available funds must be used in a judicious way in order to further
growth and cohesion. To create the conditions for this to happen is now the
immediate common task for all Members States as well as for Commission
and Parliament. How well prepared, then, are the new Member States in
this situation, after almost a decade of experience? And are there obstacles
inherent in the proposed system which will make it difficult for the
receivers to use funds in the way it is intended by the EU? The Country
Studies give a number of indications. We will start by looking at the
national issues as identified by the Country Studies and then identify some
legacy of the previous system that is perceived as particular obstacles for
the new Member States.
9.3.1 Urgent domestic issues
Need for improved strategy and planning
The Country Studies unanimously stress the need for elaborating a better
long-term strategy for the national Structural and Cohesion Policy and for
the use of support funds from the Union. The Hungarian and Polish
Country Studies clearly state that the present strategy has been mainly
limited to ensuring that no funds are lost, in other words, to make sure that
available support possibilities are used to the utmost. The same can quite
easily be inferred from the other Country Studies as well as a clear
awareness of the inadequacy of this situation. The Slovak Country Study
points out that their strategic documents have been late, particularly in
comparison with neighbouring countries. Even if this has now been
corrected, the documents are often, in the words of the Country Study,
obscure and difficult to understand for the potential users – not the least
for those that may apply for funds. According to the Czech Country Study,
improved planning documents are under way but have little chance of
survival given the political situation in the country.
Some Country Studies make the point that national priorities and EU
priorities are confused or overlapping. Necessary budget restraint may lead
to cuts being made in the wrong areas (for instance education – Hungary).
Countries should see the ECP supported priorities as long-term investment,
necessary for growth and convergence, which should not be affected by
short-term budget considerations. Budget cuts should be made in areas
outside the development plan (the Czech Republic).
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Some Country Studies underline that the national development plans lack
strategy and vision and rather display the character of a “shopping list”
(The Polish Study). The Hungarian Country Study makes a particularly
interesting point: the relatively primitive strategy that has been prevailing
and which mainly consists of ensuring that all possible support funds are
taken advantage of so that no money is lost (which, nevertheless, has
happened in several countries and instances) risks creating the opinion that
the new Member States are in the European game just for the money. The
Hungarian Study warns for a confusion between instruments and objectives
and points to the necessity of defining a sustainable long-term strategy for
the member country in the European context instead of just aiming at “the
highest possible absorption of potential EU funds.” Well thought out
national strategies may or may not coincide with the Commission strategies
but will at any rate form a sound basis for negotiations and for making the
case in Brussels and vis-à-vis the net payers.
Lack of administrative and managerial capacity
It is clear from the Country Studies that there are still great shortcomings
when it comes to the ability of national authorities to act as effective
counterparts in the ECP, despite intensive training and institution building
activities. The highly centralised system of the centrally planned economies
was obviously not conducive to building up regional and local capacities.
Reforms also have to address the political culture says the Hungarian
Country Study and Slovakia laments that it is sometimes difficult to get
understanding even for the basic principles of cooperation within EU. Much
of the planning work is in the hands of municipalities, without much
experience and hampered by lack of cooperation with regional authorities.
The Country Studies of Poland and Hungary emphasise the need to
encourage local initiatives and initiative for promoting SMEs but have to
admit that the capacity to do so is largely lacking. The Slovak Study points
out that the fiscal decentralisation has not been implemented which means
that the regions have no financial resources to stimulate endogenous
growth. Slovakia has tried to use unpaid external advisors for project
assessment but found that very difficult – lack of financial incentives
seldom leads to a good job, apart from special cases where a more idealistic
attitude might prevail.
Particularly in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia the above issues have been
aggravated through regional reforms which have been less than optimal.
The Hungarian Country Study is most outspoken on this point: The NUTS
2 regions have been created by artificially grouping NUTS 3 regions
(termed “counties” in the Country Study) together but they have no or
little political relevance or administrative capacity. A special problem
concerns the region of Central Hungary which includes the capital city: a
huge hinterland of Budapest is excluded from Objective 1 assistance be-
cause of the weight of the wealthy capital city. The Country Study argues
in favour of a split of this region in two, one of which would be the capital
city. There is a somewhat similar situation in Slovakia: the three
administrative areas which existed under the old regime have been split up
in 8 regions of doubtful relevance and with glaring shortcomings in
capacity, facilities and experience. The decentralisation of public
administration and fiscal policy is painful and hampered by lack of
cooperation between the central and regional levels of authority.113
In the Hungarian Country Study the lessons seem clear: the experience
from the pre-accession period shows that an efficient use of available
resources could only be secured when planning and decision-making is
made centrally. Operational Programmes were elaborated on the national
level due to the missing tradition and administrative capacities at the
NUTS 2 level. According to the Country Study the national approach has
permitted quick access to and absorption of resources during the first
critical years of membership. The Country Study argues for a continuation
of this approach and rather worries at the thought that the Operational
Programmes would have to be regionalised after 2006. The Polish Country
Study, on the other hand, presents quite a different point of view and
argues strongly in favour of the official position which is to organise the
national Cohesion Policy in 16 regional programmes, corresponding to the
NUTS 2 regions, against the Commission proposal to work mainly with
sectoral programmes. The Polish approach would require a considerable
amount of further decentralisation of administration and public finance in
order to provide the regional and local authorities with the necessary
instruments. Sectoral programmes, in the eyes of the Polish Country Study,
would be subject to pressure from sectoral lobbies and political parties,
particularly from industries which are still dominated by state ownership.
The Polish Country Study is convinced that management of the Structural
Funds at the regional level is the only way to strengthen local government
in a situation of a permanent budget deficit and thereby ensure that EU
Cohesion Policy will take predominance over domestic interests.
Co-financing requirements in a period of structural budget deficits
All Country Studies point to the obvious conflict between the need to
reduce the budget deficit and the co-financing requirements. It would
appear that this is perhaps the largest problem relating to the present
European Structural and Cohesion Policy. But the assessment of the
situation – as well as of what needs to be done for the future, varies from
country to country.
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113 This is also an effect of an old way of thinking and is a part of the political “culture”.
Those issues can probably only be resolved through the passing of time and generations.
This should be borne in mind when formulating the rules for the implementation of the
Cohesion Policy.
The Hungarian Country Study states explicitly that future co-financing
requirements will be met but that a restructuring of the budget would still
be necessary to comply with the ERM-criteria and allow for an
introduction of the Euro by 2010. Both expenditure and revenue reforms
would be necessary; for political reasons opportunities of such reforms
have been missed in the past. Like the Czech Country Study, the
Hungarian one points out that it is necessary to see the resources used for
co-financing of EU-supported projects as long-term growth oriented
investments which should not be curtailed by short-term considerations.
Also the Polish Country Study emphasises the positive role that the co-
financing requirements could play in pushing necessary budget reforms.
Nevertheless, a general tenor in the Country Studies is the need to change
or relax the co-financing requirements. The Slovak Country Study
mentions that Slovakia has been warned by the Commission that it might
not be able to use all the funds allocated for the period 2004-2006. The
Country Study relates this to co-financing problems but also to the EU
disbursement procedures which sometimes are considered as very in-
adequate because of the liquidity pressure that can arise between the end
of a project and the final disbursement of EU funds. This is a recurrent
theme in the Country Studies: since payments are made very late in the
project cycle, particularly smaller entities (municipalities and enterprises)
fall into a liquidity trap. This has also a negative impact on their willing-
ness and ability to participate in future ECP-financed projects.
Several Country Studies point out that it is at the lower levels of administra-
tion, regional and municipal ones, that the co-financing problems become
really acute, often due to disastrous financial and budgetary circumstances.
The Slovakian Country Study mentions that this leads to a preference for
larger projects at higher levels where the situation might be easier to handle
(see chapter 7, section 7.4). The Latvian Country Study takes a particularly
pessimistic view of the co-financing possibilities at the local level and
points out what it finds to be an inconsistency: on the one hand private
financing is no longer eligible for EU contributions to the same extent as
before, on the other hand the EU encourages so called public-private
partnerships as a way of overcoming the difficulties with co-financing.
9.3.2 Removal of obstacles in the present and
proposed system
The proposal by the European Commission for the ECP 2007-2013 was
described in detail in chapter 2 (see section 2.3). The Commission has
replaced the former “objectives” with 3 new priorities: Cohesion for Growth
and Employment, Regional Competitiveness and Employment and European
Territorial Cooperation. “Cohesion policy in all its dimensions must be seen
as an integral part of the Lisbon strategy” (COM 2004, section 2) and also
integrate the Gothenburg objectives. The Commission has proposed a
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considerable increase in the amount of resources for ECP, distributed via
three funds. A general aim has been to simplify the system, among other
things by having each operational programme financed mainly from one of
the three funds, with limited possibilities for “cross-financing.” Further-
more, support for rural development and restructuring of fisheries industry
has been transferred to the heading Common Agricultural Policy.
The proposal was under negotiation until the failure to reach a general
agreement on the future Financial Perspective became apparent in June
2005. Although a broad generalisation, it may be fair to say that the
negotiations so far focused on the total amount of funds for ECP and on the
criteria for allocation between countries, in particular between the old and
the new Member States. We shall revert to those fundamental issues later.
Here we will take up some features of the proposal which so far seem to
have had a lower priority in the negotiation process but which nevertheless
are fundamental for the receiving countries. The Country Studies show
clearly that the experience of the pre-accession support has led the new
Member States to identify a number of issues related to the system itself
which they consider as obstacles for an efficient use of funds in the present
system. A discussion of those obstacles will indicate some answers to the
third question of our study outline: whether the ECP in its current shape,
including the proposed changes, causes problems due to its design.
Simplification of procedures
There is an inherent conflict between the aim to decentralise management
and implementation of ECP-funded projects on the one hand and the
required formalities for project preparation, proposals and reimbursement
on the other. Whereas this may be little more than an annoyance in old
Member States, it can become a real obstacle in the new Member States.
The Slovak Country Study bears witness to this when it enumerates the
documentation that has to be attached to a project proposal: detailed
budget of the organisation, articles of association, annual report, accounts,
official registration certificate, and a bank statement which certifies the
ability to co-finance the project. A special account has to be opened for
EU financial sources and very strict requirements are imposed as to
accounting, budgeting and monitoring. “Many of the projects are refused
because of formal mistakes”, says the Slovak Country Study. 
The matter is not made easier by the nature of the EU disbursement and
reimbursement procedures. Normally, funds are paid out very late in the
project cycle with final payment sometimes one or two years after the
finalisation of the project when all formal requirements have been met.
Obviously this can lead to a severe liquidity crisis for small enterprises or
municipalities which also have difficulties in accessing the banking system.
Yet, as the Hungarian Country Study says, “local initiative is crucial from
the point of view of the successful use of the possibilities of EU transfers.”
One step in the direction of simplification is the introduction of the
proportionality principle according to which the complexity of the system
of monitoring will be weighted against the size of the project. This is
explicitly welcomed in the Polish and the Slovak Country Studies even if
the latter offers the opinion that the principle should be applied to more
programmes and areas than has been proposed by the Commission.
More flexibility in the use of available funds
For the receiving countries the ability to make maximum use of allocated
or available funds is obviously close to the heart. The Country Studies
contain a plethora of proposals and ideas of how to eliminate some of the
obstacles in this respect; obstacles which are easily perceived as exag-
gerated or “bureaucratic” but which may be differently assessed by net
payers or by the Commission.
Some of those observations relate to the method of assessing the project
costs that are eligible for EU-financing. It was stressed above that small
entities have difficulties in participating actively because of the liquidity
squeeze caused by the EU reimbursement rules. This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that costs for project preparation are not eligible for
EU-financing. The Slovak Country Study tells a compelling tale about
having tried to have unpaid volunteer experts help in assessing project
proposals but, obviously, without much success. Likewise the new proposal
of excluding VAT from EU-financing will have a negative impact accord-
ing to the Polish, Czech and Slovak Country Studies since it will sub-
stantially increase the domestic contribution.
The alleged simplification of funding procedures – that each programme in
principle would be financed from one fund only with limited possibilities of
“cross-financing” – has generally got a negative reception in the Country
Studies. Rather than simplifying, this proposal complicates matters, says the
Czech Country Study. The Latvian Country Study discusses the problem at
length from the particular perspective of synergy between projects financed
under different objectives in a small country, for instance between social
and regional projects. One way out, according to the Latvian Study, would
be to greatly increase the amount of permitted cross-financing. Basically,
the Study says, the establishment of the mono-financing rule shows a lack
of understanding of the special circumstances in a country like Latvia.
A foreseeable reaction is the criticism of the strict application of the so
called n + 2 rule114 as well as a general wish to soften the co-financing
requirements whereby the required budget restraint in view of the Maast-
richt criteria is a frequently used argument. The Czech as well as the
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114 This abbreviation refers to the so called “sunset clause” according to which funds get
decommitted if not claimed at the latest two years after the commitment year.
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Slovak Country Study also express their opposition to the proposal of
earmarking some of the funds for a National Contingency Reserve.
9.3.3 Conclusion: Status quo ante bellum?
The review of the Country Studies made above gives the impression of a
situation where the new Member States, eager to make the best possible
use of the new sources of finance that the EU Membership has put at their
disposal, are in the middle of an embarrassing double-fronted conflict. On
the one hand they face rules, formalities and detailed regulations imposed
by Brussels, on the other hand they suffer from a grave deficiency in the
domestic ability to absorb those funds and to manage and implement the
corresponding projects. The question we had originally formulated for this
part of the study can be summarised as: What will the future ECP look like
in the new Member States if present conditionalities will be retained in the
next Financial Perspective? Even though we may not have received an
explicit answer to this question in the respective contributions, it is not all
that hard to find the answers that are implied in the Country Studies as
they have reviewed the shortcomings both in the national system and in the
current ECP proposal. Our conclusions as to the answer to the question
posed are, then, as follows:
1. If there are no internal and EU-reforms, ECP will continue to limp
along, particularly in the first part of the period. The main concern of
new Member States will be to ensure as much funds as possible with
little strategic planning. The main concern of the Commission will be
to make sure that funds are not squandered (continued actuarial
control).
2. Among other things this might cement the opinion, both in the EU 15
and the new Member States that the EU mainly serves as a source of
financing. This will be absolutely contrary to the idea of increased
cohesion in Europe. An unchanged ECP would therefore be counter-
productive with respect to improving cohesion.
3. There is a severe incongruity between the convergence criteria for
budget deficits (ERM) and co-financing requirements. This will also
hamper ECP – there will be more cases of new Member States
returning funds to the Commission or for being included in the
Growth Adjustment Fund.115
4. The difficulties connected with the formalities and the inflexibility of
the system are mainly felt at the regional and local levels. At the same
time a continued decentralisation or regionalisation is a central feature
of the ECP. There is a risk that this may aggravate the problems for
the new Member States of making full use of available funds,
particularly at the beginning of the financial period.
115 The Growth Adjustment Fund under Heading 1a in the proposal for new Financial
Perspective is intended to  be financed partly by non-utilised ECP funds!
5. The situation might even give net payers good arguments for wanting
to be restrictive since ECP funds may be considered as a sub-optimal
way of using scarce funds.116
6. Many problems and issues have been well identified and good ex-
perience gained since 1998. Reform work has started. It is quite pos-
sible that this process will continue and even accelerate in which case
the problems discussed may be at least partly resolved some time into
the next financial planning period. (The Hungarian Country Study
says explicitly that EU policy will enforce budgetary reform in the
country and that that is good. Also the Czech Study replies in the
same vein.) However, in many new Member States the political
situation is unstable and special interests and old political culture
could delay the reform process.117 It is difficult to see which tendency
will prevail.
7. Realistically, it is not very likely that a significant increase in regional
convergence will take place, at least not in the first part of the period,
since to a large extent the old problems remain. (See again chapter 3).
This is not to say that convergence at the EU level, between countries,
would not happen – there are growth centres and production capacity
in all the new Member States and probably good chances to attract
FDI. If anything, this might further increase the regional divergences
within the countries. This could be mitigated through an effective
transfer system but that might, in its turn, affect the competitiveness
of the growth regions in a negative way.
9.4 The system adapted: country preferences revealed
In this section the preferences and priorities for the future ECP, as expres-
sed in the five Country Studies, will be described. Since these priorities
have been identified by independent researchers, they may or may not
coincide with those expressed by their governments in the official
negotiations. In the concluding section, 9.5, we will try to summarise the
main conclusions that can be drawn for the future ECP on the basis of the
studies but we will also contrast those with the approach that the actual
negotiation work seems to be taking.
9.4.1 Objectives and themes
The objectives and themes proposed by the Commission generally find
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116 A similar point is made by Richter (2005, section 7).
117 This is sometimes masked as a discontent with the willingness of the EU to take “historical
facts” and “special circumstances” into account. But the Copenhagen criteria are clear
(relatively speaking) and cannot be modified on such grounds. We might compare with the
current discussion with Turkey where there are, obviously, very critical “historical facts”
and “special circumstances” that are at odds with the basic community values but where the
position of the EU is, and should be, absolutely firm. The same must go for minority rights
and similar issues.
acceptance in the Country Studies. The embracement of the Lisbon and
Gothenburg objectives is also welcome: it provides the new Member States
with a strategy for transforming their economies, dominated by agriculture
or basic industries into what is generally labelled as “Knowledge Based
Economies”.118
This being said, emphasis on the various objectives and priorities seems to
vary. A general theme seems to be that a larger share of the Structural
Policy resources should be allocated to the Cohesion Fund. The reasons for
this are easy to understand: This fund is mainly earmarked for the new
Member States,119 its handling and implementation is easier than for the
other programmes, generally good experience has been gained from the
ISPA programmes and, last but certainly not least, co-financing require-
ments are lower. Another reason for the emphasis on the Cohesion Fund is
that it lends itself to larger projects in transport infrastructure as well as
the environmental area. 
The assessment of the large transport infrastructure projects seems to vary
a bit between the Country Studies. The Polish Study warns that large
transport infrastructure investments may be difficult to manage and lead to
centralisation. They stress the need for good local or regional transport
systems as does the Slovak Country Study. The Hungarian Study has
another view: here the field of tension is between the Commission’s
insistance on transport by rail and the national needs which are rather to
develop the highway system. (See the reasoning on “highway density” in
the new Member States vs. the old Member States in section 3.4.2 of
chapter 3.) This reflects an interesting difference of views: environmental
and energy concerns in the old Member States have led to a general
acceptance of the need of a transfer from road to rail which is not
necessarily the priority of the new Member States where the road network
to a large extent is underdeveloped or dilapidated. The question that can be
asked is whether the “western” view represents an enlightened long-term
sustainable development strategy or whether it is more a question of
impressing certain values on countries where conditions are different? 
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118 This moniker has become a catch-all that generally seems to indicate a highly developed
industrial or post-industrial economy but with very little stringency in definition or clear
ideas of the strategies required to reach this goal. We might well ask the question: should
the whole of Europe become a “knowledge based economy”? Well, maybe, but in what
time perspective? By focusing on the concept of “knowledge base” there is an apparent risk
that more mundane development strategies will get less attention than they would deserve.
119 This, of course, is one of the main negotiation points: the Country Studies generally
carefully avoid discussing this issue although it would be very much in the interest of the
new Member States if this principle would be accepted, particularly if the overall size of the
EU budget were to be curtailed along with the wishes of some of the net payers. With a
reduced budget and important ECP money being siphoned off to old Member States, the
situation of the new Member States could become precarious. New Member States have,
nevertheless, been unwilling to side openly with the net payers on this particular issue so far.
The Gothenburg objective of environmental sustainability of course gets
the obligatory reverence in most Country Studies. It is somewhat
concretised in the Czech and Slovak ones, where the need to focus on the
waste water treatment is emphasised along with a report on the good
progress made under the pre-accession arrangement (The Slovak Country
Study). The Polish Study emphasises the need for upgrading environmental
standards but underlines the need for thorough cost/benefit studies as well
as the difficulties in coordinating with other institutions (the World Bank
and IMF).
The objective of regional competitiveness and employment is an interesting
one because it is, among other things, defined as helping “regions and the
regional authorities to anticipate and promote economic change in
industrial, urban and rural areas by strengthening their competitiveness and
attractiveness” and also to support “policies aiming at full employment,
quality and productivity at work, and social inclusion.” Unfortunately this
objective excludes most of the regions that qualify for the convergence
objective. It is obvious that countries would also like to have greater access
to funds under this objective. The Hungarian Country Study is of the
opinion that automatic exclusion from this objective would work against the
Lisbon objectives and the Czech Country Study goes so far as to suggest a
merger of the Convergence and the Regional Competitiveness objectives.
The Latvian Country Study identifies certain large priority projects, for
example in the housing sector, which need to be realised but which do not
qualify under the EU requirements.
9.4.2 National or regional management of the ECP?
One of the major, and principally most important, conclusions of the Sapir
report was that “There is a solid argument for the new EU convergence
policy to focus on countries, rather than on regions, using national GDP
per capita (measured in Purchasing Power Parity) as an eligibility criterion.
However, individual countries may decide to delegate implementation and
monitoring of this policy to their regions.” This recommendation was not
accepted by the Commission. Furthermore, while the principle of national
management of the ECP had been tolerated during the 2004-2006 period,
the proposal for 2007-2014 is aimed at transferring the responsibility for
the management and implementation of the ECP to the regional level.
Against this background, it is interesting to note that a majority of the
Country Studies have more or less indicated that they would see
advantages in a national approach. The Hungarian Country Study is most
outspoken. It puts the question whether focusing on the national level
would not be a better solution than the one presently being proposed.
“Focusing on the regional level is hardly conceivable under the present
circumstances”, says the study, with reference to the underdeveloped
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regional and sub-regional administrative structures. Despite its heavy
insistence on a number of regional programmes, the Polish Country Study
also indicates acceptance of the “country approach” saying that priority
should be given to growth since the regional imbalances can be seen as
temporary and will decrease over time when adequate economic reforms
have been implemented. The Slovak study emphasises that the public
administration reform and the fiscal and administrative decentralisation has
not yet reached the stage necessary for supporting the socio-economic
development of the regions. The Czech Country Study calls attention to
the need for clearly defining horizontal themes, an idea which is mainly
compatible with a national approach to ECP. It also explicitly endorses the
recommendations of the Sapir report even if that would lead to a “certain
re-nationalisation of Cohesion Policy” (see in chapter 6, section 6.6.6).
9.4.3 The amount of funds and the co-financing issue.
Regarding the total amount of funds to be allocated for ECP in the
Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the Slovak Country Study says that they
would be happy with maintaining what they see as the present allocation,
which represents 0.45 per cent of GNI. The Polish Study states that they
could accept an overall budget of one per cent of GNI provided that this
did not mean that funds for ECP would be “crowded out”. The Czech
Country Study believes that this would be the case, however, and expresses
a mild dissatisfaction with the assessment method: the total amount of the
ECP allocation should be decided through a bottom-up approach and
estimated according to the objectives of each new Member State. 
As was mentioned above, the conflict between the needs to implement
budgetary reforms and restructuring of public expenditure in order to meet
the Maastricht criteria and the co-financing requirements transcends all the
Country Studies. Whereas the Country Studies of Hungary and Poland
admit that they would be in a position to meet the requirements also in the
future despite the “alarming” (Poland) budgetary situation, they, as well as
the other studies, advocate a loosening of the co-financing regulations.
This could take the form either of moving more resources to the cohesion
fund or by allowing private financing to be counted as national co-
financing or by otherwise changing the proposed rules for estimating the
requirements (see above). 
A more dynamic proposal is contained in the Hungarian Country Study
which suggests a direct coupling between the macro-economic criteria and
the co-financing requirements. The larger the extent to which a country
would meet the Maastricht criteria, the easier would be the co-financing
requirements.
All Country Studies, except the Czech study, discuss the so called four per
cent cap. The most common approach is to propose that certain policy
areas should be excluded from the cap: environmental and infrastructure
investments says the Latvian Country Study, territorial co-operation and
rural development says the Slovak Study while the Polish one opts for both
rural development and development of fishery industries to be excluded.120
The Latvian Study argues that the rule is unfair towards poorer countries
where the needs are correspondingly larger. National divergence will thus
be maintained, argues the study, which admits that a complete cancelling
of the four per cent cap rule is impossible for political reasons. The
Latvian as well as the Slovak Country Study argue in favour of using more
realistic GDP growth data when estimating future allocations. 
9.4.4 ECP priorities as defined in the Country Studies
Development of human resources 
All country studies unanimously stress the overwhelming need to develop
domestic human resources through education and training at different
levels. This is no doubt the strongest tenor through all the studies even if
the proposals vary in detail and concretisation.
The Latvian Country Study points to human resource development as an
investment which will not distort markets and will allow the economy to
grow faster also in the future without additional subsidies. The Hungarian
Country Study blames, at least partly, the “educational level of the society”
for the lack of multiplier effects and absorption capacity and emphasises
the need to strengthen the human capacity at the NUTS 2 regions which,
as we have seen above, remain mainly a statistical construction. The Czech
Country Study notes that almost half of the total number of unemployed
are job seekers without secondary education and that it is necessary to
adapt the human resources to the labour market conditions and infra-
structure development. The necessity to improve IT and language skills in
the public sector is mentioned. But the core of the consideration in the
Czech Study is that a much stronger connection between the private sector
and the educational institutions must be established (see chapter 6, section
6.6.7, subsection on Innovation, R&D and technology). There should be a
focus on practical skills, including project management, teamwork and
communication skills as well as problem solving and implementation of
solutions in an industrial environment. To this effect educational institu-
tions from other Member States should be encouraged to establish depart-
ments within the Czech Republic.
Human resources and education is one of the four priority areas defined in
the “Competitiveness Strategy of Slovakia until 2010”. The intention is to
increase the flexibility on the labour market, to reduce unemployment and
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120 It would seem that both the Slovak and the Polish Country Studies have a good point: it
seems illogical to transfer the rural development funds to from ECP to CAP but still count
them against the four per cent cap on Structural Funds!
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the risk of exclusion of the most vulnerable groups. The Roma community
is explicitly mentioned.
The Polish Country Study discusses the theme of human resources,
education and training at great length (see chapter 4, sections 4.5.1 and
4.5.2). After stating the necessity to improve human capital through
improved primary and secondary education, life-long learning and social
initiatives, the study goes on to discuss shortcomings in and proposals for
reform of the educational system. Differences in access to educational
opportunities and in their quality between rural and urban areas would
increase regional divergences since regions with a better educated popula-
tion have a greater growth potential, among other things because they are
more attractive for foreign investors. Those regional differences would
worsen rather than improve because of the secondary and multiplier
effects. Financing remains the greatest constraint on improving the educa-
tional system. The study supports a certain centralisation of the system.
The authors also point to the risk of a backwash effect (or brain drain) and
emphasise that life-long learning procedures are less susceptible to such
negative effects. The Polish Country Study explicitly recommends that the
ECP framework should be strengthened with a Common Education Policy
objective with the same priority and financial resources as environmental
or regional policy.
The issue of social exclusion, which is mentioned under objective of
regional competitiveness and employment in the Commission’s proposal
(COM 2004, section 2.2), has to some extent been successfully handled by
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Poland. Since those NGOs to
a large extent are dependent on government subsidies they have been hit
by budget cuts. The Polish Country Study sees those NGOs as suitable
agents for ECP financed projects under this objective (see chapter 4,
section 4.5.2).
One item which is not discussed under this heading in the Country
Studies, but which, nevertheless, belongs in the field of Human Resources,
is what we might call political culture. This concept is discussed in the
Hungarian Country Study but permeates implicitly the discussion of
administrative and managerial capability as well as the absorption,
implementation and monitoring capacity in most of the other contributions.
We do not think that this is the place to define and discuss this particular
issue except by noting that most Eastern European Member States have a
heavy heritage from previous regimes in this respect. An item pro
memoriam should, without doubt, be entered on the agenda for the design
of the future ECP.
Research and Development
All country studies have endorsed the Lisbon objectives and expressed
their intention to move towards a “knowledge based economy”121 and the
need to focus on investment in research and development in this
perspective. The Polish Country Study regrets that its Government does not
actively support basic research (apparently, it is not even mentioned in the
development plan for 2007-2013) but puts all emphasis on applied,
“commercial”, research with the argument that only close cooperation be-
tween research and industry can give optimal results. Information tech-
nology is thus given a clear preference. The Country Study argues that
there must be a balance between basic and applied research and that all
opportunities to receive ECP support for both should be exhausted.
The link between industry and research is also stressed in the Czech
Country Study. This study appears very conscious of the risk that the
creation of high technology growth poles may aggravate regional im-
balances. The backwash effect that was mentioned above is also discussed.
The Slovak Country Study points to the formidable challenge of the
national strategy plan, which advocates a shift towards a knowledge-based
economy and an information society with emphasis on research and
innovation. The Strategy document wants to achieve this through education
and support of scientists, internationally competitive research in cooperation
with industry and effective public support of business activities aimed at
research and innovations. 
Cross-border cooperation
Both the Slovak and the Hungarian Country Studies underscore the
importance of cross-border cooperation and projects. For Slovakia this
would be an instrument for combating long-term unemployment and it is
the cross-country integration of labour markets that is in the centre of
interest. The Hungarian Country Study goes much further and proposes a
new objective for the ECP, namely Cross-border infrastructure and
environment protection for the new Member States (chapter 5, section 5.7,
“The need for a new budget line: Trans-border infrastructure and en-
vironment in the new Member States”). Hungary and all the Eastern Euro-
pean Member States will need a highly developed infrastructure in order to
reap full benefit from their geographical location. But it is important that
those investments be coordinated between the new Member States.
Transport arteries should not be confined only to the east-west direction
but also within and between the new Member States, thus also in the
north-south direction.122 According to the Hungarian Country Study a new
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121 See our reservations expressed in footnote 118.
122 Given the rather westward location of the Czech Republic those expressions should be seen
metaphorically rather than as exact geographical signs of direction…
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European policy objective could help to prevent national prestige projects
and have a great and expedient impact on growth. Such an objective could
become an instrument for avoiding what the study calls “narrow-minded
and selfish bargaining”. In the opinion of the Hungarian study the
introduction of this objective would also send a political message to the
not-yet-Member countries that they are not being neglected by the Union –
they could even participate in some of the projects. Financing should, at
least partly, come from other national fund allocations and the projects
under this objective would have a considerable European Added Value123
which would benefit also the net payer countries. According to the
Hungarian proposal, this objective would fall under the Cohesion Fund,
thus easing the co-financing burden for the new Member States.
Regional convergence as a priority?
Regional convergence is an established part of the EU policy and goes way
back to the Treaty of Rome. It must, in this quality, always be at the heart
of the common Structural and Cohesion Policy of the Union, irrespective
of how particular objectives are formulated and specific instruments de-
signed. Against this background, it is striking that only the Czech con-
tribution explicitly mentions regional convergence as a priority for the
future and, even there, it is set in the context of increasing occupational
and geographical mobility of the labour force. The importance of the
regional convergence objective is self-evident but it is also clear that the
Country Studies emphasise horizontal, growth stimulating, themes as de-
velopment of human resources, research and development, institution
building and even trans-border cooperation.
9.5 The conclusions: a simplified and growth oriented
Cohesion Policy for the new Member States
So far, this chapter has summed up the experiences of five new Member
States in their participation in the various forms of European Cohesion
Policy, both before and after accession (Section 9.2). We have tried to
identify the dangers and risks for the future that are imminent if the
present system remains unchanged, even taking the proposed reforms into
account (Section 9.3). Finally we have summed up what the Country
Studies have identified as the most urgent priorities for the ECP if current
structures and conditionalities were relaxed: section 9.4 shows that those
priorities to a significant extent deviate from those of the current proposal
which is being negotiated between all Member States. We underline, once
more, that this is the result of an analysis made by independent experts
which may or may not be identical with the official positions of the
governments in question. 
123 For an in depth analysis of this concept; see Tarschys (2005).
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124 Objective 5 was split into two sub-objectives.
In this section we go one step further and try to list certain elements that
could be discussed for inclusion in a revised ECP framework, better suited
to the particular needs of the New Eastern European Member States. It
should be stressed that whereas those elements are derived from the five
Country Studies, the participating institutes are not individually responsible
for this summary assessment of the present ECP or for the suggestions for
a reformulation. We offer these proposals, however, as an input to the
discussion of the Cohesion Policy in the new Member States which we are
convinced will continue for a long period to come.
9.5.1Too many goals for the Cohesion Policy?
In a study from 2003, D. Tarschys discusses the omnipresence and multi-
finality of Structural Policy. Structural policy has been present in the
policy areas transport, environment, research, employment, agriculture,
competition, urban affairs and even peace. Structural Policy has also been
very rich in goals, for instance, the well-known 7 objectives,124 later
“simplified” to 3 objectives and 4 Community Initiatives. Transcending
this structure of goals and policies, according to Tarschys, are 3 “layers of
purposes”, the first one of which is the compensatory motive (Structural
Funds used as a resource to “buy out” countries in a negotiation situation),
the second motive relates to convergence and cohesion and a third one
which relates to institutional and attitudinal side-effects. The latter motive
includes institution and capacity building as well as involving greater parts
of the society in the European integration project.
This multidimensional structure of the policy itself has led to a congestion
of goals, that is to say there are many instruments for many objectives
(Sapir et al. 2003, section 1.3, et passim). Normally, maximum efficiency
is considered to be attained when there is one instrument for one goal.
Obviously, this can never be achieved in a political context as complicated
as the EU. But the Commission is aware of the problem and views its
proposal for 2007-2013 as “a simplified and more transparent framework”
(COM 2004, section 2) that would lead to increased efficiency in the
Cohesion Policy. The proposal states: “The pursuit of the priority themes
would be organised around a simplified and more transparent framework
with the future generation of programmes grouped under three headings:
convergence; regional competitiveness and employment; territorial co-
operation.”
After this courageous statement of intention, politics obviously kicked in.
Figure 9.1, which utilises the original wording of the proposal, shows that
the goal congestion is very far from being eliminated. It is not easy to
orient oneself among these objectives, key themes, headings, priorities,
focus, responses and key principles. The modalities for financing the
policy from three different funds is yet another dimension which is not
included in the schematic presentation in figure 9.1.
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Despite the ambitious attempts to simplify the ECP system we seem to
have ended up with a proposal that is at least as multi-faceted as the old
one. This in itself is the result of a long development process, practically
since the initiation of the European Union where every enlargement has
led to modifications of the system in order to accommodate both the new
and old Membership (Tarschys 2003a). With the Eastern Enlargement,
however, new Member States were more or less faced with a fait accompli
and a very entangled one at that.
9.5.2 The goal congestion leads to policy taking –
fund maximisation as an objective
The five Country Studies must clearly be seen against the backdrop
described in the preceding sections. The participating institutes have, to a
considerable extent, focused on different dimensions of the proposed ECP.
Some discuss obstacles raised by modalities and procedures, others focus
on difficulties to get access to available funds and in utilising them, yet
other themes are the conditionalities, notably the co-financing require-
ments, and the design of the operational programmes: should they be
“horizontal” or rather perhaps “regional”? The various objectives, themes
and priorities proposed are somehow taken for granted: one or two studies
discuss at great length how to use the allocated ECP-funds with much less
emphasis on what the funds should be used for. With some exceptions, the
attitude is one of policy taking rather than policy making. This has
pointedly been summed up by one of the studies as a strategy of “making
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sure that no money is lost”. One study concludes with great insight:
“Integration strategy has been largely replaced by concentrating on the
highest possible absorption of potential EU funds… This, however, means
that objectives and instruments have been confused. EU transfers are a
vital factor of successful membership and sustainable modernisation. How-
ever, at the end of the day, they are instruments and not objectives in them-
selves” (chapter 5, section 5.8.2, point 6).
It can easily be derived from the Country Studies that the omnipresence
and multifinality, to borrow the terms of Tarschys, of the European
Structural and Cohesion Policy are largely responsible for this attitude in
the receiving countries. All through the Country Studies the call for
simplification and flexibility is strong and impossible to ignore. We can
also draw this conclusion from the sections of the Country Studies that
discuss priorities for the future which could be implemented if current
conditions and conditionalities were relaxed. The goals of strengthening
human resources, increasing the level of Research and Development,
continued institution building, particularly at the regional level, and cross-
border cooperation appear as overall and common objectives. These are
sub-goals of the overall objective to achieve growth according to the
Lisbon principles and would accelerate the process of national convergence
within the EU. The results should be achieved through more national
control over policy and resources. 
To achieve a true simplification of the goal structure of the ECP is probably
impossible, at least in the short and medium term, due to the great number
of interests involved and the character of policy formulation by bargaining.
If this is so, the aim of all concerned must instead be to allow for
maximum flexibility and concentration within the existing policy structure.
9.5.3 Focus on the neediest countries.
More national control over the Cohesion Policy
Some of the receiving countries, and some of the net payers, favour a
national approach to the Cohesion Policy instead of a regional one. A
couple of Country Studies express that a cohesion policy focusing on the
poorest countries, instead of the poorest regions, would be acceptable. This
is also one of the recommendations of the Sapir report which points out
that individual countries could delegate the responsibility for programme
implementation to regions wherever possible. From the Country Studies we
can, for instance, infer that this might not be a good idea in Hungary with
its artificial NUTS 2 classification but on the other hand be exactly in line
with the intentions in Poland, both as expressed by the government and in
the opinion of the experts.
A strong caveat appears, nevertheless, in the studies that speak favourably
of a possible national approach: since the strongest advocates for such an
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approach are to be found among countries that also encourage heavy
budget restrictions, there may be a risk that it will be used as an excuse for
reducing the resources allocated to Structural Policy in the new Member
States.
A policy that focuses on income divergences between the Member States
rather than between the regions would seem to satisfy net payers at the
same time as it would give the receiving countries an increased control and
influence over the Cohesion Policy. It would also be in line with various
theoretical considerations125 and with the conclusion of the Sapir report.
It seems somewhat prejudiced to label a policy focusing on national
growth as “re-nationalisation”, as has sometimes been done. An old term
from development economics “redistribution with growth” immediately
springs to mind. But it would be the responsibility of the individual
Member States to take the measures for internal redistribution – measures
that surely would be different from country to country depending on the
special circumstances. The wish for such flexibility is also something that
very clearly emerges from most Country Studies.
As was shown in chapter 3, all new Member States have some specific
problem regions created mainly by historical causes. A special ECP
programme for those problem regions might be considered.
9.5.4 Human resource development and institution building –
the overriding priorities
The development of human resources takes pride of place in most Country
Studies. There are two different aspects to this. On the one hand, such a
development is one of the most important factors for long-term growth,
welfare and European Cohesion. On the other hand, in the short run a
considerable and rapid lift in managerial, administrative and technical
levels is required in order to ensure an optimal use of the resources made
available through the ECP and other EU-programmes. It may be left to the
responsibility of the Member countries to find the right mix between basic
and higher education, life-long learning and vocational training, presum-
ably monitored by the Commission.
In the Commission’s proposal for a Financial Perspective 2007-2013,
education and training is mainly covered by Heading 1a “Competitiveness
and growth of employment” which is allocated around ten per cent of the
EU budget according to the proposal. The possibilities to finance human
resource development through the ECP are limited to projects financed by
the ESF and subject to higher co-financing requirements than the Cohesion
Fund. Part of the ESF is also used for the Regional Competitiveness
125 For a review of current theoretical as well as policy making discussion see Richter (2005),
section 1, p. 24 ff.
Objective and hence out of reach for those regions that qualify for
Cohesion assistance. The Country Studies bear overwhelming evidence
that a re-orientation of the ECP so that Human Resource Development
would become a major priority would be a substantial step towards
meeting the Lisbon objectives as well as towards national convergence.
The other theme which clearly emerges from the studies is Research and
Development. It is important that a balance between basic and applied
research be found. Research and Development are covered under Heading
1a in the present proposal. Other items under this heading are, in addition
to education and training, promotion of the competitiveness of enterprises,
EU networks and management of change. It is not considered as a part of
the Cohesion Policy.
Some net payers strongly insist on the co-called “excellence” criterion for
support to R&D projects, that is to say funds should not be allocated as
national envelopes but be used where their impact is the greatest. While
this may seem a reasonable approach, it might mean, together with other
considerations mentioned above, that the scope for Research and Develop-
ment projects, particularly with respect to basic research, may become
very limited and unevenly distributed between the Member States.126
Institution building is already one of the main objectives of the ECP.
Perhaps the most telling conclusion from the experience from the pre-
accession support is that by no means is this phase over in the new
Member States. Even if considerable progress has been made and there are
many successful projects to report, it is clear that the administrative and
managerial capacity, particularly at regional and local levels still leaves a
lot to wish for. This could become a major obstacle for a successful
implementation of the future ECP. 
The Sapir report recommends the ECP to continue the institution building
activities. They go hand in hand with education and training, particularly
short-term efforts to improve managerial and administrative capabilities at
the regional and local levels. It is not mentioned in the Country Studies,
but the obvious difficulties for small entrepreneurs to participate in the
ECP due to formal requirements at all stages of the project cycle would
make support to Chambers of Commerce and Entrepreneurial Associations
and other service organs an area of high priority in the institution building.
Whereas the actual existence of institutions and regulations in the new
Member States can be measured relatively easily, their intrinsic quality and
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126 Before the breakdown of the negotiations on the future Financial Perspective there seems to
have been a general tendency to squeeze out funds proposed under heading 1a, that is to
say to further reduce the possibilities of financing HRD and research thus underlining the
arguments of this chapter.
efficiency is much harder to assess. This transpired very clearly from the
strategy papers and screening reports that were issued before the acces-
sion.127 The Country Studies confirm that those problems remain important
obstacles for cohesion even if much progress has been made, particularly
through the pre-accession support. Institution building and development of
human resources therefore remain perhaps the most important condition
for the success of the future ECP in the new Member States. 
9.5.5 Cooperation and coordination between the
new Member States
European Added Value has become a guiding principle for deciding which
programmes or projects should be supported by EU resources. This can in
a sense be seen as the mirror image of the subsidiarity principle, but
whereas that principle defines in a negative way what should not be done
at the European level, the European Added Value concept defines, in a
positive way, what could or should be done at that level.128 Intuitively, one
would feel that the proposal for cross-border cooperation, particularly
when it comes to coordinating the construction of transport networks in the
new Member States would be well qualified according to this criterion.
Some Country Studies also echo this observation. A proposal has been
made for setting-up of a new community priority for cross-border infra-
structure and environment protection investments, targeted explicitly at the
Central European region. In the words of another study, those investments
would be more efficient than national infrastructure programmes which are
often designed and implemented in line with narrow national (domestic
policy or simply prestige driven) interests.129
9.5.6 Simplification and more flexibility
We let the wealth of proposals and observations concerning simplifications
and other changes in the system stand as they have been voiced in the
Country Studies. Many of them are expressions of a natural desire to
obtain as much funds as possible at as easy conditions as possible. But
many others indicate a genuine dissatisfaction with what is felt to be
unnecessary bureaucracy and mistrust on the part of the Commission and
also a perceived lack of understanding for the special conditions of the
New Eastern European Member States. There is an obvious goal conflict
between the need to progress towards the ERM criteria on the one hand
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127 For a discussion of the risks of an erosion of the Union connected with the enlargement,
see Karlsson (2002), section 9.3.
128 A recent Sieps study entitled “The Enigma of European Added Value: Setting Priorities in
the European Union” suggests how the concept can be used as a tool for policy choices;
see Tarschys (2005).
129 See Inotai, A. (reference 2004b in chapter 5) as quoted in Richter 2005. See also chapter 5,
particularly section 5.7.
and the co-financing requirements on the other.130 There are no easy ways
out of this dilemma except to say that the situation calls for maximum
flexibility. It provides yet another argument for taking a national approach
to the future ECP and, to the extent possible, leaving it to the receiving
countries to decentralise and delegate the responsibilities for regional
implementation of the ECP. 
9.5.7 An adaptation of the ECP to the needs of the
new Member States
A re-definition and re-orientation of the ECP along the lines that emerge as
desirable from the Country Studies and which we have tried to summarise
and concretise in this chapter would go a long way towards meeting the
stated ECP objectives of merging the Lisbon, Gothenburg and Cohesion
objectives. We also believe, and that is perhaps the most important thing,
that it would greatly facilitate the move of the new Member States from
being policy takers to becoming active participants in and developers of the
true European Cohesion Process. EU transfers are a vital factor of success-
ful membership and sustainable modernisation, says one Country Study and
continues to underline that each Member state must define its longer term
role in the rapidly changing global environment and within the enlarged and
enlarging EU. Only so can the main objectives be defined for which
financial support from the Union should be sought.
However, to formulate the essential priorities that have emerged from the
Country Studies as ECP objectives in their own right, might require a
fundamental restructuring of the present goal and implementation
structures. A focus on human resource development, institution building
and research and development might require a regrouping of items
between headings in the current Commission proposal as well as – and this
is obvious – a shift in the distribution of available resources between
different objectives. Basic questions such as whether the focus should be
on national or regional convergence or the relation between co-financing
requirements and macroeconomic stabilisation may find answers that differ
from those presently given. 
This is being written after that the negotiations on the future Financial
Perspective broke down during the Luxembourg Presidency. The UK has
expressed its ambition to reach an agreement during its Presidency, that is
to say, before the end of 2005. At this moment it is impossible to form a
well founded opinion as to whether this might succeed or not. So far,
however, the most important areas of conflict appear to have been the
agricultural policy as well as the system of financing with the UK rebate
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130 For an overview of the various co-financing requirements, see Richter (2005),
chapter 1, p. 9 ff.
as a major bone of contention. Much less attention seems to have been
devoted to the Structural and Cohesion Policy.
A recent study (Richter 2005, published in May 2005; see in particular
chapter 6) gave us an overview of the negotiation positions of a number of
Member States, based on what is officially known. As pointed out in that
study, the bulk of the negotiation documents are not available to the public
or for research purposes. But, together with what is commonly known
about the negotiations, it would seem quite fair to characterise them as
having been fully focussed on the amount of funds, the methods for
allocation of funds between countries (for instance the so called “Berlin
method”), the periods and eligibility for phasing out regions from cohesion
support and, certainly not the least, the existence, abolishment or
modification of the four per cent cap on cohesion support. 
As far as the European Cohesion Policy is concerned the postponement of
an agreement offers not only an opportunity but poses a necessity to open
up a fundamental discussion of the objectives and instruments of the
policy. In that discussion the needs and priorities of the new Member
States as they have been illustrated in this study should be placed at the
centre of attention. 
We might add another, more short-term consideration. Should a financial
agreement be delayed, the question of the inflow of resources to the new
Member States and of their net positions may become an acute problem.
We can assume that this would lead to a renewed discussion of the ECP
system and strong demands for immediate simplifications and more
flexibility. Even in such a scenario, the conclusions of the present study,
based on the experience of a number of Member States and on the opinion
of independent country experts, could play a role in the deliberations.
Finally: Our conclusions also open up a much wider question: how should
we really conceptualise cohesion at the European level? In chapter 2 we
discussed an attempt to widen the perspective of the concept from the
strict economic and social aspects to include also a political and a cultural
dimension (see chapter 2, section 2.1.2). We do not have to discuss here
the so politically sensitive issue of the deepest purpose of the international
cooperation within the framework of the European Union but can refer to
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, according to Tarschys (2005)
“was a quality leap in the direction of converting the union into a
community of values. ’Die Union ist nicht nur Wirtschaft und Währung,
sondern auch Werte’ – that was how this idea was expressed in German,
with better alliteration than any other language could offer.” Maybe the
future Cohesion Policy should contribute more to this community of values
by giving more weight to the political and above all cultural dimensions of
European Cohesion. Were this to be achieved, much else would follow.
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SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING
Utvidgningen av den Europeiska unionen (EU) 2004 innebar att en ny
dimension lades till den europeiska struktur- och sammanhållningspoli-
tiken. Medlemskapet hade för dessa länder föregåtts av långa förhandlingar
om anslutninsvillkoren, men det fanns litet utrymme för dem att påverka
politiken som sådan.
Föreliggande studie vänder på perspektivet: även om de nya medlemslän-
derna presenterades inför fullbordat faktum avseende struktur- och sam-
manhållningspolitiken, borde medlemskapet ha inneburit att dessa länder
gick från att vara policy takers till att bli policy makers. Denna bok disku-
terar i vilken omfattning den nuvarande och föreslagna sammanhållnings-
politiken är kompatibel med de nya medlemmarnas behov och preferenser.
Forskare från fem forskningsinstitut i Lettland, Polen, Slovakien, Tjeckien
och Ungern har ombetts att undersöka och beskriva; erfarenheterna från
föranslutningsstöden i deras respektive länder; de problem och kontrover-
ser som uppstod i samband med medlemskapsförhandlingarna; vilka pro-
blem som är förenade med den aktuella och den föreslagna sammanhåll-
ningspolitiken; samt att skilja ut vilka prioriteringar som skulle råda om
landet ifråga kunde styra politiken på egen hand.
Målet för den europeiska sammanhållningspolitiken är att frambringa
ekonomisk och social sammanhållning mellan unionens regioner. Men
ekonomisk tillväxt är ofta koncentrerad kring tillväxtregioner. Empiriska
data ger stöd för att så är fallet, i synnerhet i de snabbt växande ekonomi-
erna i central- och östeuropa, där tillväxten är koncentrerad kring huvud-
stadsregionerna. De regionala skillnaderna, som är större än i EU15, ökade
dessutom i samband med att tillväxten tog fart på 1990-talet. Vi kan därför
se att det finns en implicit motsättning i sammanhållningspolitiken; mellan
nationell sammanhållning å ena sidan och regional sammanhållning å den
andra.
Erfarenheter av föranslutningsstöden
Föranslutningsstöden har överlag haft positiva effekter i de nya medlems-
länderna, men de har också medfört problem av varierande grad. Till
exempel har stöden inte lyckats förbereda Lettland tillräckligt väl för mot-
tagandet av stöd från struktur- och sammanhållningsfonderna och i Polen
var programmen ofta otillräckliga, även om de tycks ha haft en viss effekt
även där. Ett annat problemexempel var ISPA-stöden i Ungern, där beto-
ningen på miljömässiga aspekter innebar att EU var motvilliga till att satsa
resurser på en modernisering av det ungerska vägnätet och istället ville
satsa på rehabilitering av järnvägsnätet. Det senare exemplet är dock ett
undantag eftersom ISPA generellt sett får gott betyg i de olika länder-
studierna. 
Ett gemensamt drag i de fem länderstudierna är att föranslutningsstöden
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sällan kunde påverkas nationellt. Inhemska myndigheter blev konsulterade
snarare än att spela en aktiv roll i processen. Resultatet var att mottagarna
huvudsakligen bekymrade sig om att se till att inga resurser från EU:s
fonder gick förlorade.
Den viktigaste slutsatsen av användandet av föranslutningsstöden är emel-
lertid att en rad institutionella och administrativa tillkortakommanden har
avslöjats hos mottagarna. Det finns också indikationer om att dessa svag-
heter finns kvar och kommer att bestå under en avsevärd tid framöver. Den
slutsats detta föranleder är att resurser måste föras till för att kontinuerligt
reformera administration och lagstiftning samt att satsa på träning och ut-
bildning på flera nivåer i de nya medlemsländerna. Om dessa förbättringar
inte kommer till stånd kommer övergången från policy takers till policy
makers att bli svår och den praktik som för närvarande råder – det vill
säga att säkra så mycket av EU:s resurser som möjligt – att fortsätta en bra
tid framöver.
Sammanhållningspolitiken idag
De villkor som finns inbyggda i den samtida – och även den föreslagna –
sammanhållningspolitiken implicerar flera problem för mottagarna av
strukturfondsstöden. För det första föreligger en uppenbar målkonflikt i att
samtidigt behöva uppfylla villkoren för medfinansiering i struktur- och
sammanhållningsfonderna och att möta de krav på budgetdisciplin som
följer av Maastrichtkriterierna. Denna målkonflikt kan dock ha positiva
sidoeffekter, eftersom den kan tvinga fram budgetreformer i de nya
medlemsländerna. Vidare är det också problematiskt att decentralisera led-
ning och förvaltning av projekt finansierade genom struktur- och samman-
hållningsfonderna och att samtidigt tvinga stödmottagarna att uppfylla de
krav som finns inbyggda i förberedelser, förslag och utbetalningar av och
inom ett projekt. Den mängd dokument som är förenade med varje projekt,
tillsammans med EU:s ut- och återbetalningsregler, sätter press på framför
allt mindre företag och kommuner och kan leda till svåra likviditetskriser.
Ett annat problem, som under lång tid har följt struktur- och sammanhåll-
ningspolitiken, riskerar att särskilt drabba de nya medlemsstaterna. Det
anses generellt att maximal effektivitet uppnås genom att ha ett instrument
för varje mål, men i och med att EU försöker agera på för många områden
har man landat i en situation med för många instrument för att uppnå för
många mål. Detta är sannolikt också förklaringen till den nu rådande atti-
tyden, där mottagare av strukturfondsstöden framför allt agerar så att man
inte går miste om bidrag. Problem tycks kvarstå trots de förenklingsförsök
som kan ses i förslagen till framtida sammanhållningspolitik. Transfere-
ringarna inom EU är kritiska för ett framgångsrikt medlemskap och hållbar
modernisering, men det är viktigt att påpeka att struktur- och sammanhåll-
ningsfonderna är instrument och inte mål i sig.
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Den framtida sammanhållningspolitiken
Länderstudierna visar att önskemålen i de nya medlemsstaterna skiljer sig
avsevärt från de mål och prioriteringar som anges i förslaget till den fram-
tida sammanhållningspolitiken. För det första finns samstämmighet om att
man i framtiden bör tillåta en högre grad av nationell kontroll. En majo-
ritet av kapitlen ställer sig dessutom välvilliga till att låta politiken vara
nationell snarare än styrd på EU-nivå. I praktiken innebär detta att sam-
manhållningspolitiken i framtiden skulle koncentrera sig på de minst ut-
vecklade länderna snarare än de minst utvecklade regionerna. Därmed
skulle prioritet ges åt den ekonomiska tillväxten eftersom regionala klyftor
kan ses som temporära och kan lindras genom omfördelningar på nationell
nivå. För det andra finns det ett mycket starkt behov av att satsa på så kal-
lad HR-utveckling (human resource development), det vill säga att satsa på
träning och utbildning på olika nivåer. Denna typ av investering är särskilt
fördelaktig då den inte snedvrider marknader och dessutom tillåter att
ekonomin växer utan ytterligare subventioner. För det tredje finns ett stort
behov av att förenkla regelsystemet i sammanhållningspolitiken samt att
göra den mer flexibel. Detta är inte minst viktigt mot bakgrund av tillstå-
ndet i många av de nya medlemsstaternas regioner. För det fjärde kan för-
slaget att endast tillåta en fond för varje mål innebära att möjliga synergi-
effekter av att kunna finansiera ett program med flera fonder går förlorade.
Ytterligare en aspekt som kan läggas till denna lista, även om den betonas
olika starkt i olika kapitel, är behovet av samordning och samarbete mellan
de nya medlemsstaterna. Även om det är uppenbart att det krävs en bra in-
frastruktur för att möjliggöra hög och kontinuerlig ekonomisk tillväxt,
skulle en koordinerad ansats innebära att de nya medlemmarna kunde dra
större fördel av deras geografiska läge.
Slutsatser
Följande slutsatser dras i studien:
• Föranslutningsstöden har fungerat väl när det gäller att förbereda de
nya medlemmarna inför EU-medlemskapet, men de har också avslöjat
institutionella tillkortakommanden som till stor del kommer att finnas
kvar framöver. Resurser krävs därför för kontinuerlig reformering av
administration och lagstiftning samt utbildning på flera nivåer.
• Fokus bör ligga på de speciella behoven hos de nya medlemsstaterna
och en högre grad av nationell kontroll över politiken bör införas. Om
fokus skiftade från skillnader mellan regioner till skillnader mellan
medlemsstater skulle detta sannolikt både tillfredsställa EU:s nettobe-
talare och ge nettomottagarna ökad kontroll över politiken. Det skulle
också vara i linje med olika teoretiska hänsynstaganden.
• HR-utveckling och institutionell uppbyggnad (institution building) bör
prioriteras. HR-utveckling är en av de viktigaste faktorerna för lång-
siktig tillväxt, välfärd och sammanhållning. Institutionell uppbyggnad
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är förvisso redan ett prioriterat område i sammanhållningspolitiken,
men det är viktigt att påpeka att denna utvecklingsfas är långt ifrån
passerad i de nya medlemmarna. Även om betydande framsteg har
gjorts står det klart att den administrativa kapaciteten, i synnerhet på
lokal och regional nivå, ofta är otillräcklig. Detta kan i sig bli ett
hinder för en framgångsrik framtida sammanhållningspolitik.
• Samarbete och samordning mellan de nya medlemsstaterna är viktigt.
Samordnade investeringar är mer effektiva än nationella investeringar,
som ofta sker med snäva nationella hänsynstaganden.
• Förenklingar och en högre grad flexibilitet är önskvärda, inte minst på
grund av målkonflikten mellan att samtidigt medfinansiera struktur-
fondsstöden och att uppfylla Maastrichkriterierna. Det finns ett utbrett
missnöje över vad som upplevs som onödig byråkrati och misstro från
Europeiska kommissionens sida och också en upplevd brist på förstå-
else för de speciella villkor som råder i de nya medlemsländerna. Detta
är ytterligare ett argument för att ha en nationell ansats i sammanhåll-
ningspolitiken.
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